

think a great segment of our people wonder whether the question really does not boil down to this, namely, whether the Chief Executive or whether the Congress of the United States shall have something to say as to when this Nation should go to war, or whether a Chief Executive can throw the Nation into a serious conflict of arms and say where our armies shall be sent on foreign fields before we are in an actual war, under this pact.

It is a serious matter to my way of thinking, to establish a precedent that the Chief Executive alone should have the sole right of determining and proceeding in a manner which might involve the Nation in a war. We cannot absolutely discount this grave possibility. It would seem to me that the Congress, particularly the United States Senate, has a great responsibility to share and discharge in this respect. That is what I think was contemplated at the time we discussed on this floor the representations which were made at the time the Atlantic Pact was under discussion, that the Congress would have to decide about implementing the pact. Certainly we should not permit any Chief Executive to have this responsibility alone, either by precedent or by an overt act which we do not challenge. The people of the United States are entitled to have the additional safeguard of action by the Congress. I propose to do my best to see that they get it.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me say that I do not feel that Senate Resolution 99 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 10 go far enough. Neither has the force and effect of organic law. I shall not vote for either of these resolutions, and I shall endeavor to vote, if given an opportunity, to assert the right of the Congress of the United States to pass upon the question of sending American forces abroad, where they are to become an integral part of an international army. In doing so, I feel that it is keeping within the spirit and the representations made to the people and to the Senate at the time the North Atlantic Pact was being debated.

RECESS

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, under the order previously entered, I now move that the Senate take a recess until 10 o'clock a. m. on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 46 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess, the recess being, under the order entered on March 21, 1951, until Monday, April 2, 1951, at 10 o'clock a. m.

CONFIRMATION

Executive nomination confirmed by the Senate March 30 (legislative day of March 26), 1951:

IN THE ARMY

Maj. Gen. Paul Henry Streit, O6254, Army of the United States (brigadier general, Medical Corps, U. S. Army), for appointment as major general, Medical Corps, in the Regular Army of the United States, under the provisions of title V of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

SENATE

MONDAY, APRIL 2, 1951

(Legislative day of Monday, March 26, 1951)

The Senate met at 10 o'clock a. m., on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Our Father God, at this our morning shrine of prayer, turning from all the turmoil and chaos without, we would look within, at our own lives, knowing that out of the heart are the issues of life.

We come to this session with a vivid sense that the cause of freedom is one around the whole wide world. Thou knowest that we think with gratitude of the great nation whose blood has mingled with ours on battlefields of freedom and whose President comes to us today as the seal of our common unity, even as Lafayette symbolized the aid of France in the testing days when our Nation was born. Together, in these new times that try our souls, when our common freedom is threatened by sinister forces, strengthen the hands of our two nations to hold aloft the flaming torch of liberty enlightening the world, defending the things more precious than life itself, we raise the ancient battle cry: "Man is man, and who is more?" In the name of that One whose truth alone makes men free. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. McFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, March 30, 1951, was dispensed with.

ASSIGNMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO DUTY IN THE EUROPEAN AREA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution (S. Res. 99) approving the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defense efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Senate Resolution 99 is before the Senate. It is open to amendment.

Mr. WHERRY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Douglas	Holland
Anderson	Duff	Humphrey
Bennett	Dworshak	Hunt
Benton	Eastland	Ives
Brewster	Eaton	Jenner
Bricker	Ellender	Johnson, Colo.
Bridges	Ferguson	Johnson, Tex.
Butler, Md.	Flanders	Johnson, S. C.
Butler, Nebr.	Frear	Kefauver
Byrd	Fulbright	Kerr
Cain	George	Kilgore
Capehart	Gillette	Knowland
Carlson	Green	Langer
Case	Hayden	Lehman
Chavez	Hendrickson	Lodge
Clements	Hennings	Long
Connally	Hickenlooper	McCarthy
Cordon	Hill	McClellan
Dirksen	Hoey	

McFarland	O'Connor	Stennis
McMahon	O'Mahoney	Taft
Malone	Pastore	Thye
Martin	Robertson	Tobey
Maybank	Russell	Underwood
Millikin	Saltonstall	Watkins
Monroney	Schoeppel	Welker
Morse	Smathers	Wherry
Mundt	Smith, Maine	Wiley
Murray	Smith, N. J.	Williams
Neely	Smith, N. C.	Young
Nixon	Sparkman	

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum is present.

The Chair would like to explain for the benefit of Senators the unanimous-consent agreement under which the Senate is operating today.

On any amendment there may be debate of 30 minutes on a side, to be controlled by the proponent of the amendment, in favor of it, and by the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], in opposition to it.

When all amendments shall have been disposed of, there will be an hour on each side for debate on the resolution, the time to be controlled by the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY].

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. CONNALLY. In what order are the amendments to be called up?

The VICE PRESIDENT. They will be called up as Senators who wish to offer them obtain recognition and offer the amendments. The mere fact that they are printed and lying on the table gives none of them priority.

Mr. CONNALLY. Would not a motion to recommit take precedence over an amendment?

The VICE PRESIDENT. A motion to recommit, if one were made, would take precedence over an amendment. Such a motion may be made at any time, up until the final vote on the resolution.

Mr. CONNALLY. Can any Senator call up such a motion or must the one who makes the motion do so?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Any Senator who wishes to do so, and who can obtain recognition, may make a motion to recommit.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. Does a unanimous-consent request have the same value as a motion?

The VICE PRESIDENT. So far as debate on any motion is concerned, it is limited to 30 minutes on a side, just as in the case of debate on an amendment.

Mr. WHERRY. My question was, Does a unanimous-consent request have the same value as a motion? That is to say, if a unanimous-consent request were made, would 30 minutes be assigned to the Senator making the unanimous-consent request?

The VICE PRESIDENT. No. There is no provision in the unanimous-consent agreement for a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I move that in lieu of Senate Resolution 99 the Senate proceed to consider the joint resolution which I shall send to the desk and that the first and second readings required under the rule shall be regarded as having been had.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I make the point of order—

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. A point of order, if made, can be made at any time. As the Chair understands, the Senator from Nebraska wishes to discuss the resolution briefly.

Mr. WHERRY. That is correct.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Nebraska has the floor.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nebraska repeat his statement? I could not hear it.

Mr. WHERRY. I shall be glad to repeat it. However, before I ask for action on the motion I wish to propose a unanimous-consent request. I should like to speak on the unanimous-consent request and the motion in the time allotted for the motion itself. The motion I made was that in lieu of Senate Resolution 99 the Senate proceed to consider the joint resolution which I shall send to the desk in a moment and that the first and second readings required under the rule shall be regarded as having been had.

I will say to my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts that the proposed joint resolution is substantially the same as the resolution we are now considering, Senate Resolution 99, without the "whereases." The only language stricken from the resolution itself is the language "it is the belief of the Senate" in paragraph 2 and the language "it is the sense of the Senate" in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, and 7.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair thinks the joint resolution should be stated.

The legislative clerk proceeded to read the proposed joint resolution, as follows:

Resolved, etc., That—

1. the Senate approves the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in placing Armed Forces of the United States in Europe under his command;

2. the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area;

3. the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is the remainder identical with the pending resolution?

Mr. WHERRY. Yes, the joint resolution is practically identical with Senate Resolution 99, without the whereases.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair suggests that the further reading be dispensed with.

Mr. WHERRY. Yes. That is agreeable. I do not want to delay.

The proposed joint resolution is as follows:

Resolved, etc., That—

1. the Senate approves the action of the United States in cooperating in the common defense effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and in placing Armed Forces of the United States in Europe under his command;

2. the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area;

3. the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action to send units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, shall consult the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that he shall likewise consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

4. before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are giving, and have agreed to give full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" they will "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned;

5. the Senate herewith approves the understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units of United States ground forces as may be assigned to the above command shall be so assigned only after the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States; and the certified opinions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, and to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services as soon as they are received;

6. in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval shall be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and the Sen-

ate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe;

7. the President shall submit to the Congress at intervals of not more than 6 months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, including such information as may be made available for this purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 30 minutes on his motion.

Mr. WHERRY. I desire to say that I myself am not agreeable to some of the provisions of the proposed joint resolution. I am offering it for one purpose; that is to get before the Senate of the United States a joint resolution instead of a simple Senate resolution or a concurrent resolution. Before requesting that the motion be put I am going to ask unanimous consent of the Senate that in lieu of Senate Resolution 99 the Senate proceed to consider the joint resolution which has now been offered. I do this for mechanical reasons. Those who listened to the debate here last Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, I am sure have heard the most convincing arguments that neither Senate Resolution 99 nor Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, if adopted, will have any force or effect of law. They will simply be admonitions, advice, to the President of the United States.

Therefore it seems to me that if the Congress is to determine the policy or the program of national defense the action taken ought to have the full effect and full force of organic law. That can only be done by having the Senate and the House of Representatives consider and pass a joint resolution, regardless of how Senators may feel about its provisions. I cannot see why anyone should object to the joint resolution. If the Senate wants to approve the provisions of Senate Resolution 99 or of Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, certainly they should be embodied in a joint resolution, which, if passed, will have the full force and effect of law.

So far as the junior Senator from Nebraska is concerned I do not agree with some of the provisions of the pending resolutions, and I intend to oppose them. We have every right to amend the resolutions on the floor. We have every right to change them in any way the Senate desires to change them. But in the final analysis, when such changes have been made, if the action taken is in the form of a joint resolution, and it shall be passed, we shall have a piece of legislation which has the full force and effect of organic law. If we adopt either Senate Resolution 99 or Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 we have not adopted anything that has the full effect and force of organic law.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. IVES. I wish to inquire of the Senator from Nebraska if the approval of the President is not required before a joint resolution can have the full force and effect of law?

Mr. WHERRY. Certainly; that is understood. When we say that a measure has the full force and effect of law, of course, we mean that it has been passed through the various constitutional procedures, which means that not only the Senate makes a determination with respect to it, but the House as well, after which the President must sign it.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Nebraska yield again?

Mr. WHERRY. Yes.

Mr. IVES. The Senator from New York would like to inquire of the Senator from Nebraska what the situation would be if the President were to veto a joint resolution of this nature.

Mr. WHERRY. Then, Mr. President, there would be two options. The joint resolution would either die, or the Congress would have the right to pass it over the President's veto, as it has the right to do with respect to all pieces of legislation. Why should the Congress not have that right? Why should the President not assume his full responsibility either to sign the measure or to veto it? The whole force of the argument is, as the Senator well knows—no one knows it better than does he—that we have before us two resolutions, and even though we were to adopt one or both of them, with or without amendments, neither the simple Senate resolution nor the Senate concurrent resolution would have the full force and effect of law. Neither one would have any legal binding effect upon the administration. They would merely be admonitions to the President of the United States.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator again yield?

Mr. WHERRY. Before I yield further, Mr. President, I wish to say that we have gone far beyond the original purposes. Now we are determining the question of troops, we are determining the whole policy of defense. For that reason the Congress of the United States ought to assume its full share of responsibility, and so should the President, in determining such broad policies as are involved in Senate Resolution 99.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I yield.

Mr. IVES. The Senator from New York wishes to inquire of his distinguished colleague from Nebraska if the adoption of either the Senate resolution or the Senate concurrent resolution, as they are now before us, would not have in effect—I am not talking about the technical aspects of the matter—would not have in effect the force of law insofar as the Senate is concerned, with respect to the Senate resolution, and if the concurrent resolution were to be approved, insofar as the House also is concerned, on the future attitude and action of the Senate or the Congress? They do express, do they not, the sense of the Senate and of the Congress?

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator has answered his own question. They merely express the sentiment of the Senate and the House. They do not have any binding effect.

It is not a technical proposition at all. The Senator knows that. The scope of the resolutions which we are now considering is so broad as to involve a complete determination of our national defense policy. All committees of the Senate are interested in that determination. Not only the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Service Committee are interested, but certainly the Appropriations Committee is interested, and certainly the Finance Committee is interested when it comes to consider the means of raising the money. Every Senator is interested. Every Member of the House is interested. Certainly the President of the United States should be interested.

As I stated on the floor of the Senate on Friday afternoon, the question of sending troops to Veracruz has been raised. While that incident was used by the committee in its report respecting the Presidential powers that might be used to send troops outside the United States without invoking constitutional processes, yet when we read the message of President Wilson we find that he said he did not even want to assume responsibility for sending troops to Veracruz, where a conflict might occur, and cause war, unless a joint resolution were passed by the Congress, and the Congress would accept the responsibility for what might happen in Veracruz.

The same principle is involved here. If troops are sent to Europe with the idea of building up morale here, and they should be attacked, and war should ensue, the Congress of the United States would not have anything to do with such involvement. So, if the Congress now wants to assume its responsibility, as it should, there is only one way to do so mechanically. It is not a technical proposition. It is just as plain as can be that the question involved here goes completely beyond the phrase "it is the sense of the Senate" that Congress determine the policy, which is the form in which the resolution now appears. There is now involved a complete determination of national defense policy, and, therefore, there should be before the Senate either a bill or a joint resolution, the passage of which would give full force and effect legally and in every other way to what the Senate and the House and the President of the United States do regarding this great, broad question.

Mr. President, so far as I have been able to find, there are no precedents for the motion. I know as well as does any other Senator that a motion to substitute a joint resolution for a simple resolution or for a concurrent resolution apparently violates rule XIV; that that is not the way in which a bill or a Senate joint resolution is usually handled. But time and again there has been presented the same situation which is now before the Senate, and, by unanimous consent, the Senate has permitted such procedure, and it has been done without a point of order being made against the request.

So I felt it was my duty, inasmuch as the debate for the past 3 days has hinged upon the question of passing a joint res-

olution, at least to ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to act by way of a joint resolution embodying language identical with that contained in the Senate resolution and in the Senate concurrent resolution.

Secondly, if objection is made to the unanimous-consent request, then it is my position that the motion to which I have referred should be made.

Let me say that I am inclined not to appeal from a decision of the Chair on a point of order, if a point of order is made against the motion, because I do not wish to be a party to an attempt, each and every time a temporary situation is involved, to override the decision of the Chair and establish by such means, in cases of that sort, rules to govern the Senate.

However, I wish to point out as emphatically and as forcibly as I can that there is no precedent in the Senate against what I am doing now; I cannot find one. On the other hand, time and time again, because of the mechanics of procedure which are involved, and in order to speed upon the consideration of a measure, regardless of how Senators may feel about it, consent has been given in order to make it possible for the Senate to proceed in such a way as to eliminate the mechanical difficulties, and to enable the Senate in an orderly fashion to proceed to the consideration of proposed legislation in the way I have mentioned.

Mr. President, there are Members of the Senate who feel that the resolution should be in the form of a joint resolution, and they feel so strongly about it that they have stated on the floor of the Senate that they will move to recommit the resolution, if such a motion is the last recourse they have in their attempt to have the question come before the Senate in the form of a joint resolution.

The unanimous-consent request I have made will, if agreed to, completely eliminate the necessity for the making of such a motion, and will enable the Senate to proceed to do in a voluntary way what otherwise might have to be done by way of a motion in order to attempt to reach the same objective in another fashion or by means of another procedure.

So I feel that every effort should be made, either by way of obtaining unanimous consent, or by way of a motion made by myself, to have the resolution now pending come before the Senate in the form of a joint resolution, regardless of how Senators may feel about any of its provisions.

If Senators wish to go along with Senate Resolution 99 or with Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, there is no reason why they cannot do so while following the suggestion I have made, because my suggestion merely amounts to striking out either the words "Senate resolution" or "Senate concurrent resolution," and inserting the words "Senate joint resolution."

Mr. President, if the resolution is changed to the form of a joint resolution then, regardless of the provisions included in the resolution when it is finally acted upon by the Senate, it will

be a joint resolution which will have the effect and force of law and will be enacted into law by way of the constitutional processes.

After listening to the debate, in the course of which some able arguments on this very question have been made, I am convinced that the only sensible thing to do is to permit the Senate to proceed to consider a joint resolution on this subject—in other words, a measure which, regardless of the provisions it finally may contain, will be in such a form that it will have the force and effect of law. In that event we shall have a measure by means of which the policy will be determined in accordance with the constitutional processes.

Mr. President, I do not wish to take any further time of the Senate. This issue is very plain.

So I ask unanimous consent that in lieu of Senate Resolution No. 99, the Senate proceed to consider the joint resolution just read by the clerk, and that the first and second readings, as required under the rule, be regarded as having been had.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska withdraw the motion he made?

Mr. WHERRY. Yes, temporarily.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request propounded by the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. CONNALLY. I object.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Objection is heard.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, now I so move.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Nebraska now renews his original motion.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, does the motion propose to substitute a joint resolution for the Senate resolution?

The VICE PRESIDENT. That is correct.

Mr. CONNALLY. I make the point of order that that cannot be done under the rules of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Under rule XIV, which governs the procedure of the Senate in regard to bills, joint resolutions, and so forth, it is not in order, if a bill is pending before the Senate, to move that its character be changed to that of a joint resolution. It is not in order, if a concurrent resolution is before the Senate, to move that it be changed into the form of a bill or a joint resolution. It is not in order, under that rule, if a simple Senate resolution is before the Senate, to move that either a bill or a joint resolution or a concurrent resolution be substituted for the simple Senate resolution.

In other words, the motion of the Senator from Nebraska is not in order, for it violates rule XIV.

So the Chair sustains the point of order.

The resolution is open to amendment.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I rise to call up an amendment which has been printed. It is one which pertains to page 5, line 3, of the resolution.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 5, in line 3, at the end of section 6, it is proposed to strike out the period, insert a colon, and the following: "Provided, That persons in the additional ground troops sent to Western Europe in harmony with the provisions of this section shall be not less than 20 years of age."

Mr. CASE. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the language of this amendment makes clear its purpose. It is simple and short. It proposes that the paragraph which deals with the sending of additional ground troops to Europe be amended by adding these words:

Provided, That persons in the additional ground troops sent to Western Europe in harmony with the provisions of this section shall be not less than 20 years of age.

Mr. President, during the debate last week when the able Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN] was discussing the issues involved in this measure, he pointed out that he had taken an active part in the consideration of the universal military training, selective service, or draft bill extension; but he said that in supporting that measure and in voting for it he did not vote to draft and send 18-year-olds into an international army.

The purpose of this amendment is to give effect to a position of that sort.

Members of the Senate who have had the privilege of visiting either Japan or Germany during the time we have had an army of occupation there, can hardly have escaped hearing comment by officers in command there that boys of 18 or 19 are not proper persons to be used for an international police. In this country we do not call upon boys of 18 or 19 to be policemen. Anyone who proposes, on the other hand, that boys 18 or 19 years of age should be made part of an international command for either occupation or police duties, carries the heavy burden of proof, against the experience of the armies of occupation, that boys in that age group are fitted by temperament to meet the particular duties and responsibilities and temptations which exist in a police force.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has supplied me with a newspaper clipping giving a United Press report from London on March 18. That report points out that although in Western Europe all nations except Ireland have compulsory military training, only two countries—Britain and Switzerland—draft youths of 18 years of age. Switzerland is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. So only Britain of the NATO countries will draft 18-year-olds for possible use in the international army.

The United Press report also points out that "in France, from which Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower hopes to draw the most manpower, youths of 18 cannot even be sent into combat service outside the country."

On the other hand, according to the dispatch, "British draftees apparently get the toughest assignments among European nonvolunteer soldiers, for the

British youth is drafted at 18 and may be sent into combat after 3 months of training."

In Holland men become liable to draft during their nineteenth year, and presumably they receive a period of training before they may be sent into an international command. They serve for 18 months.

In Belgium the draft age is 19, and there they must be trained for at least 6 weeks before being sent into combat.

In France the draft age is 20, and the training period is 18 months.

Mr. President, it will be a heavy burden upon Members of the Senate to return to their homes and say that the Senate has sanctioned the sending of additional troops to Europe and has said that included among those troops may be boys who now may be drafted at 18 years of age, trained for 3 or 4 months, and then perhaps be made part of an international command, to be placed under officers who may not be officers of the United States, who perhaps may not be sympathetic with or may not understand the principles which guide officers of the United States in establishing camp conditions and the regulations under which the boys serve.

I say that a heavy burden will be placed upon Senators of the United States when they go back to their respective States if they have to say that the Senate has approved the sending of additional troops to Europe for an international army including 18- and 19-year-olds, when in France the lowest draft age is 20. My amendment merely proposes that though we approve the sending of additional troops, they shall not include boys of 18 and 19 years.

In Italy the draft age is 21, and compulsory training for 18 months is authorized, although, because of the present state of the Government's finances, the term is only 15 months. How will Senators explain the fact that without the amendment I propose, we would be approving the sending of 18- and 19-year-olds into an international army, whereas in Italy the draft age is 21?

In Denmark the draft age is 20, and provision is made for 1 year of training.

In Norway the draft age is 19, but there is on top of that a requirement of basic training of 3 months; and further training for a period of from 3 to 9 months may then be ordered, depending upon the branch of service; following which, a year of service may be required. How will Senators defend the sending of additional American ground troops to Europe, containing 18- and 19-year olds, if Norway does not draft men until they are 19, and then provides for a training period beyond that, before they go into service?

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. CASE. I yield to the Senator from Utah, provided I do not thereby lose the floor.

Mr. WATKINS. Can the Senator advise us now as to whether there are at the present time in occupied Germany or

Austria any American troops under 20 years of age?

Mr. CASE. There are some under 20 years of age. Boys who have volunteered, of course, or who have enlisted in the services, could be under 20 years of age. In the Air Force there is no restriction against enlistment under 20 years of age; and the Air Force troops who are stationed in Germany or in England, and who presumably will be a part of the international army, would not be affected. The only thing I thought I could properly affect at this point is the paragraph where it is specifically proposed to approve the sending of additional ground troops to Europe. Certainly we can condition that approval by saying that we will not include 18- and 19-year olds among the additional troops.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an observation?

Mr. CASE. I yield, provided I do not thereby lose the floor.

Mr. WATKINS. I have talked to a number of Senators who have visited Europe during the time we have been occupying Germany and Austria. In almost every instance those Senators have reported that the conditions under which our young boys are serving at the present time are deplorable, that they are yielding to many temptations with which young men of that age should not be confronted, and that altogether it is probably an undesirable policy to have our very young boys in occupation armies. I should like to say now that I desire to join with the Senator in his amendment, and, in my opinion, it should be adopted without any question.

Mr. CASE. I should like to supplement what the Senator from Utah has stated by saying that in the fall of 1947 it was my privilege to be in Germany and Austria for 6 weeks with the Select Committee on Foreign Aid of the House of Representatives. While there I was in daily contact with officers of the army of occupation, and without exception, as reflected in the opinions expressed to me at that time, there was a feeling that armies of occupation should not consist of young troops; and certainly that should also apply to police troops, which I take it the international command would essentially be.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. CASE. I yield, on the same condition.

Mr. WATKINS. Is it not a fact that under the program as now outlined, and under the program we have been discussing, there is a possibility that we may continue to have occupation in Germany and certain other countries, and that we may thereby help to garrison their lands for a period of 10, 15, 25, or perhaps 50 years—no one knows how long?

Mr. CASE. No one knows. That is certainly true.

Mr. WATKINS. Is that not one of the possibilities at the present time?

Mr. CASE. It is a possibility.

Mr. President, the proposal to participate in effectuating the North Atlantic Treaty organization by sending additional troops can be defended to the

American people only if we do it upon some basis comparable with what may be provided by the other members of the organization; and when the record clearly indicates that such North Atlantic Treaty organization countries as France, Italy, Norway, and Denmark are not proposing to send their troops into an international army, or even to draft them, until they are older than 18 or 19 years, certainly we should place the condition I have proposed upon our approval.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. CASE. I yield, provided I do not thereby lose the floor.

Mr. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator from South Dakota whether it is not true that if his amendment were adopted it would in no way be binding upon the President, but would serve merely as a suggestion or an admonition to him.

Mr. CASE. Of course, it would condition our approval. It would be the expression of the Senate. It would be as binding as any other expression embodied in the resolution. Whether it would be binding upon the President would depend of course upon the eventual form of the measure we pass. If it should become a joint resolution of the Senate and House, it then could become binding. The amendment I have proposed, if adopted, would have the same status as the portion of the resolution which it seeks to amend, to the effect that it is the expressed opinion of the Senate.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

Mr. CASE. I yield, on the same conditions.

Mr. KEM. Assuming that the amendment is added to the Senate resolution, it will then have no binding effect, will it?

Mr. CASE. Assuming that it is added to the Senate resolution, it will have no binding effect upon the President, any more than would the remainder of the resolution; that is correct. But it occurs to me that any President of the United States would be bound to give some consideration to an expression of the body which is his legal and constitutional adviser in foreign affairs.

It is proposed by the resolution to express the opinion of the Senate on a matter of policy. Throughout the debate, it has seemed to me that we might very well go to the content of the particular proposals of the resolution. By my amendment I have sought to do that. We could here very well debate not merely the right of the Senate to speak, but the merits of what we propose to endorse. The pending resolution proposes to endorse the sending of additional ground troops to Europe. I am suggesting that the Senate say that, if we go on record as approving the sending of additional ground troops to Europe, we shall say that 18- and 19-year-olds shall not be included.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Texas.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LODGE. No, Mr. President; I did not request time on the amendment proposed by the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. CASE].

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator is not confined to the discussion of any particular amendment. I yield 30 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from Texas has yielded me 30 minutes on the amendments. I intend to request additional time on the pending resolution, in order that I may make my position entirely clear.

The VICE PRESIDENT. When the amendments shall have been disposed of, 1 hour will be allowed on each side of the pending resolution, the time to be controlled by the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Nebraska. However, during the discussion of any amendment the Senator may discuss the resolution, if he gets the time.

Mr. WILEY. Do I correctly understand the Chair to rule that, having been yielded 30 minutes on the amendments, I need not be yielded 30 minutes on the resolution?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Not now.

Mr. WILEY. I do not intend to spend any time on the particular amendment, that being a matter for each Senator to weigh in determining what its effect would be on a military organization. At this time I am speaking on the resolutions which were reported from the two committees, sitting jointly.

In any domestic or world crisis—and we are now experiencing both—there are lessons to be learned. In my previous remarks on the floor of the Senate in this debate I said that we had three great values to preserve—peace, the value of the American dollar, and the Republic with its checks and balances.

Every citizen who is awake to the challenges of this period is alert to the need for preparedness. What constitutes preparedness? There is a great divergence of opinion on the meaning of preparedness to meet the onward march of communism and Marxism. Certainly one of the basic factors in any worthwhile preparedness is for us to deal with facts and reject fiction.

I shall not take the time to picture at length the situation in Asia, in Europe, all of which is so well known to every Senator. Briefly the facts are these: 110,000 or more of our troops are in Western Germany. On the airfields, in Europe, Africa, the islands of the Mediterranean our American boys are constantly on the alert. The American Navy is in the Mediterranean. Our Atlantic Fleet and our Pacific Fleet is also on the alert. We are appropriating billions. We are calling our boys by the millions

into the military service of our country. We are at war in Korea. We are furnishing arms aid to our partners in the North Atlantic Pact. Eisenhower and his staff are working feverishly in Europe. The other nations in the pact and our allies and friends—Turkey, Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia—are standing ready. The President of France and his Prime Minister are in this city to cement the ties that came into being in the Revolution and sanctified by the sacrifice of our sons in two World Wars.

And today, and for weeks past, we debate the question. Shall we approve the President's suggestion that we send four additional divisions to Europe to be incorporated with those that are there into an international army under the leadership of General Eisenhower?

Oh, yes; we debate what form the resolution should take.

Many of those who object to the present form will not vote for the resolution if it be modified to be a joint resolution because they are against sending any additional troops to Europe and against incorporating any of our troops into the international army.

Mr. President, when Congress authorizes the raising of troops, authorizes the construction of more airplanes, and a larger Air Force, authorizes an addition to the Navy, authorizes the spending of billions of dollars for armament, it has by those actions implemented by concrete action and concrete facilities the President's power as Commander in Chief. Why are we doing this?

I think at this time it is pertinent to quote the language of the Court of Claims in *Swaim v. U. S.* (28 Court of Claims 173, affirmed in 165 U. S. 553):

The Congress may increase the Army or reduce the Army or abolish it altogether. But so long as we have a military force, Congress cannot take away from the President the supreme command. It is true that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress the exclusive power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. But the two powers are distinct. Neither can trench upon the other. The President cannot under the guise of military orders evade the legislative regulations by which he in common with the Army must be governed, and Congress cannot in the disguise of rules for government of the Army impair the authority of the President as Commander in Chief.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I cannot yield; I am sorry. I have only a few minutes.

SOME ARGUMENTS AND ANSWERS PERTAINING TO THE ISSUE OF TROOPS TO EUROPE

Much has been said on this floor since the beginning of the debate on March 16. I should like, therefore, to note some of the arguments which have been presented and to give you one man's answer for each. I ask no one else to accept this answer but I wish the RECORD to be clear as to my judgment on these important points.

Argument: It has been contended that nothing less than a joint resolution by the Congress will satisfy article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which requires the implementation of the treaty by means of constitutional processes.

Answer: This reasoning is faulty. The term "constitutional processes" means that whatever is done to implement the treaty shall be according to regular practices. That is, the President may appoint a commander of American troops in the integrated army; the Congress may by resolution express its sense relative to some aspect of the treaty; and the Congress and the President may pass legislation providing for arms to be used in support of the treaty. All of these will meet the requirements according to the constitutional processes of the United States. What is a constitutional process in a given instance will depend upon the requirements of an action or the circumstances of a situation.

Let me say from the very start of this controversy and in view of these factors: First, article 3 in the Atlantic Pact; second, article 5 in the Atlantic Pact; third, the history of the legislation embodying the interpretations by the Secretary of State, the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], and other Senators.

I have repeatedly held that if the circumstances remain substantially as they were at the time of the pact the implementation thereof should be by congressional action.

It must be borne in mind that under article 3 there was a clear-cut agreement for the development of "collective capacity" by their "respective constitutional processes of the Government." Until the question arose as to the creation of an international army, there was no objection or claim that the President was not "more effectively achieving the objectives of the treaty by doing what he had been doing in relation to putting ground forces on the air bases, joint Navy maneuvers," and so forth. But when it came to a matter of implementing the treaty in relation to arms aid, he came to the Congress and the implementation was by bill and appropriation—undoubtedly a constitutional process. But there are many kinds of constitutional processes. When the President asserts his constitutional power, it is a constitutional process; when the Congress exercises its functions, it is a constitutional process.

I state again that it is my opinion that Congress had a duty and a responsibility to decide the implementation under the present circumstances of article 3 to the Atlantic Pact, and it has the similar duty and responsibility under the present world circumstances in relation to the international army issue. I repeat what I have said heretofore, that in view of the world circumstances, these two arms of the Government—the executive and the legislative branches—have an obligation to get together. I think that when there was submitted to the committees meeting jointly, the testimony of the armed services of this country and testimony of many great servants of the people, that was an evidence of getting together, and we did get together in the committee in a resolution that expresses the intent of the joint committee, which manifested a spirit of cooperation.

If Congress approves the sending of troops to Europe, to become a part of the

international army, is not this action by this Government? A great deal of argument on the floor has been heard, stating that approval by Congress by a concurrent resolution is not a constitutional process, and it must be by a joint resolution. Since this point was raised I have given considerable thought and some study to this matter. "Congressional" means, of course, according to the dictionary, "pertaining to Congress." "Process" means "a course or method of operation incident to the accomplishment of a result."

If we agree, and I think we all do, that there is at least a moral obligation in view of the facts and circumstances surrounding the ratification of the Atlantic Pact, that Congress should take action in relation to implementation, then if Congress passes this concurrent resolution we have accomplished the collaboration and the cooperation that is so necessary. However, there are those who say that this resolution has no legal affect, that it can be accomplished only by a joint resolution. If they are correct, and I do not think they are, we would still have our hand in making foreign policy in this critical period.

I agree with the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] that this is a congressional process. It is the act of the two Houses. I refer to the concurrent resolution. If that is true, then it is a legal implementation, or at least a constitutional process approving the suggested action of the Executive.

I assume from the remarks of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] on Friday, March 29, when he said, on page 2995, he would vote for the resolution, that he is of the same conclusion.

Second argument: The Senate has been urged not to pass this resolution because it is "vague and fuzzy."

Answer: The resolution is a compromise measure and represents the ground on which the members of the joint committee could meet. All efforts at clarification in committee threatened to divide the committee. Therefore, although the measure may be unsatisfactory to some, it does constitute a positive step toward an improved morale among our allies and a better understanding of the situation we face among the people of the United States. And it is a congressional action or process.

The third argument: It has been asserted that the President is attempting to make himself a dictator over the United States military policies and defense forces and therefore the Congress should enact legislation to forestall the usurpation of this power.

Answer: I have expressed on this floor my belief that the President as Commander in Chief, has the full and complete right to deploy American forces abroad and that he has this right under the Constitution. Neither this resolution nor any resolution can take from him one iota of power which the Constitution has bestowed upon him. But even if that were not true, it is doubtful that a resolution of the Congress, either concurrent or joint, would be capable of preventing him from usurping powers if he wanted to. In other words, this resolution and a joint

resolution would have little practical effect in preventing the Chief Executive from usurping powers if that were his purpose—and I seriously doubt that the President has such intentions in mind.

Fourth argument: We have been urged not to make a move until Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Germany have been brought into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Answer: This, in my book, is the counsel of frustration and despair. The need for action is now. We should go ahead on all fronts simultaneously. I agree we should seek to bring all these states into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as soon as possible, but I also believe that at the same time we must move ahead with the integrated European army without delay. That means our troops must be sent now, and Congress and the Executive should move together promptly to expedite their dispatch to Europe.

Fifth argument: A strong case has been made for the United States not taking any action until our allies have built up their defense.

Answer: One of the reasons why the European defenses have not developed more rapidly has been the lack of equipment. Another has been their inability to get together for security purposes. The United States security is intimately bound to that of Western Europe. A strong Western Europe, able to ward off aggression, is a guaranty of security to the United States. We should not hesitate, therefore, to make our contribution to the development of European defense. Since time is of importance and our assistance is of the greatest value, we should lend all help possible to Europe. General Bradley gave five good reasons for helping Europe now.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reasons stated by General Bradley be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

(1) If war should come, the ability of our present two divisions in Germany to defend themselves would be immeasurably increased; (2) the will of the free nations to fight, their morale, will be given reassurance by our sending of additional troops; (3) we need strength in Europe to deter the Soviet from attack as weakness can only invite attack; (4) this is not the time for suspicious scrutiny—it is the time for generous leadership; and (5) if war comes, we should choose to fight in other parts of the world than the United States.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I continue with the next argument:

Sixth argument: Much time has been spent in asserting that this is a new venture and that never before in the United States history have we contributed troops to an integrated unified international army. It has been further contended that the President will abandon his role as Commander in Chief of the United States military forces when they are placed under General Eisenhower's international command.

Answer: This reasoning grows out of inadequate understanding of the true

role of General Eisenhower and the relationship which he and the forces entrusted to his international command will have to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United States Military Establishment. General Eisenhower will be directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as will the American troops under his command. There will be no mixing of the troops on less than a division level and in case of conflicting direction, the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will prevail. For example, if one of the four divisions now under contemplation were needed in Korea after it had been assigned to the European army, it could be dispatched immediately by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to Korea. At no time will the President lose his power to direct the troops and the officers of the United States in Europe.

Seventh argument: We have heard long and eloquent protests against our doing this in the name of peace.

Answer: Surely the protestors could not contend that it is being done with aggressive intentions. But entirely aside from that line of reasoning, would the protestors have us maintain ourselves in a weakened condition, open to aggression waiting for the attack which Stalin, Lenin, and all the Communists have forecast they will make upon the United States and the rest of the free world if they are able to do so? If the aggressions of Soviet Russia since 1917 have not convinced the protestors that weakness is an invitation to attack, I doubt that I can persuade them.

Eighth argument: It has been contended that this is internationalism run wild and that the policy is not truly American.

Answer: The considered testimony of all military experts before the Foreign Relations Committee supported the view that a strong Europe will be able to ward off aggression and will prevent war. The security of the United States is intimately bound up with that of Europe and the building of a strong defense force in Europe is a basic requirement of the security of the United States. The contribution of the four divisions to an integrated defense force is a truly American policy for it is calculated to increase our strength and protect our shores.

Ninth argument: It has been contended that dispatching more soldiers to Europe will be a provocative act.

Answer: General Eisenhower pointed out emphatically that if the Soviet Union chose to consider this as a provocative step, it could only be because it had calculated aggression anyway. In terms of over-all needs, the force is very small and will constitute only a small part of a larger force, with only defense functions assigned to it. In no way can the dispatch of these troops be described as provocative.

Tenth argument: One plea has been that we take no action on Senate Resolution 99 because our United Nations allies in Korea have placed the burden on us and we have contributed 90 percent of the United Nations military forces and suffered 90 percent of the United Nations casualties.

Answer: The two situations are not analogous. In Korea, the President deliberately took the initiative; and the contribution of troops by other United Nations powers has been entirely according to their own discretion. Moreover, we have refused to accept some voluntary contributions of forces in Korea. In Europe, however, we are tied to a number of allies operating according to plan with a definite understanding as to what each is to contribute. The situation is therefore quite different from the Korean, and it would be a mistake to measure our efforts in Europe according to our experience in the Far East.

Eleventh argument: We have frequently heard the plea for reliance on air and naval power on the assumption that they will be adequate to handle any situation and stop aggression.

Answer: This view is completely unrealistic. Ground troops, coupled with air support, are required to stop ground attack.

I ask unanimous consent that the statement in the committee report dealing with the point be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

If there is any question on the subject, our experience in Korea should demonstrate conclusively that air superiority is not enough. There we have had complete mastery of the air, yet in spite of that the enemy has been able at times to press his advance to a perilous point.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, the twelfth argument is: The administration has been roundly criticized for testifying at the hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty that it would not implement the treaty with ground troops. It has also been contended that congressional leaders gave assurances on the floor that Congress would be consulted if troops were to be used for the implementation of the treaty.

Answer: Unlike those who have tried to deny these contentions, I freely admit that they were made in good faith by the administration and by the congressional leaders. They were made in 1949 when the situation was very different. This is 1951 and the menace to world peace and the United States security is much graver than in 1949. We now need additional American troops in Europe. Congress now has the opportunity to implement the treaty with those forces and I contend that Congress should do so without loss of time.

I

THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO DEPLOY UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES ABROAD

I should like to repeat three of the principles I stated on March 16 that are basic to any approach to the sending of troops to Europe.

The first is that the issue has been narrowed down to the simple proposition:

Has the President the power to put our forces into an international army and transfer them without the consent of Congress? That is the issue—RECORD, March 16, 1951, page 2552.

I shall have more to say on this in a moment.

The second is that the legislative history of the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty indicates that congressional authorization was to be asked if troops were to be sent to Europe to implement the pact—RECORD, page 2552. Let me say at this point in further elaboration of my answers to the eminent Senator from New York that it is my belief that most members of the Joint Committee are also of this same opinion, and that this can be demonstrated from the record of our executive sessions.

This is the backdrop against which we must interpret the meaning of paragraph 6 of Senate Resolution 99. Let us pass over the argument that the paragraph is much broader in scope than merely requiring approval for the sending of additional troops abroad, and that it is addressed to the implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The wording and evolution of this paragraph, I believe, show clearly that the paragraph is applicable when a change in policy takes place. It is not concerned with any individual soldier as the Senator from New York seems to interpret it. I repeat what I said on Friday, the paragraph must be given a reasonable interpretation. The approval recommended does not apply to any specific men nor to individuals. Reason and the committee deliberations indicate that the paragraph would not prevent the President from relieving men sent to Europe by sending others in their place. Even the strictest interpretation of the language to my mind does not justify the conclusion that the sending of an additional individual squad, platoon, or company requires congressional approval. The approval embodied in the paragraph is applicable to situations in which there is a change in policy.

If additional troops require approval, they must be in sufficient number to represent a change in policy, and common sense would indicate that a change in policy is not made by troop replacements nor by the failure to maintain an exact number of men in Europe. Unquestionably, a change in the number of divisions would call for congressional approval. Somewhere between these two extremes lies the answer. The President would be expected to exercise good faith and come to the Congress for approval when the deployment of United States forces abroad represented in fact a change in policy. Clearly he is left some discretion in the matter.

The third basic principle I should like to repeat is the one stated in answer to a query by the eminent Senator from Missouri, namely:

That if we do not adopt the resolutions the President can secure the best legalistic authority in America to say that he has the power to implement the treaty; that he does not need action by Congress. (Ibid., p. 2557.)

I warned that unless we adopt these resolutions, Congress will not lie supine, but may assert itself through appropriations. Let me add here that this is not the only remedy Congress has at hand to see that the wishes of the people are met.

The Senator from Texas in his splendid address recently, pointed out the

great troubles of President Lincoln with his Congress. The facts are correct, but not complete. What the Senator from Texas failed to point out was that President Lincoln "bypassed Congress again and again"; George Fort Milton, in his book, *The Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943* (Boston, 1944, p. 129), has the following to say on the subject:

No President before or since has pushed the boundaries of executive power so far over into the legislative sphere. No one can ever know just what Lincoln conceived to be the limits of his powers. Even a partial review of them presents an imposing list of daring adventures. Under the war power he proclaimed the slaves emancipated. He devised and put into execution his peculiar plan of reconstruction. In disregard of law he increased the Army and Navy beyond the limits set by statute. The privilege of habeas corpus was suspended wholesale and martial law declared. Public money in the sum of millions was deliberately spent without congressional appropriation. (See also Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, H. Rept. 127, this Congress, p. 18.)

And it is significant that in much of this exercise of this power the Supreme Court sustained the President—see the *Prize Cases* (2 Black 635, 1863). Now, it was in the face of this exercise of power that the Committee on the Conduct of the War became an instrument which openly and deliberately belabored and embarrassed the President. I do not justify their action; but we had better have the record complete in order that we shall know where we are going with these resolutions.

Like the eminent chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I deplore this type of congressional obstructionism and I do not believe the above-named committee's actions in Lincoln's time were particularly creditable. But I do wish to point out that the Congress is not helpless if the President does not heed its wishes. Again I repeat, Congress has a great responsibility, which it cannot evade, to define the nature of the implementation of the North Atlantic Pact—RECORD, March 16, 1951, page 2549. The two resolutions before us are the voice of the people. I repeat:

The President has a great opportunity to regain partially the confidence of Congress and the American people if he states forthrightly that irrespective of the legal powers involved, he intends to go to Congress for authority before assigning additional troops abroad (ibid., p. 2548).

II

THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO SEND UNITED STATES TROOPS ABROAD

The question has been debated for over 150 years. For more than a century and a half the exact line of authority between the powers of the President and of the Congress pertaining to the sending of troops abroad has been argued and debated—committee report, page 19. Ex-President Hoover said in answer to one of my questions at the hearings on Senate Resolution 8:

All Presidents of the United States until the year 1940 or thereabouts realized that there was a twilight zone of authority presenting many difficulties. There is a twilight zone between the authority of Congress to declare war and the implied constitutional authority to regulate our Armed Forces on

the one side and the authority of the Commander in Chief on the other. The attitude of all Presidents up to that time, including Jefferson, Adams, and Wilson, was that American Armed Forces should only be used in foreign countries where there was a question of acute danger to American life and property, and that they should not be used in any situation that was likely to create a war without an authority from the Congress. (Hearings on the assignment of ground forces of the United States to duty in the European area, pp. 729-730.)

That is the view of the only living ex-President, who has had to face this problem. It will be noted Mr. Hoover said nothing about the power of the President in case of danger to the life of the Nation.

THE CORWIN THESIS: THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT NEEDS SENATE APPROVAL

Yet, one of the most eminent authorities on constitutional law in this country in a recent article in the *New Republic*—Edward S. Corwin, *The President's Power, The New Republic*, January 29, 1951, pages 15 and 16—asserts:

It is paradoxical in the extreme to reduce the legislative organ of the Government to the level of a mere rubber stamp of policies the professed purpose of which is the preservation of free institutions. Either the Brussels agreement should be formally submitted to the Senate for approval by a constitutional two-thirds majority, or something akin to COUBERT's resolution should be adopted (ibid.).

Professor Corwin is of the opinion that the President does not have the power to send troops abroad as a part of an international army without the consent of Congress. He implies that the North Atlantic Treaty might have given him the authority; but it did not.

THE WILEY VIEW: CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL IS MORALLY, IF NOT LEGALLY, REQUIRED FOR THE MOVING OF UNITED STATES FORCES ABROAD

Now, I have given it as my view that the treaty is not self-implementing and that the President should come to the Congress for its implementation. He did in the case of the mutual defense assistance program. He should do so also in the case of implementing article 3 with ground forces. But I have said he should do so because he is morally, if not legally, bound to do so; because the interests of the United States dictate cooperation between the President and the Congress in this emergency in which we find ourselves.

PAST PRACTICES SUPPORT THIS VIEW

I assert this because there is much support for the argument that he need not come to the Congress for its approval. The fact is that the President of the United States in the past has used American military forces abroad in more than 150 instances for all sorts of purposes, among them the protection of American lives and property, the suppression of piracy, supervising elections in foreign lands, pursuit of slave traders, and giving military advice. We need not go into detail—many lists are available for those who desire such information. See, for example, House Report No. 127; mimeographed list prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress; J. Reuben Clark, *World Policing and the Constitution*, Boston,

World Peace Foundation, 1945. This imposing array, it seems to me, leaves no doubt as to the President's power to deploy United States troops abroad. In 1940 President Roosevelt sent United States ground troops to Greenland and Iceland, as well as to the Atlantic bases he had obtained under the destroyer deal. We were at peace then, since we had not yet entered the Second World War as a belligerent. No one questioned his power to do so, it being in defense of this country. Who can question the President's judgment as to what is necessary for defense?

PROFESSOR CORWIN ADMITS THAT IN THE PAST THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT NEEDED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

In the face of such precedents—and this is a land of precedents—I cannot follow the argument that the Commander in Chief cannot deploy the troops abroad as he may deem circumstances require in the defense of the United States, after Congress has provided the troops and the means. In 1948 Professor Corwin wrote:

The point is that the sort of foreign policy which present-day conditions require can never be kept going by attributing to the President, as in the past, the simple power to order the Navy around without consulting Congress (President: Office and Powers, third revised edition, New York, 1948, p. 271).

THE PRESIDENT CAN BE DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS ONLY BY A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Now that is precisely the point at issue. Professor Corwin admits that the President has had the power to deploy the Navy at will. In the absence of constitutional changes, how can he argue that the President has the constitutional power at one time but does not have it at another? Surely the will of the Congress alone or the possibility that the President might unwisely place the country in a predicament where war would result, nay, even were he to bring the whole process of government to a dead center, these acts in and by themselves are not enough to terminate a function assigned him by the Constitution. If he had the power once—barring a constitutional change—he still retains the power. If it is acknowledged—as is the case—that he has exercised the power in the past, by what legerdemain is it now proposed to deprive the President of his constitutional powers?

PRECEDENTS ARE PLENTIFUL SUPPORTING THE EXTENSIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO MOVE UNITED STATES TROOPS

But there is more than logic to sustain my point of view. In Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers—1916, page 94—ex-President Taft stated:

The President is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and militia when called into the service of the United States. Under this, he can order the Army and Navy anywhere he will, if the appropriations furnish the means of transportation.

But, the most persuasive comment of all came from one of our own former members, William Borah, who said in 1922:

We could not make the President do it (bring back United States troops from abroad). He is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and

if in the discharge of his duty he wants to assign them there, I do not know of any power that we—the Congress—can exert to compel him to bring them home. We can refuse to create an army, but when it is created, he is the commander. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 64, pt. 1, p. 922.)

Professor Mathews has the following to say on the same subject in his book, The American Constitutional System—second revised edition, New York, 1940, page 271:

When appropriations have been made and forces have thus been placed at the disposal of the President, he may appoint the military and naval officers and has full control over the directions of the movement of the forces, not only in this country, but also on the high seas and abroad. * * * It is doubtful whether Congress could even indirectly control the President's power as Commander in Chief to direct the movement of the forces through provisions in appropriation bills making funds available for the support of the Army only on condition that it is employed in a certain way or upon certain territory.

There are many other references to which we might allude, to support the view that the President may send United States troops abroad without the approval of Congress. Among them would be *United States v. Sweeney* (157 U. S. 281, 284 (1895)), *Swain v. United States* (28 Court of Claims, 173, 221, affirmed; 165 U. S. 553 (1897)) and President Roosevelt's message to the Congress reporting after troops had been sent to Iceland and Greenland—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 87, part 6, page 5868. We need go no further to show that there are many bases in the constitutional history of this country upon which the President may depend in deploying United States military forces abroad without congressional assent when no war exists. I am persuaded that the Corwin thesis does not stand up in the face of precedent. As a matter of fact, it is my view that the constitutional development of the last 150 years is a direct negation of Professor Corwin's assertions.

III

THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO SEND UNITED STATES TROOPS ABROAD IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Not only do I believe that the President has the power to deploy United States military forces abroad without congressional sanction; I believe furthermore that it can be contended with much force that the power to send United States troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty is implied in the reference to constitutional processes in article 11. Article 11 reads in part:

This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

It will be recalled that the treaty does not define constitutional processes, and therefore cannot be said to limit the President.

WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES?

Now then, in reference to the power of the President to send American troops abroad, what are some of the more important United States constitutional processes involved? As we have already

noted many times, the Constitution designates the President as the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy—article II, section 2, clause 1; he has executive power of government—article II, section 1, clause 1; he has power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties—article II, section 2, clause 2; he must preserve and protect and defend the Constitution—article II, section 1, clause 7; and he must take care that the laws be faithfully executed—article II, section 3. These are constitutional processes which are invoked when the President must deal with an emergency.

MEANING OF EXPRESSION "IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES"

Mr. President, as this debate has progressed, it seems to me that considerable confusion has arisen with respect to the exact meaning of the words "constitutional processes." I should like to take a few minutes of the Senate's time to clear up the record on this point.

Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that the treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their "respective constitutional processes." The question which is at issue, it seems to me, is this: Does the expression "in accordance with their constitutional processes" refer directly and solely to action taken by the executive branch of a government directly on the basis of legislative enactment or other legislative action? In the United States, for example, does the expression mean a joint resolution or act of Congress, or might some other action by the Congress, such as a simple resolution by the Senate or a concurrent resolution, suffice?

Examination of the language of the expression, and of instances of its use, leads me to the conclusion that the expression is regularly employed to avoid any new statement, in an instrument, relating to the distribution of powers between the executive and legislative branches of Government. The expression is specifically designed to leave the existing distribution of powers undisturbed.

In certain types of situation, "constitutional processes" clearly require action by the legislative branch. For example, the U. N. Charter and the Rio Treaty provide that those instruments should be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of the signatory states. In the case of the United States, the expression here called for Senate action in giving its advice and consent to ratification. Article 43 of the U. N. Charter provides for the negotiation of special agreements between the Security Council and members on Armed Forces, assistance, and facilities to be made available for U. N. service under the Charter on call of the Council. Article 43 further provides that these agreements "shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." Section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 provides, in the case of the United States, for approval of such special agreements by the Congress.

It is noteworthy that the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Charter contained the following statements:

The committee believes that the authority of the United States delegate should therefore be determined after the Charter has been ratified. However, the committee is convinced that any reservation to the Charter, or any subsequent congressional limitation designed to provide, for example, that employment of the Armed Forces of the United States to be made available to the Security Council under special agreements referred to in article 43 should be authorized only after the Congress had passed on each individual case would clearly violate the spirit of one of the most important provisions of the Charter. One of the fundamental purposes of the Charter is to provide forces which will be immediately available to the Security Council to take action to prevent a breach of the peace. Moreover, if a reservation to this effect were to be adopted by the Senate, the very nature of the Charter itself would be changed, and further negotiations with the other signatories of the Charter would unquestionably be necessary.

The committee feels that a reservation or other congressional action such as that referred to above would also violate the spirit of the United States Constitution under which the President has well-established powers and obligations to use our Armed Forces without specific approval of Congress.

As I have already pointed out, article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that—

This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in reporting on the North Atlantic Treaty, said:

The committee and the Senate, in Senate Resolution 239, attached great importance to assuring that any such agreement as the pact would not only be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of the signatory nations, but also that all its provisions would be carried out under the same constitutional safeguards. Constitutional processes for giving effect to the will of the people are the very essence of democracy, and it is only through wide popular support that the treaty can be given the strength and vitality necessary to assure its success.

The committee wishes to emphasize the fact that the protective clause "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes" was placed in article 11 in order to leave no doubt that it applies not only to article 5, for example, but to every provision in the treaty. The safeguard is thus all-inclusive.

The treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority between the President and the Congress as defined in the Constitution. In no way does it alter the constitutional relationship between them. In particular, it does not increase, decrease, or change the power of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces or impair the full authority of Congress to declare war.

It would seem clear, therefore, that constitutional processes in certain other types of situation call for action by the executive alone without joint resolution, act of Congress, or Senate advice and consent.

Use of the expression "in accordance with constitutional processes" thus is not an attempt to define what processes the

Constitution, in the case of the United States, requires in any given situation. Use of the expression leaves the matter unchanged, and it is necessary to look elsewhere than the expression in order to determine whether the Constitution calls for Senate, congressional, or simple executive action.

In fact, the type of action necessary to carry out our constitutional processes will depend upon the circumstances in each case. The requirement might be met, as in the case of the Rio Pact, by a simple Senate resolution approving the ratification of the treaty. It might be met by a joint resolution passed by both Houses and submitted to the President for his approval. It might be met by a simple Senate resolution or a concurrent resolution. In some cases, it might be met by action taken by the executive branch alone.

What I am driving at is this: The term "constitutional processes," as used in the Atlantic Treaty, simply means that unusual, unconstitutional methods should not be resorted to in the implementation of the treaty. Whatever is done by way of implementation should be carried out in the normal manner in accordance with the customary procedure under the Constitution.

Certainly, as the senior Senator from Georgia has so clearly pointed out, there is nothing in the Constitution which makes it illegal for the Senate to adopt a simple resolution or for the Congress to adopt a concurrent resolution. The Congress is a sovereign body. Any established methods which it may choose to express its approval for a particular course of action is clearly within the meaning of the term "constitutional processes."

In this case, Mr. President, as previously stated, many people believe that the President already possesses the constitutional authority to send additional ground forces to Europe without congressional approval. Personally, I do not believe it is necessary for us to resolve that question at this time. What we need now is national unity in the face of a common danger. The joint committees have recommended that congressional action in this instance should be taken through the medium of a Senate resolution and an identical concurrent resolution. I believe this procedure meets the present situation. Moreover, I believe it fits within the four corners of our Constitution. I hope, therefore, that the Senate will support the recommendation of the joint committees and approve the resolutions in the form in which we have submitted them.

IN FOREIGN RELATIONS THE PRESIDENT'S POWERS ARE PLenary, AND HE CAN DEAL WITH AN EMERGENCY ACCORDING TO THE NEEDS, WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

In the field of foreign relations the powers of the President are very extensive. There is strong support for the proposition that with respect to the external affairs of the Nation, the President may recognize an emergency and act accordingly. This is discussed at considerable length in *Foley, Some Aspects of the Constitutional Powers of the President*, 27 A. B. A. J. 435, 1941. This article cites several instances where this

has been done. On March 16, I quoted in part from the *Curtiss-Wright case—U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* ((1936), 299 U. S. 304)—to show that the President's power in the field of international relations is "plenary and exclusive," and does not require congressional sanction for its exercise.

When a crisis such as war is imminent or threatened, the Executive may act without waiting for congressional authorization. This was sustained in the *Prize cases*, to which we have already alluded. Even when war is not imminent, it has been asserted that the President may act to protect American interests. In 1916 Ex-President Taft wrote in an article entitled "The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial Branches of the Government":

The President has the authority to protect the lives of American citizens and their property with the Army and Navy. This grows out of his control over our foreign relations and his duty to recognize as a binding law upon him the obligation of the Government to its own citizens. (25 *Yale L. J.*, 599, 610 (1916)).

Thus, it would seem to be clear that the President may deploy United States Armed Forces abroad not only when he acts as the Commander in Chief but also when he exercises his exclusive and plenary control over our foreign relations. Both are constitutional processes and both are involved in sending United States troops to Europe to form a part of the new integrated, unified army under a single command.

THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME UNITED STATES TROOPS HAVE BEEN UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL COMMANDER

It has been argued persuasively that this is a departure in our constitutional practices, and I have indicated that I am sympathetic with that point of view. But let us not forget that the United States made her contribution of men to the military force under Field Marshall Count von Waldersee during the Boxer Rebellion; to the Allied army under Marshall Foch in the First World War; and to the Allied operation Overlord under General Eisenhower during the Second World War. And today we are operating a combined command in the Free Territory of Trieste under the command of a British general. Contributing United States ground forces to an international army is not a new departure. See V. Moore, *International Law Digest*, 481-3.

IV

CONCLUSION

Has the President the power to put forces into an international army and transfer them without consent of Congress? I believe, in the light of precedents and the implications of article 11 of the treaty, that it can be argued he does have such power. And that is the very reason I responded to the Senator from Missouri as I did on March 16. Congress should state its view clearly. In the face of such unresolved doubt as exists upon this subject when coupled with the crisis in which the American people finds itself, there is no room for a constitutional conflict, especially when the legislative history of the ratification

of the North Atlantic Pact shows that congressional authority was to be obtained if troops were to be sent to Europe to implement the pact.

Mr. President, when we note the will to peace in the world, this great body cannot set itself against the efforts of the administration to meet the world crisis. There have been many eloquent arguments on this floor designed to solve this problem for the United States by taking us out of the international world. But they do not solve the problem for us. We are inescapably a part of the world in which we live. We cannot run away from it, even if we wanted to do so. To every one of the arguments, I have tried to show, there is an effective answer. When the cards are down, the issue still remains: What does the security of the United States and the interests of the people of our country dictate? Shall there be a resolution or shall there be none?

My unhesitating answer is that we cannot stop short of a resolution. By it we concur, we concert, we agree. It is congressional action—process. It is the instrument on which a joint committee could unanimously report to the Senate. The security of the United States requires that the four divisions of American troops shall be dispatched to Europe. This resolution says the Senate considers it necessary and approves. The American people are given notice that this is the view of both branches of their Government, for the House is given the opportunity to register its opinion if it so chooses. The constitutional question remains unchanged. Those who fear that the Congress will be bypassed unless some congressional action is taken have their congressional action. And consultation is provided for in an effective and orderly manner. I do not think we could ask for more. I urge my colleagues to vote for Senate Resolution 99.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. CASE]. For the benefit of Senators who were not in the Chamber at the time it was stated, I shall repeat it. It is brief, and reads:

On page 5, line 3, at the end of section 6, it is proposed to strike out the period, insert a colon, and the following: "Provided, That persons in the additional ground troops sent to Western Europe in harmony with the provisions of this section shall be not less than 20 years of age."

Mr. President, as a member of the Committee on Armed Services I submit that this would be disruptive to the teamwork in our military organization. In the first place, we have in the occupation army today men who are less than 20 years of age. So we are saying that, so far as they are concerned, they may participate in the international army, but those who are under 20 years of age and still in the United States may not. I say that that is making two classes of soldiers, and I think that would be disruptive of the morale of the Military Establishment.

Furthermore, the amendment relates only to the ground forces, which means that those who are under 20 years of age

in the Air Force and those who are under 20 years of age in the Navy may participate, but we are saying that a man who is in the Army and under 20 years of age may not participate. I submit again that it relates only to Europe. We are saying that none who are under 20 years of age may participate in an international army for the purpose of helping to prevent war in Europe, but we are not drawing that line with respect to those who are under 20 years of age and are now participating in the fighting in Korea. I say that that is utterly inconsistent.

In the general process of training an Army the men in the armed services take their basic training. They go to their units, and participate in unit training. They become members of a fire team. They become participants in a general over-all team, whether it is in the armored division, or whatever other division it may be. This amendment provides that before such a well-trained unit can be sent to participate in an international army the ranks must be screened and everyone who is under 20 years of age must be withdrawn and not permitted to be sent, so far as this resolution is concerned. I believe that that is utterly inconsistent, and would be disruptive of our military organization. Regardless of how we may feel about this resolution and the over-all policy, as a member of the Armed Services Committee I plead with Senators not to take this action, which I believe would be disruptive of our military organization.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. CONNALLY. I should like to have the Senator's views on the proposition that if this amendment were adopted the troops which go to Europe will, we hope, never have to be active. The object is to prevent war, to prevent action. Other troops at home who are under 20 years of age could be sent to Korea, where we know they would have to fight, and perhaps die. It is utter discrimination against those in that position.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I agree with the Senator; and I tried to make that point in the course of my very brief remarks.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Is it not true that during the course of World War II, before the Committee on Armed Services, it was pointed out by a competent witness that a provision at that time calling for discrimination and separation from the ranks actually caused a delay in completing the war against Japan, and also may have caused the death of some of the men who were left behind?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I quite agree with the Senator that that was the evidence before the committee.

I submit that this is not the way to meet this problem. I personally supported on the floor of the Senate the draft of 18-year-olds. There are those who differ with that policy. Men have a right honestly to differ on that issue.

But certainly, whatever the age limit at which we take men into the service, we should not then say to one group of them that we are not going to permit them to participate in the defense of their country along with their associates. I believe that the men in the services themselves would resent that, and I think it would be doubly resented if we were to follow one policy in Europe and an entirely different policy in Asia. For that reason I hope that the amendment offered by the Senator from South Dakota will not be adopted.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Vice President please state how much time is left for the proponents and the opponents of the amendment?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. CASE] has 15 minutes, and the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] has 3 minutes, if they care to use the time.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from California has made an interesting argument. But let us follow through on the argument about disrupting morale. If there was one thing that disrupted the morale of the American people with reference to the war in Korea, it was that boys fresh out of high school, smooth-faced boys, were being thrown into the conflict in Korea. If there is something wrong with doing that, let us correct it. Let us not repeat the mistake. Just because that was done in Korea does not require that we should repeat it in setting up an international army in Europe.

If the opinion of the Senate is to be based upon what will be disruptive to morale, let me suggest that the morale of the American people and the morale of everyone concerned will be shaken upon learning that the Senate, as a matter of policy, with the issue presented to it, hesitates to say that we do not want 18- and 19-year-olds sent into an international command to serve in an international army, alongside soldiers from the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty organization which themselves refused to draft 18- and 19-year-olds.

Will it help the morale of the American people to say that the Senate wants to send 18- and 19-year-olds into the international army when Holland will not draft her boys until they are at least 19, and when Belgium will not draft her boys until they are 19, and then requires that they have a certain amount of training before they can be sent into combat?

Would it help the morale of the American people at this time, when the President of France is here presumably to cement American-Franco relations, to know that we are proposing to draft 18- and 19-year-olds to send into the international army, when France does not even draft her boys until they are 20 and that Italy does not draft her boys until they are 21?

It would strengthen the morale of the American people if the Senate, as a matter of policy, were to say, "We are not going to send 18- and 19-year-olds into

an international army under an international command." Denmark does not draft her boys until they are 20. Norway does not draft her boys until they are 19, and then requires basic training following that before the boys go into combat.

There is another aspect of this question which is suggested by the comparison which the distinguished Senator from California made with respect to service in the Navy. Boys in the Navy, for the most part, serve on board ship. Their environment and their conditions are pretty much controlled by American officers. The duties assigned to them do not bring them into contact with conditions which are not under the control of their officers.

With all respect to the international officers who may command these troops, Members of the Senate who have traveled abroad and who know anything at all about the conditions under which our occupation troops or troops in a police force must serve certainly know that we have little to say about the kind of places the boys are permitted to enter and very little to say about the environment under which they serve. The only single member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which drafts at 18, aside from the United States—if we carry out the new policy—is England; and, for the most part, the boys of England who are assigned to the international army will be serving at home, in England. No other nations in Western Europe drafts at 18. Two or three of them draft at 19, and they require additional training.

Mr. President, history records a number of crusades along in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, as I recall, to recover the Holy Land. One of them was called the Children's Crusade, because children were called upon to help recover the Holy Land, and their bones and their graves were scattered from France to the Holy Land.

General Eisenhower wrote of his experiences in World War II in Europe under the heading, "Crusade in Europe."

What I am suggesting today is that we shall say that it is the sense of the Senate that this is not to be another Children's Crusade. Call it sentiment or call it a little hard-headed consideration for the kind of an army we want, it must be remembered that the Constitution provides that the Congress shall make the rules and regulations for the Army and the Navy. Even though we admit, for the sake of this argument, all that can be said about the authority of the Commander in Chief, no Member of the Senate will deny that the Constitution says the Congress shall have the power to make rules and regulations for the Army and Navy and for the militia when called into the service of the United States.

Much debate has been addressed to the big constitutional questions, and that is all proper. But if anything, there has been too little consideration of the content of the policy we will voice here in one way or another. My amendment is an attempt to say, as a matter of policy, that the consent of the Senate and the advice of the Senate, shall not be merely registered as an affirmation

after the fact, merely giving an O. K. to something that has already been done, but that we here seek to express our own opinion on foreign policy. It strikes me as an empty assertion of congressional authority to say, "Yes, we approve of what you have done, but next time please ask us about it before you do it." If we would make it more than that kind of a sorry approval after the fact, we should here say something about it. We should express ourselves as to the kind of policy we want to implement. That is why I offered the amendment. I feel that the American people are entitled to have an expression initiated by the Senate, a statement by the Senate as to what our policy should be. I feel that the Senate should say, "This international army, this third crusade in Europe, is not to be a children's crusade."

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. I call to the Senator's attention the fact that some of the National Guard units now in Korea contain many boys of 17 and 18 years of age. There are some from my State in that age group. With reference to the question of morale, I think we have received more protests from the people at home over sending to Korea youths of that age to fight before they were properly trained, than over any other one question that has come before us in recent times.

Mr. CASE. It would help the morale of the American people, in my judgment, if the boys 18 and 19 were given an opportunity to get out of Korea.

Mr. WATKINS. It seems to me the amendment of the Senator from South Dakota should receive the support of everyone who considers the question of the morale of the American people. It will certainly not result in building morale to take the boys in the circumstances under which they are taken.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield to me the remainder of the time he has?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. On this issue I submit that the adoption of the amendment will result in establishing two different classes of soldiers, those in the Far East fighting in Korea at the present time, and those we are proposing to have go to Europe to prevent, if possible, the breaking out of war there.

The Senator from Utah has raised the question that the troops should not be sent if they are young men not properly trained. I agree with the Senator on that point. Indeed, I agree that no soldier should be sent, whether he is 18, 19, or up to 26 years of age, unless he is properly trained. That is not the issue. Of course, all our troops should go through their basic training. They should have a period of time for unit training. The point at issue is, after they are properly trained, when they are in their divisions, when they are a part of the fire teams, whether we are going

to remove them from ground forces sent to Europe, but let them serve when it is proposed to send them to Korea. Furthermore, there is involved the question whether we are going to say it is perfectly all right for them to go into the Air Force and Navy, but not to go into the Army. I submit that is not a sound policy. It would be utterly disruptive of the Defense Establishment.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I should very much like to yield, but I have only 3 minutes, and the Senator from South Dakota, I believe, has a little additional time remaining.

The Senator points out that some nations do not draft their men at as early age as we are proposing to do. I admit that is correct. But we stop our draft at 26 years of age, and some nations continue their draft on up to as high as 35 years of age.

The question is not whether it is wise or desirable, or whether we want to call these young men into the service. I think all of us wish we lived in a world where we did not have to maintain the type of defense establishment we must maintain. But so long as we are faced with the menace of communism we must provide armed defense forces for the Nation. It is not for us to lower our sights to the lowest sights of some European ally, but rather it is our job to try to raise their sights so we may all meet the menace of international communism.

Certainly I do not agree, and I do not think the Senator from South Dakota would agree, simply because some European nation decided it would have no armaments at all, that that was an example and a precept we should follow, because we know that when nations have been weak they have been overcome by communism. We must lead from strength, and not from weakness. The one chance we have to preserve the peace of the world is to maintain an adequate national defense, and once we have taken these men into the army—and the place to decide that issue is on the manpower bill and not in connection with the pending resolutions, when they have had their basic training, when they have had their unit training, when they have become parts of a fire team, we should not say to their responsible commanding officers, "Now you must take them out and disrupt your organization."

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from California has expired.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, have I some time left?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from South Dakota has 8 minutes left.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I should like to call the attention of the Senate to the fact that the portion of the resolution to which the amendment is addressed deals only with ground forces. That is why the amendment uses these words. Paragraph 6, which my amendment seeks to amend, deals exclusively with the approval of the sending of four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe. I read the last clause:

And the Senate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe.

My amendment adds at that point the following:

Provided, That persons in the additional ground troops sent to Western Europe in harmony with the provisions of this section shall be not less than 20 years of age.

If the resolution itself were dealing with air forces or naval forces, that would be another matter, and that question might be raised. But the amendment deals with ground troops because that is the subject of the resolution.

In any event, the considerations pertaining to age with respect to ground forces are different than those with respect to the Air Force, or the Navy, because of the nature of their respective duties, the nature of their stations, and the nature of their commands. The naval contingents for all practical purposes will be on board ships that are sent out of American waters. The air troops will be stationed at air bases for the most part, under present plans—well, perhaps, we should not go into that subject now. But at least air troops can move more rapidly than ground troops.

Furthermore, those who are familiar with the type of recruits that are sought for the Air Force, the Navy, and ground troops—and I am sure the Senator from California will bear me out—know that the Navy and Air Force have catered more to younger men. Enlistment ages, historically, have been lower as well as entrance ages for Annapolis as compared with West Point. There must be sound military reasons for that.

But laying that aside, we are here dealing with a resolution which proposes to approve the sending of "additional ground troops" to Europe. That is what we are dealing with.

If the age requirements should be corrected with respect to the Air Force and the Navy, that is another matter; but it is not presently before us.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator from South Dakota seems to be leaving the impression that so far as the ground forces are concerned, they will not be under American officers, but that the men in the Navy will serve on ships under American officers and that those in the Air Force will be under American officers. Let me say that no one has any idea of putting American soldiers under foreign officers in the international force, which is to be composed of naval, air, and ground force units. That is not the way that force will be organized. There will be American divisions that will have American commanders; there will be American regiments that will have American commanders; there will be American companies that will have American commanders. We shall not require individual American ground soldiers to serve under an international or foreign commanding officer, any more than we shall require our Air Force wings or Naval squadrons to serve under foreign commanders.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, in commenting on that point, it should be stated, as a matter of physical fact, that

if a boy is serving aboard ship, the conditions under which he serves are much more under the supervision and control of his American commander and are much different from the conditions under which a boy serves in ground troops in a foreign country, even though he may serve there under an American commander, for the environment in the foreign country is very different.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. CASE. Yes, but only briefly as my time is running out and others wish me to yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I shall be brief. Let me say that I do not agree with the Senator from South Dakota that all military environment or service environment is bad. If a young man wishes to get into trouble or into a bad environment, he can find a bad environment in some of our American cities.

Mr. CASE. Certainly that is true, Mr. President; young people can find a bad environment in Washington, D. C., for instance, by going to some of the downtown clubs where, unfortunately, one member of our armed services was wounded the other night.

However, the point is that a boy of 18 or 19 years of age is not in the position in which an older boy is, in respect to selecting his environment. Certainly no Senator will maintain that in the critical teen years there is not a great deal of difference between boys who are 1 year or 1½ or 2 years apart in age, in respect to the selection of environment.

Mr. DIRKSEN and Mr. LEHMAN addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from South Dakota yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. CASE. I yield first to the Senator from Illinois, and then I shall yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, with especial reference to the observations made by the Senator from California, let me say that unless we are sending these detachments abroad to go into combat immediately, it is fair to assume that most of the time they will be doing garrison duty in Europe. Anyone who has been in uniform knows what garrison duty is. In such case, the young man will be circulating around, when he is not engaged in intensive training; and the chances are that for only 6 weeks out of a 6-month period will he be taken somewhere for a period of intensive training. The rest of the time he will be more than likely to be a civilian emissary for his own country. I contend that when he is serving in that status and in that capacity, if he has the benefit of the maturity and the judgment which are attained after being a few years older, he will be a far better representative of his country.

Anyone who has been in Germany, anyone who has been around the world in the last few years, particularly since the end of World War II, will know that it is those who are older and more mature who have done an infinitely better job for their country.

Unless it is contended that our men will be sent abroad to fight at once, I wish to see them have a little more ma-

turity when they are doing garrison duty; and goodness knows how long they will be there, circulating first in one country and then in another. If they have the additional maturity and the extra age, I think there will be reason to be a good deal prouder of their service than otherwise we might be if we were to send immature young men to Europe.

The amendment also provides that "the additional ground troops shall be not less than 20 years of age." The adoption of that amendment will not prevent the use in the international force of some of our occupational troops who already are abroad. The amendment merely provides that "the additional ground troops sent to Western Europe shall be not less than 20 years of age."

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. Should not the remarks of the Senator from South Dakota have been addressed to the bill the Senate passed some weeks ago, by which the draft age was set at 18 years?

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, at that time I voted for the one amendment on which we had an opportunity to express ourselves on the age matter. It was the amendment by the distinguished Senator from Oregon, to put the draft age floor at 18½ years rather than at 18. However, even there the situation is not analogous, because in that case we were proposing a training program, under which, presumably, those who would be drafted would receive some months of training before going into service. In the present case we are dealing with the question of service of ground troops in Western Europe. Mr. President, let us not make the international army a children's crusade.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from South Dakota has expired.

All time on the amendment has expired.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. WHERRY and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays, and the yeas and nays were ordered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. YOUNG (when his name was called). On this vote I have a pair with the senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKellar], who is absent because of illness. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." I withhold my vote.

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCarran] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKellar] is absent because of illness.

I announce further that if present and voting, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] and the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE] are detained on official business. If present and voting, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 27, nays 62, as follows:

YEAS—27

Bennett	Cordon	Kem
Brewster	Dirksen	Langer
Bricker	Dworshak	Millikin
Butler, Md.	Eaton	Mundt
Butler, Nebr.	Ferguson	Schoeppel
Capehart	Hendrickson	Watkins
Carlson	Hickenlooper	Welker
Case	Jenner	Wherry
Chavez	Johnson, Colo.	Williams

NAYS—62

Alken	Holland	Murray
Anderson	Humphrey	Neely
Benton	Hunt	Nixon
Byrd	Ives	O'Connor
Cain	Johnson, Tex.	O'Mahoney
Clements	Johnston, S. C.	Pastore
Connally	Kefauver	Robertson
Douglas	Kerr	Russell
Duff	Kilgore	Saltonstall
Eastland	Knowland	Smathers
Ellender	Lehman	Smith, Maine
Flanders	Lodge	Smith, N. J.
Frear	Long	Smith, N. C.
Fulbright	McCarthy	Sparkman
George	McClellan	Stennis
Gillette	McFarland	Taft
Green	McMahon	Thye
Hayden	Martin	Tobey
Hennings	Maybank	Underwood
Hill	Monroney	Wiley
Hoey	Morse	

NOT VOTING—7

Bridges	Magnuson	Young
McCarran	Malone	
McKellar	Vandenberg	

So Mr. CASE's amendment was rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution is open to amendment.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I desire to call up an amendment which I desire to offer to the pending resolution. It is my amendment B.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will state the amendment.

The amendment proposed by Mr. McCLELLAN to Senate Resolution 99 was read, as follows:

On page 5, at the end of line 2, change the semicolon to a comma, and immediately thereafter insert the following: "but it is the sense of the Senate that no troops in addition to such four divisions shall be sent to Western Europe in implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty without further senatorial approval."

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. President, the purpose of this amendment is to clarify section 6 of the pending resolution. There are those who opposed the two resolutions because they think that any expression by the Senate or by the Congress is an infringement upon the constitutional prerogatives of the President as Commander in Chief. With that viewpoint I do not agree. When I addressed the Senate last Thursday, I stated my position with reference to the constitutional questions that are here involved. Assuming that

the Senate takes action, it is contemplated that one of the two resolutions, or both, will be agreed to by a majority of the Senate and of the House. We should therefore make every effort to have the language of the resolutions made so clear and certain in its terms that, when adopted, we will know what we have said and done.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. In the Senator's amendment, with which I am thoroughly in agreement, I notice the language is used "without further senatorial approval." That violates my view that there must be congressional approval.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I may say to the able Senator that two resolutions are pending, and to each resolution I have proposed a similar amendment. Therefore, if only the Senate resolution should be adopted providing for senatorial approval, then I think the Senate should approve.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. My thought is, that even in the Senate resolution, we are justified in expressing the sense of the Senate that the Congress shall approve.

Mr. McCLELLAN. That is all right, but we shall have the same opportunity in connection with the concurrent resolution to say "it is the sense of the Congress."

Mr. WHERRY and Mr. CORDON addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Arkansas yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am glad to yield first to the minority leader.

Mr. WHERRY. I agree with the Senator that he has offered his amendment to both resolutions, but does he not feel that whether the amendment be to the Senate resolution or to the Senate concurrent resolution, the objective should be accomplished of having the approval of Congress—

Mr. McCLELLAN. If the amendment to the concurrent resolution is agreed to and the concurrent resolution is agreed to, there is no point in arguing it. But if we are simply going to let the Senate express itself, let us conform to that and say, "It is the sense of the Senate."

Mr. WHERRY. I brought the question up because I wanted to make that point clear. If the Senate resolution should be agreed to, does the Senator feel that the Senate ought at least to include its approval of sending troops to Europe?

Mr. McCLELLAN. That is my point exactly. If the suggested amendment should be adopted, then we are certain that it will be in the Senate resolution if it is agreed to. I am hoping that my amendment will be agreed to, and then we can feel certain that a similar amendment will be adopted to the concurrent resolution.

From the very beginning of the debate, since these resolutions were re-

ported, I have been asking members of the Committee on Armed Services and of the Committee on Foreign Relations whether, under the language of the resolutions as now written, they would require the President of the United States to come to Congress for approval, or do they express the view that it is the sense of the Senate or the sense of the Congress that congressional approval should be had of additional assignments of troops. Nearly every Member to whom I have talked and whom I have interrogated has had some different idea or interpretation of the meaning of the resolution.

Either we believe the President should come to Congress to get approval or come to the Senate to get approval before assigning additional troops to the international army, or we do not so believe. We either favor it or we do not favor it.

If my amendment is adopted, this resolution is plain; it is absolutely positive. There can be no equivocation; there can be no misunderstanding or misinterpretation on the part of the President of the United States or on the part of anyone else. But if we adopt the resolution in its present form some of us will be voting for it believing and hoping that it expresses the sense of the Senate that further congressional approval will be required if additional troops are to be assigned, and others will take the position once the policy is approved, as this resolution approves it, the President is free to send unlimited numbers of troops abroad without obtaining approval from either the House or the Senate.

Mr. CORDON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am glad to yield.

Mr. CORDON. Does the Senator intend that his amendment shall refer to ground troops?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Yes; that is what the resolution deals with. I am perfectly willing to modify the amendment in that respect.

Mr. President, at this time I ask consent to modify the amendment to insert the word "ground" before the word "troops," in line 3. I thought it was clear.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator may so modify his own amendment.

Mr. McCLELLAN. The able Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], in his address this morning, referred to this question. I thought I understood him to say that, according to his opinion, a majority of the members of the Committee on Armed Services and of the Committee on Foreign Relations, which heard the testimony and reported the resolutions, did so in the belief and with the understanding that the President, under the resolution would be required to come to the Senate to get further approval. That was the Senator's understanding, and a majority so understood it.

Let us clarify it. We do not have to leave it that way. There is no sense in adopting the resolution when it is so ambiguous that it will be susceptible of different interpretations. This is simple and easy. We are either for the President coming to Congress for approval, or we are opposing it. If the resolution is amended as proposed by me, there will

be no misunderstanding about how the Senate feels, once a vote is cast upon the resolution.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am glad to yield to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Did not the Senator intend to refer to article 3 of the Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. McCLELLAN. It is in implementation of the whole treaty.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. No one has questioned the procedure under article 5 of the treaty. We do not want the President to come to Congress in case article 5 should be involved. It seems to me it should be limited to article 3.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I have no objection to dealing with only the present situation. The purpose is the implementation of the entire treaty, to be prepared for attack if it should come, to be prepared for aggression if aggression should come and if an attack is made. It is in implementation of the whole treaty, including article 5.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I invite the Senator's attention to the fact that he is amending paragraph 6, which reads as follows:

It is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Then the Senator offers to amend that which already ties his amendment to it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Absolutely. It is a declaration of the sense of the Senate, and this amendment ties in with it.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Article 3 relates to the sending of troops when there is no actual warfare.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield myself three more minutes.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am glad to yield.

Mr. WHERRY. The observation made by the distinguished Senator from Virginia was one of the observations which I wanted to make, but I should like to ask this question: In the event the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas is not agreed to, is it his feeling that it is unnecessary for the President to come to Congress to ask for authority to assign any more troops under the resolution?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I have grave fear that the resolution in its present form is susceptible to that interpretation.

Mr. WHERRY. That is correct.

Mr. McCLELLAN. There are those who favor the resolution in its present form and who want it to have that interpretation. That is why I desire to clarify it, so there will be no doubt, and I am

asking my colleagues to vote either for or against it. If it is adopted, there will be no question about what is intended.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. CAIN. I expect to vote for the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, because I think it is both positive and clear. My question is this: If the Senator's amendment, however clear and positive it may be, is adopted, will it amount to anything more than an expression of opinion by the Senate of the United States?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Irrespective of the legal conclusions we arrive at, the whole purpose is in the interest of constitutional processes and national unity and understanding. That is why we are proposing to take action. Let me say further that national unity and understanding can best be promoted by obtaining the approval of the people of the Nation through their elected representatives in Congress. Any attempt to circumvent and avoid having the elected representatives of the people share in the responsibility will bring about greater disunity, greater misunderstanding, and less willingness to have our boys sent abroad, where they may have to be sacrificed on foreign battlefields. If we want unity and understanding, let Congress share the responsibility. Mr. President, I am willing to share it. I believe we should send some troops to Western Europe.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 more minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. At this time the Senate is compelled to proceed to the Hall of the House of Representatives. The Senator from Arkansas will be recognized when the Senate reassembles.

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE IN THE HALL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—RECESS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, formal arrangements have been made for a joint meeting of the House and Senate to hear an address to be delivered by the President of the Republic of France. I therefore move that the Senate stand in recess for that purpose, that the Members of the Senate now proceed to the Hall of the House of Representatives, and that the Senate reconvene immediately after the conclusion of the address.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McFARLAND. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. The motion is debatable, is it not?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair thinks it is debatable.

Mr. WHERRY. I shall not debate the motion at length; but I want to have an understanding about whether the adoption of the motion invalidates the unanimous-consent agreement under which the Senate is now operating.

The VICE PRESIDENT. There is a specific provision with respect to it in the unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to have the provision pointed out to me, because my understanding was that the Senate would stay in continuous session.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The motion has no effect upon the unanimous-consent agreement, except to suspend the agreement while the Senate is in recess and attending the ceremonies in the Hall of the House of Representatives.

Mr. WHERRY. That is the statement I wanted to hear. The adoption of the motion does suspend the provisions of the unanimous-consent agreement. I should like to ask another question of the distinguished Vice President. The same situation may be presented if we decide to recess tonight at 6 o'clock. Would a recess then suspend the operation of the unanimous-consent agreement? The unanimous-consent agreement provides that the consideration of the resolutions shall be proceeded with continuously until they are disposed of. Is that correct?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair so understands. A temporary suspension would not invalidate the unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, the unanimous-consent agreement provides that the Senate is to remain in continuous session until consideration of the two resolutions has been concluded. That will be done, unless we enter into a unanimous-consent agreement to do otherwise. However, the unanimous-consent agreement also provides—

That it shall be in order on said Monday, April 2, notwithstanding the provisions of the above agreement, for the Senate to attend a joint meeting of the two Houses in the Hall of the House of Representatives to hear an address by the President of France.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the motion of the Senator from Arizona.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 12 o'clock and 3 minutes p. m.) the Senate stood in recess.

Thereupon, the Senate, preceded by its Secretary (Leslie L. Biffle), its Sergeant at Arms (Joseph C. Duke), and the Vice President, proceeded to the Hall of the House of Representatives to hear the address delivered by His Excellency, Vincent Auriol, President of the Republic of France.

(For the address delivered by the President of the Republic of France see page 3118-3120 of today's proceedings in the House of Representatives.)

At 12 o'clock and 55 minutes p. m., the Senate, having returned to its Chamber, reassembled, and was called to order by the Vice President.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

ASSIGNMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO DUTY IN THE EUROPEAN AREA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution (S. Res. 99) approving

the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defense efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. When the Senate recessed, the Senator from Arkansas had used 13 minutes and had remaining 17 minutes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield myself two more minutes in order that I may yield to the Senator from Virginia.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator has control of his entire time.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am yielding to the able Senator from Virginia for the purpose of a question. Or, if he would like the floor, I shall be glad to yield him some time.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I merely wanted to comment on the interpretation of section 6, and to say that I feel that the amendment offered by the senior Senator from Arkansas is in line with what I always thought section 6 meant.

Let us analyze it. It begins by saying:

In the interests of sound constitutional processes—

That relates to policy where a treaty is involved—

and of national unity and understanding.

Everyone wants unity if we are going into a major military effort. It is very desirable. Then the section goes on to say that under those circumstances, before any troops are sent abroad under article 3, which is the peace-serving article of the Atlantic Pact, there should be congressional approval. I am omitting reference to the fact that the President has notified us that he wants to send four divisions abroad under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and we approve sending four divisions abroad. The first part of the paragraph clearly indicates that it refers to a continuing policy. If there are to be two or four or six additional divisions sent later, the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas merely means, as I construe it, that if the President wants to send more than four divisions later, the same rule shall apply, and the Congress shall be notified that the President wants to send additional troops to implement our commitment to the Atlantic Pact, and desires the approval of Congress.

To me, Mr. President, that is a very simple procedure, and I hope that all Senators who believe in paragraph 6 will also accept the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I should like to have a vote on the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN].

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield for a question?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I call the attention of the Senator from Arkansas to the fact that paragraph 6 of Senate Resolution 99, which the Sena-

tor now proposes to amend, provides, in line 21, at page 4, "congressional approval should be obtained," whereas I note in the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas the language is: "further senatorial approval." Does not the Senator think that there is an inconsistency and contradiction between the two provisions, unless the second provision, just read from the Senator's proposed amendment, is changed to read "congressional approval"?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I may say that I have no objection to making it "congressional approval." I intend to offer such an amendment to Senate Concurrent Resolution 18. In this instance we are dealing with a Senate resolution.

Mr. HOLLAND. Will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. While it is correct to say that we are dealing with a Senate resolution, it is also true that paragraph 6 of the Senate resolution, if adopted, would require a finding that it is the sense of the Senate that congressional approval should be obtained. It states:

6. It is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

It seems to the Senator from Florida that an inconsistent note would be injected into paragraph 6 if the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas were to remain in its present form, because it refers to "further senatorial approval," whereas paragraph 6 in the Senate resolution speaks of "congressional approval."

Mr. McCLELLAN. I appreciate the Senator's suggestion. I have no objection to modifying the amendment, if the Senator thinks it is important to do so. Accordingly, Mr. President, I modify my amendment by striking out "senatorial approval" in the last line of my amendment and inserting in lieu thereof "congressional approval," so as to conform the language with the text of paragraph 6 of the Senate resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOEY in the chair). The Senator from Arkansas modifies his amendment accordingly.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's making the modification.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am glad to do so, even though we are dealing with a Senate resolution at this time.

Mr. WHERRY. It would still mean that what we did was the sense of the Senate, namely, that congressional approval be obtained.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am glad to make the modification. I had promised to yield 1 minute to the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT]. I do not see him in the Chamber.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am not certain that whether the Senator has modified his

amendment in line 5 by including the words "in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty."

Mr. McCLELLAN. I do not think it is necessary to do so, because paragraph 6 deals with article 3.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Arkansas have any objection to inserting the reference to article 3? I ask the question because some Members of the Senate would go along with the Senator's amendment if he were so to modify it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I have no objection to so modifying it, because that is exactly what paragraph 6 relates to. It refers to the implementation of article 3. If such a modification would clarify the amendment, I have no objection to modifying it in that way.

Mr. MORSE. I think it would clarify the amendment.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I further modify my amendment by adding after the word "implementation" in line 5 the words "article 3", so as to make the phrase read "implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator modifies his amendment accordingly.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I am glad that the Senator from Arkansas has accepted the suggestions of the Senator from Florida and the Senator from Oregon. I think in so doing he clarifies his amendment to the point where there will be no dispute about it. Otherwise, the semicolon might have left the inference that the amendment applied to the entire North Atlantic Treaty, rather than to article 3 of the treaty.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield for a question. May I ask the Senator from Texas whether he intends to use any time in discussion of the amendment? If so, I should like to reserve some time.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not intend to use more than a few minutes.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I appreciate the Senator's modifying his amendment, because I feel there are a number of Senators who now feel better about voting in favor of it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I very much hope that the Senate will not adopt the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas. The members of the two committees which considered the resolutions feel they have labored on this question for a long time, and that we have done the best we could possibly do in the resolutions as they have been reported to the Senate. Our attitude is to support what the committees have done and to vote down all amendments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] as modified.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wonder whether the Senator would tell the Senate what is his understanding of the present provision of paragraph 6 of Senate Resolution 99, or that portion of it which reads:

6. It is the sense of the Senate, that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring—

And so forth. What is the understanding of the Senator from Texas with reference to the meaning of that provision?

Mr. CONNALLY. The meaning of the provision is that it is merely an expression of the views of the Senate. It has no binding or legal effect at all. Does that answer the Senator's question?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. It seems to the Senator from Florida that while of course it has no binding effect on the President, it does bind the Senate and Senators who vote for it as the expression of their sense and understanding of its being the legal situation that congressional approval must be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It has been the understanding of the Senator from Florida that that is what was meant by paragraph 6. It is for that reason that he sees no objection to the inclusion of the clarifying amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN].

I would appreciate very much an expression by the Senator from Texas, as chairman of the committees sitting jointly on this important question, as to whether or not it is true that paragraph 6 as now drawn would express the sense of the Senate, or at least of those Senators who voted for it, that congressional approval must be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of any American troops abroad under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. CONNALLY. I will say to the Senator from Florida that the language in paragraph 6 is "congressional approval." It is subject, however, to different interpretations. On the one hand, some members of the committees expressed the view that congressional approval could be given only by formal legislation. Others believed that both the letter and spirit of paragraph 6 might be met in certain circumstances by consultation by the administration with, and the approval of, appropriate committees of Congress. In any event, it should be noted that the resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that congressional approval should be given. It is not a legislative mandate. Of course, when we speak of congressional action we usually mean action by both Houses of Congress. However, it is a loose term, which is frequently used without any accurate or specific definition.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I should like to make the observation that that is exactly what is confusing the whole issue. Some members of the committee place one interpretation on the language. Other members of the committee place an entirely different interpretation on it. I do not know what interpretation the President of the United States or others would place on it. I do know that if the amendment which I have offered should be adopted the language would not be susceptible to different interpretations. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I urge support of the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas. It is in accordance with what I think we clearly mean. In the second place, it would do what we did in the case of the United Nations' army. The United Nations Charter provides that the number of troops shall be agreed to and shall be limited. I think there is no question about the power of Congress to make such a limitation. I wish particularly to call attention to a poll of public opinion, which is in the hands of every newspaper in the country. It is a Gallup poll. The exact question asked was:

At the present time, do you think Congress should have the right to limit the number of troops which can be sent to Europe, or do you think the number of troops which can be sent should be left up to the President and his advisers?

The answers were: Congress, 58 percent; the President, 31 percent; both, 1 percent; no opinion, 10 percent. In other words, the people of the country believe, by a vote of nearly 2 to 1, that Congress rather than the President, should determine the number of troops to be sent abroad.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the complete Gallup poll statement be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESS SHOULD HAVE RIGHT TO LIMIT NUMBER OF TROOPS SENT OVERSEAS, PUBLIC SAYS—MAJORITY IN SURVEY OPPOSES LEAVING DECISION SOLELY UP TO PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISERS

(By George Gallup, director, American Institute of Public Opinion)

PRINCETON, N. J., April 3.—Should the President have the right to send as many troops overseas as he wants—or should Congress limit the number?

In the current debate over this issue, public opinion upholds the right of Congress to limit the number, judging from interviews just completed with a balanced cross section of the voting population.

This vote may signify growing congressional prestige in the public eye as President Truman's popularity diminishes.

The average American seems to want Congress to exercise final judgment on this vital issue.

In making the survey interviewers for the institute put the following question to each person interviewed:

"At the present time, do you think Congress should have the right to limit the number of troops which can be sent to Europe, or do you think the number of troops which

can be sent should be left up to the President and his advisers?"

	Percent
Congress-----	58
President-----	31
Both-----	1
No opinion-----	10
Total-----	100

Actually, there have been two issues involved in the controversy over Presidential powers in the matter of troops: (1) Whether the President should be allowed to send soldiers overseas without obtaining congressional approval first, and (2) whether the number he can send should be limited.

On both counts the public has been siding with Congress.

Last month the institute reported a survey showing that 64 percent think the President should not be allowed to send troops overseas without prior congressional approval, while 28 percent think he should have this right and 8 percent are undecided.

REPUBLICAN ATTACKS

Senator ROBERT A. TAFT, of Ohio, has led attacks on the President's unchecked power to send troops overseas.

TAFT's position is that if there is no limit on the Presidential power to dispatch troops abroad, it would "practically destroy the power of Congress over foreign relations."

He and other Republicans charge that Mr. Truman's own action in sending troops to Korea last summer was arbitrary and not well thought out.

The Korean episode may, in fact, have a bearing on the public's apparent wish to have Congress act as watchdog on the troops issue.

In January and again in February the weight of opinion, as measured in institute surveys, was that our entry into the Korean War was a mistake.

By the terms of the new draft bill passed by the Senate and now before the House, Congress could by indirection put a limit on the number of troops the President can send abroad.

The bill puts a limit on the total size of the Armed Forces.

With two hemispheres to police, as well as continental United States, this would automatically place a limit on the number of American troops that would be available for the defense of Europe.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield 1 minute to me?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I wish to reserve some time.

Mr. WHERRY. I desire only 1 minute.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I intend to support this amendment. I only regret that the congressional determination does not run also to the four divisions. That is the only regret I have in supporting the amendment completely. I think it is just as important that Congress determine the policy with respect to sending the four divisions as it is with respect to sending further divisions. My feeling is that this is a toe-in-the-door policy. That is one thing which I think has clouded this issue. This amendment would certainly make it clear as to what we are to do in the future. If the amendment is adopted, the determination ought to be on the basis of a joint resolution, so as to give it the effect of law. But certainly if it is the sense of the Senate that

constitutional processes ought to be adhered to so far as future divisions are concerned, we shall have accomplished that much.

I intend to support this amendment, but I believe that it is just as important that congressional determination run not only to the four divisions but to any other troops which may be assigned under the implementation of article 3 of the Atlantic Treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOEY in the chair). The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON.]

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] has read to the Senate the figures of a Gallup poll as to how the United States should be defended. The Constitution provides who shall be in charge of the various aspects of the defense of the United States. The Constitution says that the President of the United States shall be the Commander in Chief. It also provides that the Congress shall have the power to raise armies and maintain a navy. But, Mr. President, in my opinion, when the Congress undertakes to deploy the troops there will be a repetition of the terrible mistake which was made during the first part of the War Between the States, when there was constituted a committee of Congress which told the President of the United States how to operate the Armed Forces, with results that are only too well known to history.

We are now going one step further, it seems. We are going to take a Gallup poll as to where we shall send troops, and how many. I suppose the next question will be as to what kind of equipment shall be sent.

I notice that the amendment has been modified by inserting a provision that no ground troops in addition to the four divisions shall be sent to Western Europe. In all this debate to which I have been able to listen, there has been no effort to distinguish the President's power to distribute the naval forces, the Air Forces, and the ground forces of the armed services of the United States.

Mr. President, this amendment, if adopted, would, it seems to me, be subversive of the Constitution. It would be placing hobbles on General Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and would result in the future in a pitched battle in this body upon every single deployment of troops which might be proposed.

I believe that the best interests of the national security lie in the defeat of the amendment.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I certainly hope that this amendment will not be adopted. It seems to me that what we have had going on for the past 3 months on the floor of the Senate is the best argument against the amendment. If it

should happen that more troops were needed in Europe, and if other nations were to say that they would put up many additional divisions if the United States would put up one or two more divisions, the President should have the authority to go ahead and send additional troops, without having to come to Congress and await the results of a Gallup poll, while we spend 3 months in debate, so as to give every Senator an opportunity to be heard in detail and make five or six speeches on the subject. At some time decisions must be made. We have been fortunate that the Communists have not moved while this so-called great debate of 3 months has been taking place.

The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Somewhere along the line decisions must be made as to when certain things are to be done, and they must be made without hearing every Senator in complete detail while he states his views, and without waiting for a Gallup poll and thinking the thing over for 5 or 6 months before a decision is reached.

I believe that we should recognize the fact that we are not going to save lives merely by having our troops in the United States. If war should break out in Europe, not only four divisions, but every division we could raise would be sent into the fight. Our troops will have to go overseas if war breaks out. They will have to fight on foreign soil, whether we want it that way or not. So to sit here and hope that if we keep our troops in the United States our boys will not be called in the event of war, is only wishful thinking. We might as well realize that the best chance for us to preserve the peace is to have allies, to be strong, and to be able to win a war if we must fight one.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG. Not at this time.

We know that we shall get a great deal more help from France, Belgium, Holland, and our other allies if we have forces in the field which can prevent those countries from being overrun while they are calling up their reserves and getting their men to the colors. If France is able to mobilize her entire reserves, she may have two or three million men in the field if we can keep the country from being overrun while she is mobilizing. If other nations are going to work with us, we ought to be able to take action without hearing from everyone in the United States before any additional troops can be assigned. Therefore it seems to me that once we have made the decision, the President should be able to assign certain troops to General Eisenhower's army, and should be able to decide how many troops ought to be assigned, rather than to have his hands tied and be compelled to come back to Congress.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LONG. I yield for a question if I have time.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I should like to call the Senator's attention—

Mr. LONG. I yield for a question.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I am going to ask a question, but I wish to call the Senator's attention to the fact that there has been a great deal of criticism about the slowness of Congress. I wish to ask him if he is not aware that practically 2 years have gone by since the North Atlantic Pact was approved. The European nations have apparently done nothing physically to implement their side of the agreement.

In this morning's issue of the New York Times it is stated that finally, at long last, the administrative end in Western Europe has finally decided where it will locate the army headquarters and where it will locate the administrative headquarters. They have been fighting back and forth, as to whether it should be in Paris or London, or whether it should be divided. After months and months of argument and delay, they have finally decided administratively the simple question of where the headquarters shall be. The criticism of Congress is probably not justified.

Mr. LONG. I cannot see that it would at all help if, after the people to whom the Senator from Iowa has referred had wrangled 2 or 3 months in an attempt to reach a decision as to where to locate the headquarters, Congress should wrangle for 2 or 3 more months about the same subject.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining? I was originally yielded 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOEY in the chair). The Senator has one-half minute remaining.

Mr. WATKINS. I doubt whether I could complete my question in one-half minute. I shall not try.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN].

Mr. LEHMAN. If the pending amendment is adopted, I believe we will be doing an extremely unwise and dangerous thing. It would inevitably result in tying the hands of the President and of our military authorities. As the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] has pointed out, we have already debated the subject for the better part of 3 months. We have seen filibusters in the Senate, and if we adopt the amendment, it will mean that when action hereafter is requested, debate on the subject may last for weeks, and perhaps months, and thus tie the hands of the President and our military authorities for an indefinite time.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LEHMAN. I have only 2 minutes, and I cannot yield.

There is nothing new about the principle that the President has the right to deploy our troops. He has done it time and time again. We have troops in Trieste, we have troops in the Mediterranean area and in Greece. They are not endangering the security of this

country any more than would the troops we might send to take part in the international army under the command of a great American general.

It is nothing new for our troops to be a part of an international army. We took part in such an organization 50 years ago, at the time of the Boxer Uprising, in China, when our troops became a part of an international force headed by a German general, a force that was participated in by France, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and Germany. We did not thereby lose our sovereignty. We did not lose our power of withdrawal had we considered it wise to do so, any more than we would lose that power now.

Mr. President, the pending amendment is one of the most important amendments that will come before this body today. If we adopt the amendment we will take the chance of rendering ourselves, for an indefinite period, completely impotent, of rendering ourselves subject to long, endless debates which will occupy time which should be given to other important matters.

Mr. President, I hope the amendment will be defeated.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. How much time for debate remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas has 6 minutes remaining; the Senator from Texas has 15 minutes.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS].

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am entirely in sympathy with the idea of some rather strong safeguards being placed around the sending of large numbers of troops to Europe, but, with all due deference to the distinguished author of the pending amendment, and those who support it, I am somewhat alarmed at the extent to which the amendment goes. I think it would be a most serious mistake to adopt it.

When it comes to sending troops to Europe, let us either send them or not. That is a policy to be decided and it should be before us as a clear-cut issue. But once having determined to send troops to Europe, we will be entering upon an unsound course if we provide, as we would under the pending amendment, that in order to send additional troops it will be necessary to have senatorial approval.

Mr. President, the sentiment in favor of sending four divisions of troops to Europe is so strong that approval of that action was expressly voted into the resolution by a vote of 24 to 0. In other words, the sentiment is so strong in the two Senate committees that there was not one single dissenting vote in opposition. Yet it has already required 90 days to get the resolution to the voting stage.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Ohio briefly.

Mr. TAFT. Does not the Senator think that if the President had come to Congress on the first of January with the Brussels agreement and said, "Here is what I think ought to be done," we would have been through with the matter by the 15th of February, rather than be debating it today?

Mr. STENNIS. That may be, but it is not a question of who is to blame. It is a question of taking a sound military step. I submit for the candid judgment of this body that once we have determined as a matter of policy to send troops to Europe under the implementation program, it is unsound, from a military standpoint, and unsound from the Government standpoint, to put a choker on the measure, and say, "We are not going to permit the sending of any additional troops except with Senatorial approval."

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Arkansas briefly.

Mr. McCLELLAN. As I understand the Senator, his interpretation of the resolution as now drafted is that the President will not have to come back to Congress to send additional troops to Europe.

Mr. STENNIS. My interpretation is that there certainly was some latitude allowed in paragraph 6. Unless there were a change in policy the President would not be required to come back to Congress. I repeat, the sentiment here is so strong in favor of the sending of the troops, that the vote in the two committees was 24 to nothing. Yet it is now proposed that a choker be placed in the resolution, which would be unsound from a military standpoint, and, frankly, in my opinion, would be unconstitutional, even if it should have the force of law.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I now yield 3 minutes to the senior Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I merely desire to call the attention of the Senate to a distinction between paragraph 6 of the resolution and the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas. Paragraph 6 provides that congressional approval should be obtained of any policy, whereas the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas prevents, on any condition, any further ground troops being sent in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The McClellan amendment is too restrictive. We must leave some flexibility in the resolution, because obviously cases will arise when it might be necessary to act, even under article 3, and we would not want to be bound to await action by Congress after a full-dress rehearsal.

I do not think we are in any danger in leaving the language as it is in paragraph 6, which provides that—

In the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops—

And so forth. To my mind the whole emphasis of this paragraph is on the question of approving policy, and we

tentatively approve the policy of sending four divisions.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. How many American troops does the Senator think the President could put in Europe even if the restriction were adopted?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Does the Senator mean the McClellan restriction?

Mr. TAFT. Yes.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. He could not put any in Europe.

Mr. TAFT. We have 120,000 troops there now, as I understand. I suggest that with the four divisions we would be putting at least 200,000 more in Europe. We have in addition to that the Air Force. Even with the restriction proposed by the resolution, and certainly by the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, I think we could actually put 400,000 American boys in Europe. Does not the Senator feel that if we are to go beyond any such number the administration should come back to Congress for a further authorization?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I have said right along that it seems to me if we are to go into the matter of sending great numbers of troops to Europe, a vast extension of the policy would be involved.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. May I ask whether the Senator from New Jersey is in favor of the President coming back to the Senate to secure approval for sending troops?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. On every occasion we have to determine whether or not a new policy is involved. I think the President would have been wise, if I may say so, had he come to Congress long ago and asked for a joint resolution, which would have given him the right to approach this matter.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I agree with the Senator.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I do not want to restrict the leaders of our Armed Forces or the President himself by language which provides that he cannot send another soldier without first obtaining further congressional approval.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Does the Senator agree with me that the resolution in its present form is susceptible of so many different interpretations and is so ambiguous that any person can place on it any interpretation he wishes to and cannot be successfully challenged in doing so?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. No, I do not agree to that, because it seems to me that the situation will be cared for under the provision requiring consultation with the two committees of each of the two Houses of Congress.

Mr. O'CONOR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, in order that I may ask a question of him?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield for a question.

Mr. O'CONOR. Let me ask the Senator whether he would consider modify-

ing his amendment by substituting the word "should" for the word "shall" in line 4?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I meant to make that modification, namely, in line 4, to change the word "shall" to the word "should" so as to conform with the text of the paragraph of the resolution to which the amendment applies.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The modification will be made.

Mr. O'CONOR. I thank the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE].

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I merely wish to say that I agree that paragraph 6 is ambiguous, and I hope there will be an opportunity, later on, to clarify it.

However, as I read the amendment which has been proposed by the Senator from Arkansas, it would put the United States in a very rigorous strait jacket, so far as looking after our own interests in the future is concerned, for as I read the amendment it means that no troops in addition to four divisions shall be sent without further Senatorial approval.

I think that would mean that the Senate would have to approve every shipment proposed above four divisions, and thus the amendment would convert the Senate into an operations section of a general staff—something for which the Senate is not fitted either by training or experience or by its ability to act with secrecy and dispatch. I think American public opinion wants congressional control and congressional watch over any new policy involving the sending of troops, but I do not think American public opinion wants the Senate to get itself into the position of being an expert on troop movements, when the Senate should not be anything of the kind.

Mr. President, in my opinion this amendment would have a most unfortunate effect; and I hope it is rejected.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, since the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas has been modified by the insertion of the words "ground troops," it seems that the Senator from Arkansas and those who are supporting the amendment are agreeable to the abdication of Senatorial control over air generals and admirals, but insist that the Senate itself act as the generals on the ground. I have asked the Senator from Arkansas whether there is any limitation which he admits would be imposed by his amendment upon any other paragraph of the resolution which would limit the right of the President to send air and naval forces to Western Europe.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, the entire resolution deals with ground troops. It was in that form that the resolution was reported by the committees, and we are still dealing with the resolution in that form.

Mr. McMAHON. That is correct. I do not support paragraph 6 as it is now written, but I wish to have it clarified the other way from the way the Senator from Arkansas has attempted to clarify it. So I congratulate him at least on drawing the issue plainly.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. McFARLAND. In other words, to make the resolution more restrictive would be a handicap to General Eisenhower in performing his duties. If the resolution is to be clarified, it should be clarified the other way.

Mr. McMAHON. I think so. For the life of me, I have been unable to understand why Senators of the United States believe they are supreme in respect to ordering around our ground troops, whereas they say—insofar as we are able to determine from anything included in the resolution or from any effort which has been made by Senators in regard to amending the resolution—that we are not concerned with the deployment of the air or naval forces. To me, that simply does not make sense.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. No; I have only 2 minutes.

Mr. President, the Senator from Ohio—and I have adverted to this once before—has mentioned the Gallup poll as the basis for a position.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Connecticut has expired.

Mr. McMAHON. May I have an additional half minute?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized for an additional half minute.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I thought that at the present time polls were rather in disfavor. Certainly they were a few years ago. However, now, apparently, we are not only going to select the President of the United States in advance, but we are going to select the generals of the United States in advance, without asking those who have to give their entire time and attention to that matter how we are going to protect the vital security of the United States against the greatest threat that has ever been posed to a free people. What nonsense.

Let me present a question to the Senate, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, may I have an additional half minute?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield an additional half minute to the Senator from Connecticut.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized for an additional half minute.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I wish to read this question and to place it in its proper context, and then I wish to ask Senators whether they wish to vote for the deployment of ground forces of the

United States on the basis of this kind of what I call monkey business: At the present time, do Senators think Congress should have the right to limit the number of troops to be sent to Europe, or do Senators think the number of troops which can be sent to Europe should be left to the President and his advisers to decide?

Mr. President, that question supplies its own answer.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Connecticut has expired.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Arizona [Mr. McFARLAND].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I shall not use even that much time.

Let me say that I hope the amendment will be rejected. I am one of those who would like to have paragraph 6 of the resolution clarified, but I should like to see it clarified in conformity with the explanation of that paragraph which has been given by the distinguished Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH]. We should not make this resolution more restrictive.

If Senators wish to defeat the resolution, let them vote against it. However, let us not destroy the resolution by adopting crippling amendments.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I have some time remaining, have I not?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, let me say that I very much hope the Senate will reject the amendment.

If we wish to use a microscope on any bill or resolution, we can always find in a proposed piece of legislation something or other which we do not like and which we would wish to change. However, no one Senator has yet reached the point where he himself is able to write an entire bill or an entire resolution.

The Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. McFARLAND], and the other Senators are adhering to the resolution as reported by the two committees. The committees spent a great deal of time working on these resolutions. We believe they represent the best we can possibly do. We think that all the so-called amendments to tinker with this and tinker with that and tinker with the other thing do not get us anywhere.

So I very seriously and humbly beg the Senate not to adopt this amendment, but to vote it down; and then let us proceed to the consideration of the other amendments.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT].

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Arkansas has rendered a great public service by bringing clearly before the Senate and the country the basic issue in this debate. The

issue is whether in the future the Senate is going to completely abdicate any authority it has over American armies assigned to an international command.

We have heard a great deal about the movement of ground troops. This amendment deals not with the ordinary movement of ground troops but, I submit, Mr. President, that this amendment deals only with the movement of ground troops to which we assign American boys who have been drafted, to serve overseas under an international command.

We have heard a great deal about the great American general who is in charge; but before the ink has dried on the resolution, there may be a French general or an Italian general in charge, and this resolution will still apply.

Let me point out that Senators who vote against this amendment will be voting in contravention of article I, section 8, clause 14, of the Constitution, which provides that the Congress shall have power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."

If we blindly surrender our authority to the Chief Executive, thus giving him the authority to move United States troops in any way he wishes, and without congressional authorization, including their movement overseas for assignment to an international command, we shall be surrendering the constitutional authority which we have as Senators of the United States. I urge adoption of the McClellan amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from South Dakota has expired.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I have remaining. I desire to make but a very brief statement.

I have listened to the arguments in opposition to the amendment. Those who want the President to have and to exercise all power to commit American troops to an international army want the pending resolution adopted in the form in which it was reported by the two committees. We might just as well get the issue straight. Those who do not believe that the President should have that power, or that consent of the Congress should be a prerequisite to his exercise of such power, want the amendment adopted, in order that the resolution may say what we intend that it shall say.

The argument made by the able Senator from Louisiana, if valid, would mean that the entire proceeding of adopting a resolution was futile, a mere empty gesture. Why have we consumed any time at all, beyond the time required to approve the sending of four divisions at this time? It is because our sense of duty impels us to do so, and because we have the constitutional right to do so. Merely because we approve the policy of sending four more divisions now is no reason why we should permit the President to send 25 or 50 more divisions later, particularly in view of the fact that other members of the North Atlantic Pact may not be doing their fair share toward committing troops to the

international army under the command of General Eisenhower, in furtherance of the defense program.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. LONG. It is my understanding that our reason for having a debate is that we are passing upon the policy of whether the President may commit troops to the international army, not because the Congress is expected to indicate how many troops it thinks ought to go to any particular place.

Mr. McCLELLAN. The resolution says it is the sense of the Senate that the Congress shall approve the policy, as well as approve the sending of the four divisions. I contend that when we approve the policy, we ought to make it clear that we are merely approving the sending of four divisions; that that is the extent of our approval of the policy. But the implementation of the policy from here on does not require us to give the President of the United States authority to commit further divisions indiscriminately, without approval by the Congress. We retained that right under the United Nations Charter, which is a document of higher authority and which covers more territory than does the pending resolution. Why should we not retain at this time the power which we have under the United Nations Charter?

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Can the Senator tell me when in American history, Congress has ever directed the disposition of the ground troops of this country, stating how many divisions should be in one place, and how many in another?

Mr. McCLELLAN. We have never before, in our entire history, had a charter similar to the United Nations Charter. We are either going to retain the power vested in us by the Constitution, in the interest of national unity, or we are going to surrender that control, with a realization that it will be productive of disunity and further misunderstanding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. The question is on the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], as modified.

Mr. WHERRY. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the demand sufficiently seconded?

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. WHERRY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Capehart	Eastland
Anderson	Carlson	Ecton
Bennett	Case	Ellender
Benton	Chavez	Ferguson
Brewster	Clements	Flanders
Bricker	Connally	Frear
Bridges	Cordon	Fulbright
Butler, Md.	Dirksen	George
Butler, Nebr.	Douglas	Gillette
Byrd	Duff	Green
Cain	Dworshak	Hayden

Hendrickson	Lodge	Russell
Hennings	Long	Saltonstall
Hickenlooper	McCarthy	Schoeppel
Hill	McClellan	Smathers
Hoey	McFarland	Smith, Maine
Holland	McMahon	Smith, N. J.
Humphrey	Malone	Smith, N. C.
Hunt	Martin	Sparkman
Ives	Maybank	Stennis
Jenner	Millikin	Taft
Johnson, Colo.	Monroney	Thye
Johnson, Tex.	Morse	Tobey
Johnston, S. C.	Mundt	Underwood
Kefauver	Murray	Watkins
Kem	Neely	Welker
Kerr	Nixon	Wherry
Kilgore	O'Connor	Williams
Knowland	O'Mahoney	Young
Langer	Pastore	
Lehman	Robertson	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. O'CONOR. Mr. President, inasmuch as the amendment has been modified in certain respects, I ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 5, at the end of line 2, it is proposed to change the semicolon to a comma, and immediately thereafter to insert the following:

But it is the sense of the Senate that no ground troops in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further congressional approval.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN]. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. YOUNG (when his name was called). On this vote I have a pair with the senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR], who is absent because of illness. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay," and if I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." Therefore, I withhold my vote.

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

I announce further that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is paired on this vote with the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN]. If present and voting, the Senator from Washington would vote "nay" and the Senator from Nevada would vote "yea."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY] is detained on official business.

The result was announced—yeas 44, nays 46, as follows:

YEAS—44		
Bennett	Butler, Md.	Capehart
Brewster	Butler, Nebr.	Carlson
Bricker	Byrd	Chavez
Bridges	Cain	Cordon

Dirksen	Knowland	Robertson
Dworshak	Langer	Schoeppel
Ecton	McCarthy	Smith, Maine
Ferguson	McClellan	Smith, N. C.
Hendrickson	Malone	Taft
Hickenlooper	Martin	Thye
Holland	Millikin	Watkins
Jenner	Morse	Welker
Johnson, Colo.	Mundt	Wherry
Johnston, S. C.	Nixon	Williams
Kem	O'Connor	

NAYS—46

Alken	Hayden	Maybank
Anderson	Hennings	Monroney
Benton	Hill	Murray
Case	Hoey	Neely
Clements	Humphrey	O'Mahoney
Connally	Hunt	Pastore
Douglas	Ives	Russell
Duff	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Eastland	Kefauver	Smathers
Ellender	Kerr	Smith, N. J.
Flanders	Kilgore	Sparkman
Frear	Lehman	Stennis
Fulbright	Lodge	Tobey
George	Long	Underwood
Gillette	McFarland	
Green	McMahon	

NOT VOTING—6

McCarran	Magnuson	Wiley
McKellar	Vandenberg	Young

So Mr. McCLELLAN'S amendment, as modified was rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution is open to further amendment. If there be no further amendments—

Mr. IVES. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from New York.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I offer the amendment which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair recognized the Senator from New York, but he seems to have taken his seat.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, I do not desire at this time to offer an amendment, but I shall offer one eventually.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I offer the amendment which I have sent to the desk, and I ask to have it read.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed to strike out the period at the end of line 8, on page 5, and to insert in lieu thereof a semicolon; and at the end of the resolution to add the following new paragraph:

8. It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should join with the other parties to the treaty of peace with Italy, entered into on February 10, 1947, or with such of the parties as may agree thereto, in the negotiation of a new treaty of peace with Italy which will eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty which impose limitations upon the military strength of Italy and prevent the performance by Italy of her obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to contribute to the full extent of her capacity to the defense of Western Europe.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I should like to have the Members of the Senate note that part (b) has been stricken from the amendment. My amendment would advise the President, along with the other advice which would be given him under the resolution, that we think the Italian peace treaty has outlived its usefulness, and that we now ought to untie the hands of the Italian people so that they may defend themselves, and thereby not make it necessary for us to send quite

so many American boys to defend the Italians, while they sit by and watch the fight.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WATKINS. I yield.

Mr. BRIDGES. Did not the Senator inadvertently misstate a fact when he referred to the Italian treaty as having outlived its usefulness? Was it ever of any use?

Mr. WATKINS. That may be a technicality. As a matter of fact, it was never a good treaty. Even its proponents said that it was not a good treaty, but they thought it was the best that could possibly be obtained under the circumstances. I voted against it, as did the Senator from New Hampshire. We thought it was a bad treaty, and we still think so. As time has gone on it has become worse and worse. It seems to me to be idle to be talking about sending our own flesh and blood to defend the Italian people, while there are 8,000,000 men in Italy who are able to bear arms. We should not send our own troops to Italy and have the Italians sit by because their hands are tied. They should be in a position to be able to defend themselves. They are not permitted to raise an army. They cannot defend themselves. They are prevented from doing so by the treaty.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WATKINS. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator's amendment relate only to the portion of the treaty which refers to the right on the part of the Italians to rearm in order to defend themselves, or does it refer to all provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty?

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I am sure Senators did not hear the question because of the confusion in the Chamber.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. WATKINS. I should like to have the Senator from Vermont restate his question so that all Senators may hear it.

Mr. AIKEN. The question I asked of the Senator from Utah probably could be answered by a closer reading of his proposed amendment. Does the amendment proposed by the Senator from Utah affect only the provision of the Italian treaty which prohibits the Italians from arming themselves in order to defend themselves against aggression, or does it affect all portions of the Italian Peace Treaty?

Mr. WATKINS. It affects only their power to defend themselves. It goes to that part of the treaty only. All we have before us now is the question of the military implementation of the North Atlantic Pact and the sending of troops to Europe. I do not wish to involve in this question the matter of the economic obligations placed upon the Italians, and the terrific load which they are now carrying and will be required to continue to carry under the treaty. I have submitted a resolution to take care of that situation.

My motion to amend results from the knowledge that while we debate the question of sending American troops to Europe to help defend the nations of Western Europe, there exists in law a prohibition against Italy's rearmament. The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 limits Italy to a 185,000-man army. During World War II she had in the neighborhood of 8,000,000 men under arms and in the latter years of the war contributed much to the victory over Germany. Thus, while we debate the sending of American troops to Europe on the one hand, we block Italy from raising and equipping an army for her own defense.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WATKINS. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. As the Senator knows, I am very much in sympathy with the idea of eliminating existing limitations on the ability of the Italian people to rearm themselves and to take part in the Atlantic defense. I should like to suggest a modification of the language of the Senator's amendment.

Mr. WATKINS. In which part?

Mr. LODGE. In lines 2, 3, 4, and 5. I should like to explain why I think the amendment should be modified. As the amendment now reads, it says:

8. It is the sense of the Senate that (a) the United States should join with the other parties to the treaty of peace with Italy—

And so forth. That means that we would instruct our State Department to join with the Soviet Union in negotiating a new treaty of peace.

Mr. WATKINS. I invite the Senator's attention to the fact that if he will read further he will see that my amendment provides "or with such of the parties as may agree thereto, in the negotiation of a new treaty of peace with Italy."

I would not want to shut out Russia if she wants to agree to it.

Mr. LODGE. Is it not true that what the Senator wishes to do is to modify the existing arrangement, and not negotiate a new treaty? Why does the Senator want to negotiate a new treaty and go through that whole dreary business all over again? Would it not be much more expeditious if we were simply to say that we do not like the treaty as it stands, and want to improve it? To undertake to negotiate a new treaty of peace with Italy would open up a great many complications. I would eliminate everything after the word "should" in line 2, reading, "join with the other parties to the treaty of peace with Italy, entered into on February 10, 1947, or with such of the parties as may agree thereto, in the negotiation of a new treaty of peace with Italy which will," and then insert "seek to," so as to make the remainder of the amendment read: "seek to eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty," and so forth.

Mr. WATKINS. The Senator means to eliminate the remainder of the amendment?

Mr. LODGE. No. I would eliminate everything in line 2, after the word "should," and all of lines 3, 4, and 5. In

line 6 I would eliminate the word "will." The amendment would then read:

8. It is the sense of the Senate that (a) the United States should seek to eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty, which impose limitations upon the military strength of Italy—

And so forth, as it now reads.

It seems to me that would be a much more expeditious way of handling it.

Mr. WATKINS. I am sorry the Senator from Massachusetts did not previously bring his proposed modification to my attention. On the spur of the moment, Mr. President, I accept his modification to my amendment.

Mr. LODGE. I am very much obliged to the Senator.

Am I correct in understanding that the Senator has already modified his amendment by striking out everything in subparagraph (b), beginning at page 2, line 2?

Mr. WATKINS. Yes; I have stricken out the "(b)" portion of the amendment.

It seems to me that it is utterly ridiculous to send American troops to Europe to help defend Italy while we deny Italy the right to arm herself in her own defense.

My amendment is designed to require the Department of State and the administration to take immediate steps to correct the situation brought about by continued adherence to the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty.

The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 was premature. It was entered into and rammed down the throats of the Italian people before the situation in Central Europe had crystallized and before the mailed fist of Russian imperialism had completely revealed itself. The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 is a product of post-war hatred and revenge. It was deliberately designed to reduce Italy to a condition of helplessness. It was predicated on a determination to punish Italy and her people. Much of this resulted from the insistence of Russia and her friends. As I have already said, Russia was the principal author of that part of the treaty, and actually urged the harsh provisions of the treaty in a spirit of revenge.

The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 violated every principle of the Atlantic Charter. It deprived Italy of her colonies. It transferred important portions of the domestic territory of Italy to other nations, and put Italian nationals under the jurisdiction of other nations without these people having the right to say where they desired to be.

The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 is totally inconsistent with the principles underlying the Greek and Turkish aid program and the Marshall plan. It deprived Italy of economic substance, and transferred it to the Soviet Union at the very moment when we were sending economic aid to Italy to foster recovery and prevent unemployment and suffering.

The Italian Peace Treaty contradicts the mutual defense assistance program. It requires Italy to transfer ships and armament to the Soviet Union, thus making it necessary for the United States

to supply arms and equipment to Italy if Italy is to stand by our side in the defense of Western Europe.

The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 provided that certain Italian war vessels were to be placed at the disposal of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. These powers established a Naval Commission at Rome to decide upon the allocation of the vessels thus transferred.

The four-power Naval Commission reached a final agreement on February 8, 1948, as to the vessels which were to be given to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, France, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

On December 11, 1948, Italy and the Soviet Union signed an agreement in Moscow for the transfer to the Soviet Union of 33 Italian warships. It was stipulated in the Moscow Agreement that the ships should be transferred in five groups beginning January 15, 1949. As of the present date some—and possibly all—of these vessels have been transferred.

In the event of a war with Russia these same Italian vessels transferred under the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty would be used by Russia against the nations of Western Europe, even including Italy itself.

The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 is a contradiction of the North Atlantic Treaty and the organization which has been brought into existence for the defense of Western Europe. The treaty places severe military and economic restrictions on Italy and will make it impossible for her to contribute her fullest potential to the defense of her friends and neighbors in Western Europe in the event of an aggression. She has agreed, as we all know, under the Atlantic Pact to do her part and to take steps for the mutual aid and collective defense of the nations parties to that pact; yet by the very terms of the Italian treaty, which we still tolerate, and which we were parties to fastening upon the Italian people, she is unable to do her part and carry on with the other countries in the collective defense of the free nations of the world.

Italy cannot defend herself without large and well-equipped infantry forces. At present such forces are being equipped with American-made weapons. Reports from Italy indicate that Italian production of weapons and equipment is delayed and ineffective. Major George Fielding Eliot, an able and renowned military expert, reports from Italy that the Italians would fight bravely in their own defense but that they have lost confidence in the United States insofar as our efforts to aid their own military production program is concerned. Major Eliot quotes an Italian Army officer as saying:

The development of Italy's arms production program is being just as effectively sabotaged by your eternal delays, hesitations, and reconsiderations as if Stalin himself were right here in Rome directing every movement.

Incidentally, I should mention that even the manufacture of arms by the

Italians comes under the limitations of the treaty itself.

Major Eliot further quotes this Italian Army officer as follows:

It isn't that you aren't delivering your own finished weapons to us. We're getting tanks, artillery, aircraft, .50-caliber machine guns, bazookas, and other American arms according to schedule, or even ahead of it, but our basic need is a small-arms program, which of necessity includes stepping up our own production of rifles, machine guns, and small-arms ammunition—and whenever it's a question of helping Italian weapon production, that's where the run-around begins.

In the same report from Rome, Major Eliot says:

At present the armament of the Italian infantry is a mess. Weapons using nine different types of ammunition are in use.

Major Eliot reports an Italian sergeant as having said to him with reference to the rifles available to Italian troops:

Its best use is to throw it at the enemy. You might even hit two of them that way.

Italy has several excellent arms factories and has the skilled workmen capable of producing small arms. If the limitations were removed, they could proceed to manufacture arms which are so necessary for the defense of their people. Although Italy has been stripped of the means of manufacturing heavy military equipment and is denied the right of building vessels and planes of war, those restrictions can be lifted if we denounce the Italian Peace Treaty and then give Italy substantial aid under the mutual defense assistance program.

The Department of State has taken the position that now is not the time to move for abrogation of the Italian Peace Treaty. The State Department insists that revocation of the Italian Peace Treaty presents important political and legal considerations, not only for Italy but also for the United States and other signatories of the Italian Peace Treaty which require continuous study. The Department therefore refuses to take any action to correct the anomalous situation caused by continuous adherence to the terms of the 1947 treaty.

The Italian Government has warned the west that Russia's Balkan satellites are rearming and that this has created a dangerous situation in the Mediterranean. Italy has, according to reports, appealed for revision of the 1947 Peace Treaty in order that she may increase her own armed forces. The Department of State has replied that it shares Italy's concern over the illegal building up in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The State Department insists, however, that it does not consider the present an appropriate time to discuss possible changes in the Italian treaty.

My amendment to the resolutions now under discussion is designed to express the will of the Congress that the American Government shall take the lead in seeking revision of the Italian Peace Treaty. It is designed to make it clear that the Congress of the United States favors removal of the military restrictions on Italy which are contained in that treaty.

My amendment is designed to express the will of Congress that Italy shall be allowed to defend herself.

It seems to me that this is only a movement dictated by common sense, a movement dictated by the necessity of putting the people of Italy in a position to defend themselves and to aid in the great movement for the defense of the free nations of the world. It seems to me, considering the way the treaty is drawn and the way we are now moving, that we are likely to see the very impracticable, ridiculous, and stupid situation of having American troops in Italy defending the Italians while the Italians sit on the mountain sides watching the Americans fight the Russians or the Communists. In World War II we had the experience of many of the Italians watching us fight again to liberate them from the Germans; but at this time it seems to me that the situation will be just as I have mentioned unless we take action now by way of advising the President and giving impetus to the movement to do away with the unfair limitations of the treaty.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. WATKINS. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. Will the Senator tell us, if he knows, what the attitude of the Italian Government is toward this proposal?

Mr. WATKINS. As I understand, the Government of Italy is very much in favor of having the limitations of the treaty removed. I have not had word directly from them, but I have seen copies of the Italian press published in Rome and other places, which heartily support this movement. I cannot see how the Italian Government could possibly object or in any way try to prevent such a movement from succeeding.

I think the Senator understands that in the diplomatic world it would probably be unwise for Italy at this moment to start the movement. I am not starting this primarily in behalf of the Italians, but in behalf of American boys who will have to go abroad and defend the Italians if their hands are not untied and if they are not allowed to defend themselves. That is my primary motive in asking for a change in the treaty. It seems to me that the Senate ought to accept the amendment. We are giving advice. Let us throw in some for good measure, which will help our boys, and incidentally help the Italians and the other nations who will have to fight Italy's battles, too, if the Italians are not given their liberty to defend themselves, to build armaments, to operate their factories, to manufacture tanks and planes, and also to receive tanks and planes from us and from other nations which will go, in large measure, to re-arming 8,000,000 Italians who can bear arms, and who can defend themselves if given the opportunity.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WATKINS. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. I invite the attention of the Senator from Utah to the fact that Italy is one country which has a surplus

of labor at the present time, and that his amendment, if carried out by our own Government, would not only give Italy an opportunity to improve her own economic condition, but would also put her in a much stronger position to defend herself if attacked.

As I see it, the United States is now in the position of having tied Italy's hands behind her and promised her that if any other nation should attack her we would come to her defense. Of course, that is a very incongruous situation for this great Nation to find itself in.

I am in favor of the Senator's amendment, and I hope that it will be adopted. I hope, even more, that the administration will see fit to act upon it after it is adopted.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, in response to the Senator from Vermont I should like to say that there are unemployed, many hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Italian men, who are of an age enabling them to bear arms. If they were put into the defense forces they would be in a position to take care of themselves, and in addition, to help defend their country and lighten the burden on the United States, on which, in the end, in spite of all we do, most of the burden will be placed.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WATKINS. I should like to add a further observation, and then I will yield. My information is that the Soviet Union has failed to keep its part of the Italian treaty agreement. The Soviet Union has opposed every nomination that was made to make Italy a part of the United Nations. In other ways Russia has violated the Italian treaty, and there is no longer any obligation on our part to carry out the other provisions, since Russia has taken the attitude which she has taken.

I now yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. DWORSHAK. How can we expect full participation by Italy in the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty so long as the peace treaty limits her armed forces to 185,000 men? How can we overcome that restriction?

Mr. WATKINS. There is no way I know of to do so legally. We can violate the treaty. But it seems to me the more honorable course would be to urge this country and other countries who are attempting to defend free nations, to set aside the treaty and secure a new treaty which frees Italy from arms limitations. I think that is the only way we can do it.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WATKINS. I yield.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Emphasis in this debate has been placed on the essential need of strengthening and improving the morale of the countries of Western Europe. I ask the Senator from Utah, How can we enhance the morale of the people of Italy so long as they are prohibited by the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty from defending their nation against communistic aggression? Certainly if we want their support, if we want them to take an active part in implementing the North Atlantic Treaty, then we cer-

tainly should take steps immediately to do something about the limitations inherent in that peace treaty.

Mr. WATKINS. I agree with the Senator from Idaho. Suppose the situation were reversed, and Italy was sending Italian troops to the United States to help us against some other country, and our soldiers were required to sit on the sidelines and watch that situation. What would that do to the morale of the American people? What would it do to the morale of any people who had any pride in their country, loyalty to its flag and to its great traditions and history, such as the Italian people have? It seems to me a poor way of helping the morale of a people.

I hope we may today have an almost unanimous vote by Senators expressing their feeling with respect to this question, so that the State Department, the President of the United States, and the other nations parties to the treaty will take whatever steps they can to have the treaty changed, at least with respect to the limitations on the military power of Italy.

Mr. President, how many minutes have I left of my time?

The VICE PRESIDENT. 10 minutes more.

Mr. WATKINS. I reserve the remainder of my time. I yield the floor at the moment.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, the unanimous-consent agreement provides as follows:

That no amendment or motion that is not germane to the subject matter of the said resolution shall be received.

On the strength of that provision I make a point of order against the amendment of the Senator from Utah. It is not germane. There are a number of signatories of the peace treaty with Italy. We cannot unilaterally declare it is no good, and withdraw. Furthermore, the proposal would merely involve us in another international quarrel with Russia, and might possibly eventuate in armed aggression by one or the other of the powers. So I hope the Chair will sustain the point of order.

Mr. WATKINS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I still have the floor.

Mr. WATKINS. I thought the Senator had quit.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not claim to be a quorum, but I am here and entitled to be noticed.

It seems to me that this amendment is immaterial and not at all germane to the purpose of the resolution. The resolution refers only to the sending of troops to Western Europe. What in the world the Italian peace treaty has to do with that is very difficult for me to see. I urge the point of order.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Utah desire to argue the point of order?

Mr. WATKINS. I desire to argue it, but I want to have a quorum call first, so Senators may know what we are talking about.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time consumed in calling the roll will have to be taken out of the Senator's time. He has only 10 minutes left.

Mr. WATKINS. Well, I do not desire the time for the roll call to be taken out of my time. If that is the ruling of the Chair, I shall have to abide by it.

It seems to me the very question we are discussing is the number, to a certain extent, of the troops we will send to Europe, and if anything we can do will result in cutting down that number, or materially affect it, it seems to me it is germane to what we are considering.

I cannot conceive any better way to cut down the necessity for sending American troops abroad than to get rid of the Italian Treaty. I have already pointed out there are some 8,000,000 Italians able to bear arms. During World War II Italy had in reserve and actually under arms around 8,000,000 men. They are available again today. If they are available, it certainly will have some effect upon the necessity for American troops if they are given the right to bear arms and if we allow them to operate their arms factories to make guns, build tanks, ships, and whatever is needed to wage war. If we are not talking about defense, and the ways to improve our defense in Europe, and defend the free nations of the world, what are we talking about here today? I cannot imagine anything that strikes more at the heart of what we are debating today than my amendment. What are we proposing to do? We are proposing to give advice. All I propose is that the Congress of the United States give some more advice which, together with the rest of it, will improve our defenses in Europe.

I suggest my amendment is germane, and I ask the Chair to rule that it is germane.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an observation?

Mr. WATKINS. I yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. DWORSHAK. I should like to call attention to paragraph 4 of Senate Resolution 99:

It is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty—

Including Italy—

are giving, and have agreed to give full, realistic force, and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid," they will "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned.

Mr. President, obviously Italy cannot cooperate with other nations under the North Atlantic Treaty and under the provisions of self-help and mutual aid contribute armed forces to the implementation of that treaty. The amendment offered by the Senator from Utah thus is germane to the pending resolution.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Utah wish to argue further?

Mr. WATKINS. I reserve the remainder of the time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. On the point of order the Chair does not think the limitation of time applies, because the point of order as made is debatable so long as the Chair wishes to hear any argument in support of the point of order or in opposition to it. The point of order may not be regarded in the nature of a motion.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I cannot hear the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair thinks the point of order does not stand on the same level with a motion, the time on which is limited by the unanimous-consent agreement. So if the Senator wishes to argue the point of order further, the Chair will hear him reasonably. The time for discussion of a point of order is as a rule in the discretion of the Chair, because it is for his information.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WATKINS. May I suggest that the Chair submit the question to the Senate for decision.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair presumes that he has a right to submit it, although under the unanimous-consent agreement it seems to be assumed that the Chair would pass on points of order.

The resolution which is before the Senate pertains to the sending of troops from the United States to Western Europe to implement the Atlantic Pact. Italy is a member of the Atlantic Pact. The question of a treaty between Italy and other nations, especially Russia, limiting her power to arm herself, presents a difficult situation, and the Chair does not wish to indulge in any dogma as to its germaneness. The germaneness of one proposition to another is rather a technical matter. The Chair is not convinced that the mere expression of the sense of the Senate with regard to a treaty wholly outside the Atlantic Pact, although one of the members of the Atlantic Pact is a party to that treaty, is germane to the resolution now before the Senate.

Indirectly the amendment may have some effect upon the President's ability to carry out the agreement under the Atlantic Pact, but an expression that is the sense of the Senate that the President and the Secretary of State should initiate negotiations in some way to bring about a revision of the Italian treaty does not impress the Chair as being the logical way to get at that matter, although the entire resolution is merely an expression of the sense of the Senate—if it be the sense of the Senate—in regard to the implementation of the Atlantic Pact.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, before the Chair concludes his ruling, may I observe that on page 1 of Senate Resolution 99, in the fourth "whereas," we find the following:

Whereas article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty pledges that the United States and the other parties thereto "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and

develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Mr. President, I submit that if the restrictions of the treaty deny to Italy an effective medium of promoting and developing self-help, then the amendment is germane to the resolution, for that is all the amendment amounts to. Certainly if the restrictions and limitations of the Italian peace treaty are removed, Italy will be in a better position to help herself and to make a greater contribution to the entire subject matter which now is under discussion.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is it the Senator's position that the United States of America, under a Senate resolution declaring it to be the sense of the Senate, can initiate procedure by which that treaty could be revised?

Mr. PASTORE. No, because the amendment, as I understand, is merely an admonition that by promoting good will and making—by means of the removal of those limitations—the proper movements that are necessary to be made in order effectively to promote the purpose of the resolution, Italy will be in a better position to make a larger contribution to the effort of the North Atlantic nations. So I submit that the amendment is absolutely germane, simply for the reason that it is a drive in the proper direction.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, permit me to call attention again to the amendment itself. It has been modified; but the original amendment expressed what I think has just been stated by the Senator from Rhode Island, namely, that—

It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should join with the other parties to the treaty of peace with Italy, entered into on February 10, 1947, or with such of the parties as may agree thereto, in the negotiation of a new treaty of peace with Italy which will eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty which impose limitations upon the military strength of Italy and prevent the performance by Italy of her obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to contribute to the full extent of her capacity to the defense of Western Europe.

Mr. President, the resolution has to do with implementing the North Atlantic Treaty. The purpose of the amendment, as offered, is to permit Italy to do her part in implementing that treaty. It seems to me that since we are offering advice only to the President, then in its broadest sense the amendment certainly is germane to the resolution; and I believe that the ordinary man on the street, the citizen who is not schooled in parliamentary usage, would say that the amendment has a direct relationship to the resolution. I am sure the American people will feel that the amendment has something to do with the subject matter, and so will the Italian people, and all other peoples who are parties to the pact.

I realize that the Senate is guided by its own rules and regulations; but it seems to me that a certain amount of discretion may be exercised by the Chair in connection with questions of this sort, and that therefore the Chair would not properly be criticized for ruling that the amendment is germane, and thus is

proper for consideration at this time. So it seems to me that the Senate should be permitted to vote on the amendment, so as to let the President and the world know how we feel about this matter.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair does not think the amendment is very germane. The Chair does not think it is very much in order. However, the Chair will let the Senate pass upon that question by voting on it. Therefore, the Chair will, with a good deal of reservation as to the correctness of his position, overrule the point of order.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President—

Mr. WATKINS. Just a minute, Mr. President; I did not understand the Chair's ruling.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair overrules the point of order—with a good deal of reservation.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WATKINS. I yield.

Mr. ANDERSON. When the Senator from Utah read this amendment a moment ago, I believe he read it as it was originally printed, whereas the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] suggested some modifications of the amendment.

I would be inclined to support the amendment with the modifications suggested by the Senator from Massachusetts. Am I correct in understanding that the modifications were made?

Mr. WATKINS. Those modifications were accepted by me and are a part of the amendment as it is now before the Senate. In reading the amendment a moment ago, I merely had before me a printed copy of the amendment, and I read that in order to explain the sense of the amendment. When I read the amendment, I explained that the amendment is not now in exactly that form.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WATKINS. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. For the information of the Senator from New Mexico, let me say that the Senator from Utah accepted the suggestion that the amendment be modified so as to include the words "seek to" after the word "should" in line 2, on page 1, and then to strike out the remainder of line 2, and all of lines 3, 4, and 5, and the word "will" in line 6, and to insert the words "with Italy" after the word "treaty" in line 6, so as to make the amendment read as follows:

It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should seek to eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty with Italy—

And so forth.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I suggest that the amendment as modified and as now before the Senate be read.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Utah yield for that purpose?

Mr. WATKINS. Yes, Mr. President; I suppose I still have some time remaining.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment as modified will be read.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 5, it is proposed to strike out the period at the end of line 8, and insert in lieu thereof a semicolon; and at the end of the

resolution it is proposed to add the following new paragraph:

8. It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should seek to eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty with Italy which impose limitations upon the military strength of Italy and prevent the performance of her obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to contribute to the full extent of her capacity to the defense of Western Europe.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Utah has approximately 8 minutes remaining, if he wishes to use them.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I shall reserve my time. I see that the Senator from Texas is seeking recognition, and I may wish to reply.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President—
The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Texas yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I thank the Senator from Texas. I wish to take only a minute and a half although I did not realize that the Senator from Texas had been recognized.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, the time on all amendments is controlled by the proponents of the amendments and the Senator from Texas.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, the time yielded to me should be taken from the time allotted to the control of the sponsor of the pending amendment.

Mr. WATKINS. Very well, Mr. President; I am glad to yield to the Senator from Wyoming for the time he desires.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I merely wish to say that I am in complete agreement with the sense of the amendment as submitted by the Senator from Utah and as modified in accordance with the suggestions offered by the Senator from Massachusetts. I think the amendment as modified is highly intelligent, and is a desirable declaration of policy. I believe the Senate should adopt the amendment as modified.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President—
The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Texas yield to the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

The VICE PRESIDENT. How much time does the Senator from Texas yield to the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield the Senator 5 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, when the treaty with Italy was before the Senate for ratification, I moved to delay its consideration from that time—which was during the summer, I believe—until the following September.

I was opposed to the treaty then, and I still am. I should have been perfectly willing to go further than this amendment, if the whole treaty were to be reconsidered or abrogated, if that were possible, because I think it was a very unwise treaty.

So that if this amendment has the effect of at least lessening the impact of the Italian peace treaty, I certainly ex-

pect to support it. If those who have studied it more than I have contemplate going further in regard to the treaty, so as to eliminate some of the other restrictions it contains, I shall be very glad to support that movement also.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Arizona [Mr. McFARLAND].

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I wish to explain the vote I am about to cast on the pending amendment. I should favor modifying the treaty with Italy, but I do not think this is either the time or the place for us to consider amendments of the kind suggested. I believe the proposal should be given careful consideration by the proper committee before we act on it. I do not know how far it might reach or what its effect might be. Before we vote upon amendments of this character I think the committee should consider them. I understand that this amendment was not considered by any committee. If the Senate of the United States is to adopt a resolution on the subject of the assignment of troops to Europe, in my opinion it should be a resolution similar to the one now under consideration. I do not believe we should begin amending the resolution by an amendment of the kind now proposed. We do not know where it would lead. It could be said that we ought to have another treaty with Mexico, or with Canada, or with some other country, if we are to amend the resolution to cover questions growing out of treaties.

Mr. President, for the reasons stated, I do not believe this is either the time or place to consider the subject matter covered by the amendment, as indicated by the Chair in overruling the point of order, with reservations, and I shall therefore cast my vote against the amendment.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Texas.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I was a member of the American delegation when the Italian treaty was written. It did not suit me, and it did not suit other members of the American delegation, to place on Italy the limitations contained in the treaty. I am in sympathy with Italy's having a right to arm and defend herself, but this is not the way to accomplish it. I repeat, this is not the way to reach that objective.

A number of other nations are parties to the Italian Peace Treaty. Do we want to offend them by undertaking through unilateral action to modify the treaty? Do we want to offend countries who will oppose our action? It would be necessary to get the consent of Russia, for she is a party to the treaty. Is it supposed that if we adopt a simple resolution Russia will say, "Fine; all right; whatever you boys want, we will agree to it"?

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. How are we going to have action to modify the treaty started unless we undertake to express our opinions as to what should be done?

Mr. CONNALLY. Whatever we do should be done directly, not as a side

issue in connection with the pending resolution. The Secretary of State and the President will be here long after this amendment has been acted upon, and whenever they desire to do so they may take the question up with other parties to the treaty. It is impossible to tack onto this resolution an amendment to deal with every question which may arise anywhere in the world.

The Chair very clearly indicated he did not regard the amendment as germane, or as very germane. In fact, it is not at all germane. We ought to proceed according to rules and regulations and in accordance with judgment, policy, and logic. The amendment is not germane to the question now before the Senate.

Let us suppose that, instead of this amendment, we should say, "We want a resolution on the subject of the treaty with Mexico made at Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848." It would be equally as germane as the proposal now being made. In my opinion, neither of them is germane.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. DWORSHAK. Certainly Mexico is not a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty, is she?

Mr. CONNALLY. No; but she is a signatory to numerous other treaties. I am merely illustrating the point that such an amendment as the one now pending cannot be added to the resolution as one might attach a tail to a kite and have our relations with other countries of the world affected in that manner. We have treaties with many nations.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. Is there any sound reason why we cannot give the President good advice, in this instance, as we are doing with respect to the implementation of other parts of the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. CONNALLY. I think an effort is being made to give him too much advice. I think the President should be allowed to exercise his own judgment in certain matters, without being dictated to by the Senate in the interest of politics.

Mr. WATKINS. Had the President been given better advice in the beginning, I should not now be urging this question, because there would never have been such an Italian peace treaty as now exists.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am sure it is easy for the Senator to say what might have happened, and what will happen.

Mr. WATKINS. I want it known that I voted against the Italian peace treaty, because I thought it a bad treaty when it was negotiated. The committee itself said it was not a good treaty; and it has become worse as the years have gone by. Now that Russia has violated the treaty, there is no reason why we should not initiate a movement to get the State Department and the President to proceed, in any legitimate way they can, to remove the limitations referred to.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator from Utah makes a very logical argument. He argues that because Russia has violated some treaty, we ought to violate one. Is that the Senator's argument?

Mr. WATKINS. If one party to a treaty does not observe its obligations under the treaty, does not that afford the other parties ground for denouncing it?

Mr. CONNALLY. Why, of course.

Mr. WATKINS. What would we do, for example, in respect to the North Atlantic Pact, if all the other members to the pact said, "No, we are not going to do anything"? Would we remain in it and continue to carry on?

Mr. CONNALLY. I may say the Senator's question is about as germane as the amendment we are now discussing.

Mr. President and Senators, I have sympathy for the Italian people. I do not want to see them prevented from defending themselves or from arming themselves. But the issue raised by the amendment is not germane to the question with which we are concerned. We can deal with it at any time. Let the Senator from Utah present his proposal when the pending resolution has been disposed of, when we can give it consideration. It can be studied by the proper Senate committee. It can be investigated through appropriate hearings. Let us not do a foolish thing simply because we may be irritated by some aspects of the Italian peace treaty. I hope Senators will vote against the amendment. The issue is whether the treaty shall be sustained. The proposed amendment is a troublemaker, and I hope Senators will vote it down.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the amendment of the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS] as modified.

Mr. WATKINS. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. YOUNG (when his name was called). On this vote I have a pair with the senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. MCKELLAR], who is absent because of illness. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea." I withhold my vote.

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. SMITH] are unavoidably detained on official business.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. MCCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. MCKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

I announce further that, if present and voting, the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR] and the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] would vote "yea."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The result was announced—yeas 67, nays 20, as follows:

YEAS—67

Alken	Ferguson	Morse
Anderson	Flanders	Mundt
Bennett	Fulbright	Neely
Benton	Hendrickson	Nixon
Brewster	Hickenlooper	O'Connor
Bricker	Humphrey	O'Mahoney
Bridges	Hunt	Pastore
Butler, Md.	Ives	Robertson
Butler, Nebr.	Jenner	Saltonstall
Byrd	Johnson, Colo.	Schoeppel
Cain	Kern	Smathers
Capehart	Kilgore	Smith, Maine
Carlson	Knowland	Smith, N. J.
Case	Langer	Taft
Chavez	Lehman	Thye
Clements	Lodge	Tobey
Cordon	Long	Watkins
Dirksen	McCarthy	Welker
Douglas	McClellan	Wherry
Duff	McMahon	Wiley
Dworshak	Malone	Williams
Eastland	Martin	
Ecton	Millikin	

NAYS—20

Connally	Hill	McFarland
Ellender	Hoey	Monroney
George	Holland	Murray
Gillette	Johnson, Tex.	Sparkman
Green	Johnston, S. C.	Stennis
Hayden	Kefauver	Underwood
Hennings	Kerr	

NOT VOTING—9

Frear	Magnuson	Smith, N. C.
McCarran	Maybank	Vandenberg
Mckellar	Russell	Young

So the amendment of Mr. WATKINS, as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON], the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENBRICKSON], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], the Senator from Maine [Mr. SMITH], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE], and my colleague the junior Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] I submit an amendment.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will state the amendment offered by the Senator from New York for himself and other Senators.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 4, line 19, it is proposed to strike out all of paragraph 6 through page 5, line 2, and in lieu thereof insert:

6. The Senate hereby approves the present policy of assigning American forces, including ground troops, to Western Europe when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty and hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground troops to Western Europe; to this end it is the sense of the Senate, in the interests of national unity and understanding, that there should be full collaboration between the Congress and the President; and it is the sense of the Senate that, whenever either a majority of all the members of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, acting jointly, or a majority of all the members of the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, acting jointly, may believe that any proposed policy pertaining to the implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty is a new policy, or may disagree with the certified opinions referred to in paragraphs 4 or 5,

such new policy or the matter in disagreement should be submitted to the Senate and House for their consideration and approval in such manner as the committees may recommend.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from New York is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. IVES. I shall not take that much time. I yield myself 15 minutes.

Mr. President, it is most regrettable that at one of the most critical periods in our Nation's history the relationship between the President and the Congress and the confidence of the Congress in the President have reached so low an ebb that many of us in the Senate have believed it necessary to assert by formal expression the authority of our National legislative body with respect to the Chief Executive.

Mr. President, may I have order?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order. Senators who wish to converse will please retire from the Chamber.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, if there be constitutional grounds for the action we would take, then our action becomes a duty and obligation. It seems to me, however, that with or without constitutional provocation, such action as we contemplate is essential.

Whether or not the President is required to obtain the consent of the Congress for the use and deployment of American Armed Forces abroad, including Western Europe, he should, as a matter of practical expediency and common sense, consult and collaborate with the Congress on every significant matter of this kind. In fact, he should seek to obtain the approval of the Congress without being requested to do so by the Congress. Indeed, it is hard to understand how any Chief Executive in these trying days would want to take upon himself the sole and exclusive responsibility for decisions involving, not alone our Armed Forces, but the very fate of the Nation.

As it is, we have before us a resolution expressing the attitude of the Senate and outlining in part a course of procedure by which the Senate—or both Houses of the Congress if the concurrent resolution is adopted by the House of Representatives as well as by the Senate—would collaborate with the President in the determination of policies and programs affecting the assignment of American armed forces abroad—especially of American ground troops to Western Europe. I agree with the purpose of this resolution and to a considerable extent with its substance.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will suspend until the Senate is in order. There is entirely too much moving around in the Chamber and too much conversation. The Senator who has the floor is entitled to the respectful hearing of the Members of the Senate. Senators who are compelled to converse will please retire from the Chamber.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, I suspect that the context the resolution may have something to do with the moving around in the Chamber.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair has no way of knowing what is causing the moving around.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, the resolution approves the selection of General Eisenhower as supreme allied commander in Europe. It accepts as fact the necessity which requires the United States to assign units of our Armed Forces to the Eisenhower command. As a preliminary to such assignment, it calls for consultation by the President with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate, the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services of the House, and General Eisenhower himself. As an essential prerequisite for such assignment, it calls upon those nations which are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to give full, realistic force and effect to the requirements of article 3 of said treaty. It insists that the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty shall make the major contribution to the ground troops under General Eisenhower's command and, even then, specifies that such assignment shall only be made after the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have certified to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services and to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services that it is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States. It calls upon the President to submit to the Congress at intervals of not more than 6 months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, including such information as may be available for this purpose by General Eisenhower. It specifically approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe.

Only in the resolution's failure to provide definite procedure by which to obtain congressional approval of future policy pertaining to the assignment of American ground troops abroad, in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, is it seriously defective. In the first six lines of paragraph 6, as now written in the resolution, the language is so indefinite and ambiguous that it is subject to varying and conflicting interpretations which have been disclosed during the course of this debate.

This language of the paragraph paves the way for future controversy and debate which may be provoked when the emergency will have become far more critical and dangerous. To adopt this resolution with paragraph 6 in its present form will lead to almost certain and perhaps disastrous misunderstandings and misinterpretations at some later date when protracted debate would be fatal in its effect not only on civilian morale, but even worse, on the morale and welfare of American Armed Forces everywhere.

Therefore, I have been pleased to join in efforts to clarify the language and terminology in paragraph 6 so that it can state what it means and can be understood by everyone. And so I sup-

port the pending substitute amendment, which I have sent to the desk. It is very similar to the amendment which was offered last Friday by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON] and myself. I support the pending substitute amendment, both as to its purpose and as to its substance.

At this point, Mr. President, I wish to point out that copies of the amendment, in mimeographed form, have been distributed, and they are now on the desks of all Senators.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. IVES. I am very sorry I cannot yield. I am speaking against time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator declines to yield.

Mr. IVES. If I have some time remaining at the conclusion of my remarks, I shall be very happy to yield.

This amendment not only endorses the present general policy of assigning American forces, including ground troops, to Western Europe when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; it also proves specifically the present plans to send four additional divisions of ground troops to Western Europe. Calling for the "fullest collaboration between the Congress and the President," it places with appropriate congressional committees initial responsibility for the consideration of and action on every new policy which may be proposed and every decision regarding the future assignment of American ground troops to Western Europe which may be proposed by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Eisenhower.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. STENNIS in the chair). The Senate will be in order. Visitors in the Chamber, who are presumably helping Senators to transact business, will kindly retire if it is necessary for them to converse.

Mr. IVES. To those who may charge that, in designating by title four committees of the Congress to consider these questions in the first instance, we thus would set up an "elite group" to bypass full Senate consideration and to circumvent full Senate action, I would point out that no situation of this kind could possibly arise under the terms of the amendment. Under the procedure outlined in the amendment, no Member of the Senate would be deprived of the opportunity to take such personal action regarding proposed policies and programs affecting our Armed Forces as he would be able to take if the amendment were not in effect. Were any Member of the Senate to differ with any decision of the committees in question, he could, through the process of offering a resolution, both express his personal dissent and obtain full Senate action on the matter through a motion to discharge, just as he can do at the present time. By this process any dissenting Senator would be assured of thorough floor debate and floor action on the question at issue.

As a matter of fact, the procedure contemplated by the substitute amendment would provide substantial protection to the Senate as a whole and to each Member of the Senate individually

against precipitate action by the President, or the Secretary of Defense, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without Senate approval. It would force the disclosure of any new policy or any program before it might become a fait accompli and before, in the course of normal events, it might even be brought to the attention of the Senate.

Without the procedural requirements in this substitute amendment, and under the terms of paragraph 6 as it now appears in the resolution, we have no way of knowing what course the Senate should take in dealing with new policies pertaining to the implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty or with questions arising under paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution. This condition in itself could easily destroy the effectiveness of the resolution, and make it wholly inoperative.

The pending substitute amendment for paragraph 6 both clarifies the intent and the language of the paragraph, as it is now written, and assures to the Senate as a whole adequate opportunity for the proper consideration of every matter falling within the purview of the resolution. It removes all ambiguity from the paragraph, and reduces to a minimum the likelihood of future misunderstanding and controversy over the *modus operandi*.

I urge the adoption of the substitute amendment because I believe it is essential to the resolution, if the resolution itself is finally to mean anything at all, and is not ultimately to cause more harm than benefit.

Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. FERGUSON, Mr. HENDRICKSON, and Mr. LODGE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from New York yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. IVES. I yield first to the senior Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator would revise the resolution so as to indicate approval of the present policy. He specifically says that if a majority of the committees say that there is to be a new policy, that question shall be submitted to the Senate for its approval. Does the Senator so interpret his amendment that a new policy would include a change in policy which would be sufficient really to bring about a radical difference in a previous policy?

Mr. IVES. I am very glad the Senator brought that question up. I point out to the Senator from Massachusetts that that is a matter which would have to be left to the determination of the four committees specified in the amendment. They would have to determine whether the policy was new or was the extension of an existing policy, or whatever its status might be. I point out that under any course we might take in the Senate, presumably that is the initial step which would have to be taken with respect to a matter of that kind.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. IVES. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If there is a sufficient extension—for example, if two new divisions were to be sent in addition

to the four—that would not be a new policy, but it would be a change in the policy, or an extension. Would the Senator so interpret his amendment as to require that question to come before the committees?

Mr. IVES. Undoubtedly that question would have to come before the committees, and their interpretation would have to be placed upon the proposal.

I now yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENDRICKSON].

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. IVES. I will yield if I have time. We have only half an hour all told.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I should like to have the Senator yield for a question.

Mr. IVES. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Does the Senator anticipate that there will be public notice from the Executive to the committees, so that every Member of the Senate will have knowledge of what the change or alteration in the policy is to be?

Mr. IVES. I have a little doubt as to whether there would be any public notice issuing from the Executive as to whether a definite change was proposed in a matter of this kind. That is why I say that this amendment would be a safeguard, because four committees would be on the alert to ascertain whether anything of the kind was taking place, and to take action in accordance with the amendment.

Mr. FERGUSON. The Senator indicated that Members of the Senate would have knowledge of what was going on, so that they could propose a resolution if desired. Would that not indicate public notice?

Mr. IVES. The point the Senator from New York made was simply this: If any Senator knew of anything like that going on, or if it happened to be a matter of public knowledge, the committees would know it. Any individual Senator might not approve of the action of the committees. He could take the course which he normally would take in the Senate under ordinary circumstances.

Mr. FERGUSON. Does this procedure indicate a vote by the committees, so that the vote would become public?

Mr. IVES. Certainly the action of the committees would be known. It would have to be known.

Mr. FERGUSON. Would not what they were voting on have to be known, if the information was to be of benefit to Members of the Senate?

Mr. IVES. In the end it would be known; but undoubtedly in some instances the committees would know about the matter before the Senate as a whole could know about it.

I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, on the 27th day of February 1951 I arose on the Senate floor to indicate my general attitude on the then-pending Wherry resolution. Since that time this great debate—and it has been a great debate in every sense of the word—has shed considerable light on the entire issue of troops to Europe—indeed, the de-

bates of the past week have highlighted the responsibilities of the Congress and of the Executive, and have made those responsibilities patently clear. I shall ever regret that I was deprived of participating more fully in these debates by committee activities which I could not honorably escape.

Mr. President, I say that the issues are now clear—crystal clear—there can be little question that we should provide General Eisenhower with four additional divisions.

But, Mr. President, as I indicated in my February 27 speech, too long have we permitted the executive branch to sound the "tuning fork." The time has arrived when the Congress should be the voice of the people. The people of America not only expect it—they are demanding it.

Mr. President, I have supported, and shall continue to support, every effort here today and tomorrow, if we go on into tomorrow, to give Congress the strongest possible controls over the future course of our committal of troops to foreign lands.

The Ives-McMahon amendment, with which I have associated myself, is one of the proposals designed for that purpose, as well as for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguities in paragraph 6 of the pending resolution. I hope it will have the enthusiastic support of every Member of this body, for I deem it essential to the basic attainments which we here seek to accomplish; namely, appropriate controls over the use of our precious American youth in our Armed Forces. Unquestionably, congressional controls will go far toward reestablishing the confidence of the people in their Government.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, how much time have we left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 13 minutes remaining.

Mr. IVES. I will refrain from taking the floor, and let the other side occupy some time.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] was obliged to leave the Chamber for a little while, and he asked me to take control of the time. I yield 10 minutes to the senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT].

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, in my opinion this amendment removes from the resolution everything which is of any value whatever, so far as action by the Senate is concerned. We might just as well not adopt any resolution if this amendment is to prevail. I intend to support and vote finally for the committee resolution, no matter whether it is amended or not, but I certainly will vote against this amendment, and urge other Senators to vote against it.

This particular amendment embraces an extraordinary policy. In the first place, it takes out any declaration whatever by Congress on the constitutional issue. By doing so, it makes it clear that Congress is not willing to assert that it has the slightest constitutional power in the premises. The original paragraph provided that—

It is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes—

That, to my mind, is the heart of the resolution on that question— and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is an implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The amendment omits the words "interests of sound constitutional processes." So it is in effect an abdication by Congress, of any right whatever under the Constitution to determine any question relating to the sending of troops to Europe. It seems to me that alone is sufficient to justify a rejection of this proposed modification of the language adopted by a majority of the two Senate committees.

The procedure as to the committees seems to be novel and contrary to every proper consideration to the rights of committees or the rights of the Senate. In effect it says that we shall never be able again to pass on any question of troops to Europe unless these two committees decide that we ought to have that right.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Ohio yield to the Senator from New York?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. IVES. The Senator from New York would like to ask the Senator from Ohio if he heard the comment of the Senator from New York on that question?

Mr. TAFT. No, I missed it.

Mr. IVES. After all, is it not true that any Senator, at any time, by resolution, can bring the subject to the attention of the Senate if he is not satisfied with the action taken by the committees?

Mr. TAFT. Of course, any Senator at any time can bring up an initial question. The proposal is not that we ought to have a right to pass on a change of policy, but only that we ought to have the right to pass on a change of policy if the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, considering a matter in secret—and it may be entirely secret so far as I can see; there is no occasion for publicity—decide that that is a policy on which the Senate ought to pass. We would have these two committees set up as a bar to action. In theory we could prevent the adoption of a resolution, we could prevent the sending of troops to Europe if we wished to do so. But under this amendment the question would never be brought before the Senate unless the two committees decide that a new policy, if there should be one, is something on which the Senate ought to pass. I never have known of any committees having been given such power in any resolution ever proposed to the Senate of the United States. Certainly that extraordinary procedure alone seems to me to be a sufficient basis for defeating the amendment.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If there is objection to letting the Congress pass on such a question, what would be the reason

for the proposed action? Why place the authority in the hands of two committees? It simply does not add up.

Mr. TAFT. The original amendment provides that congressional approval shall be obtained of any new policy. This amendment provides that no congressional approval shall be necessary unless the two committees decide that the Congress ought to have the right to pass on the question. It seems to me that is a very condescending attitude on the part of the committees. Certainly we do not want to provide in a resolution of the Senate that two committees can determine for us the question of whether a new policy to be determined is a policy for us to consider or not to consider.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Is it not possible under the wording of the modified amendment that a proposal could be approved by the two committees, and that the troops could be sent abroad, as a change of policy, before the Senate would even know about it?

Mr. TAFT. I think the Senator is entirely correct, because there is no provision for publicity. It goes further, to say that the new policy or matter in disagreement should be submitted to the Senate and House for their consideration and approval in such manner as the committees may recommend. The committees would not only assume the right of vetoing the adoption of any policy by Congress, but they would also assume the right of telling us in what form we should pass on that policy.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. IVES. Can the Senator from Ohio imagine any substantial number of troops being sent abroad without the Senate knowing about it; not only the four committees involved, but the whole Senate?

Mr. TAFT. I think so. I do not know how many troops of these four divisions have gone abroad so far. Some of them are on their way, but I do not know how many. No one has told the Senate. No one has told the Senate what is in the Brussels agreement, or how many troops America has agreed to contribute to the international army. The whole matter has been shrouded in secrecy from the beginning.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. IVES. Can the Senator well imagine any matter of that kind, which might be known by the four committees mentioned in the proposal, being kept a secret, so that no one else would know anything about it?

Mr. TAFT. I think we might hear rumors of what was going on, but have no exact information. The very purpose, as I see it, is secrecy. Why else submit the proposal to the two committees? Why not submit it to the Senate itself? The only purpose seems to be to submit to the committees matters that might alarm the whole world.

My time is short. I wish to recur to the point that the provision also re-

moves from the resolution any assertion whatever of a constitutional right on the part of Congress to pass on the question of sending troops to Europe.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Ohio has expired.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Lodge] on his feet. How many minutes would the Senator like?

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I am in favor of the amendment. I am glad to make that statement in the time of the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I am in favor of the amendment.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Connecticut 5 minutes.

Mr. McMAHON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, it seems to me that the argument which has been made by the Senator from Ohio relative to the secrecy provisions of the amendment is not well taken. I think it is grounded in sophistry, because the only way the Senate or the House, so far as I know, learn of a policy adopted by the military branch is through committees of the Congress. I have never known them to publish it in the Federal Register, or in the New York Times, or in any other journal of daily publication. The suggestion that this is a devious method to keep information from the Senate as a whole, or the Congress as a whole, is not well taken.

Mr. President, the votes cast in the Senate today will have a very great influence upon the eventual question of peace or war. It seems to me that every Senator would do well to think, as I know we all do, of the responsibility that is ours in passing upon this very grave issue.

The amendment which has been offered by the Senator from New York [Mr. Ives] and myself is an honest attempt to discharge our responsibility as we see it. Since I have been a Member of this body I have been one of those who have tried to defend not only the rights of the Congress but the rights of the Chief Executive under the Constitution of the United States. It is my belief that when the Congress, or the Senate, seek to impair the rights of the Chief Executive they are striking a blow at the instrument from which we must draw our life, our vitality, our being.

I can remember that in the past 2 years I have defended the right of the Chief Executive and his constitutional prerogatives which were challenged here, and recently I defended the right of the Congress to set a limitation upon the number of the Armed Forces, and argued valiantly alongside the Senator from Ohio in favor of sustaining that congressional prerogative.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that the amendment makes clear exactly what the committee was trying to do. In my opinion, it safeguards the rights of the Congress. We are to be consulted. There must be collaboration, as there should be collaboration. As has been well pointed out, in order to deploy troops Congress must raise them. The action of the Congress is necessary.

The venture that is being undertaken in the world today, including the venture in Western Europe, must go forward with the collaboration of the Chief Executive and the Congress. As General Eisenhower said, unless he has such collaboration and support of the Chief Executive and the Congress, he might as well be in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. The amendment as now drawn assures him that that kind of collaboration is provided for by the resolution. In other words, provision is made for the four divisions, and we say that if there is to be a new policy, the four committees mentioned, which certainly are trusted by this body and by the House of Representatives, shall be consulted. The four committees are composed, let me say to the Senator from Ohio, not alone of Members on this side of the aisle, but also of Members on the other side of the aisle. Yet the Senator from Ohio would pose what seems to me to be the ridiculous proposition that the 75 men constituting these committees would connive and conspire to keep away from the Senator from Ohio the fact that there is to be a change in the basic policy. Mr. President, to make such a suggestion is certainly to descend to the utmost degree of the ridiculous.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Is it not the Senator's interpretation of the amendment that any new policy would have to be submitted to the Senate by the committees, together with whatever recommendation, either in the form of a joint resolution or a Senate resolution or a concurrent resolution, they might see fit to draw up? They could not conceal a new policy.

Mr. McMAHON. Exactly. Furthermore, the amendment spells out exactly what the Senate can do at any time, regardless to any resolution. Seventy-five Members of the Senate and the House, constituting the members of the four committees, must be consulted. Some of them sit on this side of the aisle and some on the other side of the aisle in this Chamber, and some are on either one side or the other side in the House of Representatives.

Mr. President, I consider this amendment to be a great improvement of the doubtful and confusing phraseology of paragraph 6 as it is now written. I think the amendment will reassure the American people and will reassure General Eisenhower and will reassure our Allies and will give pause to the gentlemen in the Kremlin, because they will realize that we in the United States are determined to go through with the contract we made when we ratified the North Atlantic Pact, and that we meant what we said.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Will the Senator give to the Senate the definition of the words "new policy"? What do they mean?

Mr. McMAHON. I would say that the words "new policy" mean the drafting, let us say, of a million new troops, the

providing of a massive ground army. I think that would come within the definition of "new policy." Under the amendment, I think it would be up to these committees, too, to determine, in accordance with the resolution, what that new policy was.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. Would not the Senator also say that if any Member of the Senate thought a certain policy was a new policy, he could submit a resolution explaining his view that it was a new policy. The resolution would be referred to one of the committees, and if no action were taken on it, the author of the resolution could move that the committee be discharged from its further consideration and in that way could have the resolution handled in the Senate by majority vote? There is no question about that, is there?

Mr. McMAHON. I believe the Senator is correct. The only way that could be prevented would be for the 75 members of the four committees to receive information from the Chief Executive and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then hide it, so that the other Members of the Senate and the other Members of the House of Representatives would not know about it. Of course, that is about as ridiculous as anything could be.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. It is also possible, is it not, for a Senator to submit such a resolution, even if we do not adopt this amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair did not understand the statement of the Senator from Rhode Island in yielding time to other Senators. The time of the Senator from Connecticut has long since expired.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, how much time will be charged now against the opponents of the amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island yielded 5 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. WHERRY. That is correct—5 minutes only.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

The Senator from New York has 13 minutes remaining.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the junior Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from New York is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, although this amendment, of which I am very glad to be one of the cosponsors, does not go so far as I would like to have it to go or so far as I have proposed in the amendment I submitted the other day, which amendment now lies at the desk, nevertheless I wholeheartedly support the amendment in its present form.

It seems to me that it does two things, both of which are in the interest of the unity and the security of our country and of the other freedom-loving coun-

tries of the world. In the first place, the amendment approves the present policy of the Government of the United States in assigning American forces to implement article 3 of the North Atlantic Pact. Furthermore, the amendment approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground troops to Western Europe.

Therefore, any reasonable additions to the plans that are now approved would not require either the scrutiny of the committees or the approval of the Senate.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I have only 3 minutes allotted to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York declines to yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. But, Mr. President, it is perfectly evident that if a change in policy should be proposed, these committees would scrutinize it; and if they found that a change in policy was about to take place, it would be their duty—and a mandate to that effect is provided in the amendment—to report to the entire Senate for such Senate action as may be recommended or decided upon.

So it seems to me that by means of the amendment we safeguard the implementation of a policy already approved, and we protect the Senate in its rights in considering any changes which may be proposed in the policy.

The distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] suggested a desire to maintain secrecy in connection with the relations between the Executive and the Congress of the United States. I am quite certain that is not the purpose; but I may say that I believe a little secrecy with regard to our plans would do us no harm. I have been amazed and shocked at the disclosure of plans which has occurred here on the floor of the Senate—a disclosure of plans which cannot help but be of service to the forces of aggression from which we are seeking to protect ourselves.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from New York has expired.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, I shall not be able to yield for questions, because I have not previously spoken regarding this matter except by way of interruption. Of course, in the short period of time allotted to me I shall not be able to discuss the question fully.

However, let me say that it seems to me that this entire matter presents no really difficult problem if it is looked at in the proper way.

The question now before us is, How and by whom is the North Atlantic Pact to be implemented? That is the sole real question.

The question is not whether the President of the United States may send additional forces—ground forces or air forces or sea forces—to support the oc-

cupping army in Western Germany. The question is not whether the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief of the Army, when an army has been created by the Congress, may deploy, move, or control that army as he wishes short of declaring war. That is an altogether different question.

However, in the case of the North Atlantic Pact, we undertook to write a treaty which was not self-executing; but, according to the doctrine of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON], if the Senate ratifies a treaty which is not self-executing, the President of the United States can take it into his own hands and execute it.

Mr. President, what is the North Atlantic Pact? What did we do by ratifying it? We began the consideration of the North Atlantic Pact with a statement in its preamble that the treaty would have to be implemented by due constitutional processes. I raised the objection that the preamble was not an essential and vital part of the treaty itself; that it was much like the title at the head of a chapter, and I insisted that we write it into the treaty itself. We first wrote it into article 5 of the treaty, specifically saying that the Congress itself should have the right to implement it; that is, to determine what contribution we would make, how we would make it, and when we would make it. Then in article 11 of the treaty it was provided that the treaty itself, and all articles of the treaty, must be executed by constitutional process.

Now, what have we? We have no question of the broad power of the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of an army created by the Congress. We have no question of the right and power of the President to support adequately the army of occupation in Western Germany. We have but the single question, namely, How are we to construe a treaty which we, in committee, tried to say was not self-executing?

The amendment now proposed by the distinguished Senator from New York makes it completely self-executing, except when some new policy is to be brought into the picture, and then, by the grace of the two committees, the Senate or the Congress may have some right to determine that question.

The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the North Atlantic Treaty was most carefully prepared. It was submitted by the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], the chairman of the committee, but it was prepared by several members of the committee, who worked on it day after day, trying to express exactly what we meant, and who tried to say that the Congress had power to implement this extraordinary treaty, by which we were pledging ourselves to go to war against any aggressor in any part of Western Europe, a pledge which of itself represented a complete departure from all the prior policies of this Government. Upon the report, which was submitted concurrently with the report of the treaty itself, the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY],

Mr. GEORGE, and other Senators, with the aid and assistance of State Department advisers, Mr. President, if you please, worked. At page 8 of the report it is stated:

The treaty expressly provides that all of its provisions must be carried out in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of the parties.

It says "all." Could language be more conclusive? Why are Senators fearful? Why are Senators timorous in asserting the right of the American Congress to say what we shall do in Europe about the implementation of the treaty? From page 10 of the report I read further:

A realistic assessment of the defensive capacity necessary to resist armed attack will be a function of the organization to be established under article 9. On the basis of this assessment each party would determine for itself what it could most effectively contribute in the form of facilities, military equipment, productive capacity, manpower, etc. This decision would be taken in the light of the resources and geographical location of the individual state and with due regard for its economic stability.

I read from page 13 of the report:

The specific commitment undertaken by each party in article 5 is that in the event of an armed attack in the North Atlantic area it will "assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Again, from page 13 of the report, I read:

In this connection, the committee calls particular attention to the phrase "such action as it deems necessary." These words were included in article 5 to make absolutely clear that each party remains free to exercise its honest judgment in deciding upon the measures it will take to help restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. The freedom of decision as to what action each party shall take in no way reduces the importance of the commitment undertaken. Action short of the use of armed force might suffice, or total war with all our resources might be necessary. Obviously article 5 carries with it an important and far-reaching commitment for the United States; what we may do to carry out that commitment, however, will depend upon our own independent decision in each particular instance reached in accordance with our own constitutional processes.

I refer now to page 14 of the report, and if Senators would stick close to the text, they would not be apt to go wrong:

The decision as to what action was necessary, and the action itself, would of course have to be taken in accordance with established constitutional procedures as the treaty in article 11 expressly requires.

Mr. President, I do not read more from the report of the committee, except to call attention to this statement regarding article 9, which provides for the organization, under the treaty, of the Council of Defense. The report states:

The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of articles 3 and 5.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, I therefore conclude by saying that the amendment now offered is one which would fix the permanent policy of this Nation to send troops to Europe, until a majority of two committees sitting jointly in the House, or in the Senate, should say, "Lo and behold, you are now proposing something which is entirely new."

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. GILLETTE. Mr. President, I believe the pending amendment is one of the most astounding amendments I have ever seen presented in the Senate. The committees are agents of the United States Senate. We receive matters and refer them to committees and ask for a report. But what is contemplated in this proposal? First, an expression of opinion on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as provided in paragraphs 4 and 5, that, in their opinion, our associates in the North Atlantic Treaty are giving full and realistic force to their responsibilities; second, that in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it is necessary for us to strengthen the security of the United States by sending troops abroad. They file that report, as a matter of opinion, with the Secretary of Defense, the President of the United States, and with the appropriate committees of the two Houses in order to keep them informed.

The pending amendment proposes that a majority on either side of these committees, on their own initiative, and as agents of the Senate, shall report that they disagree with the opinions which have been filed by those who are charged with filing opinions.

Will someone tell me how in the world a majority of the Armed Services Committee or of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House can make a report to the Senate as to their opinion? That is what is contemplated here. How do they report? They report, in their own way, that the matter in disagreement should be submitted to the appropriate Senate and House committees, reporting it to us for consideration and approval, as the language is now drafted, in such manner as they see fit. It is an expression of opinion on their part, disagreeing with an opinion which the executive branch is charged with making. We are placed in the unhappy position of seeing agents of the United States Congress, acting for us, assuming the initiative.

Let me say, in closing, that if there is any way which anyone can disclose to me by which committees of the United States Senate can report to the House, or how a committee of the House, or a majority of a committee, in this case, can report to the Senate and recommend approval of some action, I should like to know how it can be done. It is something new in the legislative process.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, I wish to take a minute to explain my own position.

For 2 weeks the two committees sitting jointly held hearings. In addition, they held seven executive sessions, some

of which were long-drawn-out, at which we endeavored to reach an agreement. All the different points of view which have been expressed during the debate were expressed in the committee meetings. We finally made a unanimous report on the part of the two committees. I do not feel that I am at liberty to agree to any amendment which would change the agreement which was reached at those meetings. I think it would be unjust to one side or the other.

I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon has 2 minutes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I associated myself with the Senator from Georgia on the constitutional argument he made in committee, and I again associate myself with him in his argument just made on the floor. I also associate myself with the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] on this issue. It seems to me that the arguments of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] on the pending amendment are unanswerable.

There are two points which I want to emphasize in the brief time at my disposal. I am satisfied that when we ratified the North Atlantic Pact we wrote clearly by implication, and, I think, by language, also, a congressional check upon the implementation of article 3 of that pact.

We did not have to do it, Mr. President, but we did it, as the Senator from Georgia has stated. We cannot erase that language from the pact, from the committee report, or from the record made in debate on the floor of the Senate. It is that language which reserved to the Senate the power and intention to implement the pact.

Therefore, Mr. President, I want to say that we have to keep this issue of implementing article 3 of the pact separate and distinct from the much broader constitutional issue of what the inherent powers of the President may be. That question is not involved in this issue of the necessity of obtaining congressional approval of specific plans for implementing the pact. What is involved is what Congress reserved to itself when it debated the North Atlantic Pact. I think it is clear that it reserved the power to pass upon all proposals for the implementation of article 3 of the pact.

Second, Mr. President, I am opposed to the pending amendment, after giving it thorough and careful study, because in effect, if not in spirit and intent, it amounts, in fact, to a delegation of the legislative power of the Senate to two committees of the Senate. With that delegation of legislative authority I am in complete disagreement.

It is true as proponents of the amendment have argued that any Member of the Senate has the right to bring to the floor of the Senate a resolution and have it considered if he does not like what is going on in the Armed Services Committee or the Foreign Relations Committee in respect to implementing the North Atlantic Pact. In my judgment,

it evades the issue which is before us, which is the question of whether the business of the Senate is to be directed to the full Senate, in the first instance, and then sent to a committee, with a subsequent report from the committee to the floor of the Senate. I look upon this amendment as having a tendency to get around the well-established legislative policy of sending matters to a committee for action, with the expectation of a report to the Senate upon which report the entire Senate will take final action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, I yield what time I have left to the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized for 8 minutes.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, this amendment will have the net result of greatly tightening the grip of Congress on the question of future assignment of troops abroad under article III of the North Atlantic Pact. As has been so well said, the language of paragraph 6 of the pending resolution is so extremely ambiguous that it is an invitation to any executive to interpret the ambiguity precisely to suit his own plans at the moment. Being so ambiguous, the language of paragraph 6 could never command the public respect which would subject a President to censure because he did interpret it in his own way. When language is as ambiguous as is this language, no President and no Senator has any choice but to interpret it as he sees fit.

The proposed amendment, on the other hand, sets forth in simple, non-technical English precisely what I believe American public opinion rightly wants. In my judgment, American public opinion does not want Congress meddling with the day-to-day details of strategy and tactics, because we clearly have neither the time nor the training nor the necessary secrecy and speed to act as a general staff section which is determining troop movements.

American public opinion does want Congress to take part in any new long-range policy, because that is a matter on which Congress is qualified to pass, which involves many nonmilitary factors clearly within the competence of Congress, and in which speed and secrecy are not vital factors.

Let me illustrate with an example. There is at the present time virtually unanimous agreement, strategically speaking that the United States is essentially a sea and air power, and, like the other great sea powers in the past, it is sometimes advantageous for the United States to make a limited land effort under specifically favorable conditions, notably when the making of this limited land effort will result in other countries making a far larger land effort.

That is one example of a policy. If that policy were to be changed, for example, to one in which we would try to make our major effort by means of our land army instead of by air or by

sea, giving up any idea of having allies to bear the load of combat with us, that would be a new long-range policy, and, under the terms of this amendment, it would come squarely before these committees of Congress for whatever action they saw fit to take. Of course, these committees are subject to a vote to discharge.

Mr. President, that is the plain English of the situation, and that is what I believe America wants us to do. We tighten the grip of Congress because we assign a function to Congress which is squarely within the competence of Congress. We do not impose a restriction on the President which is ruinous or confusing and which public opinion would not support.

Sending troops abroad, Mr. President, is only one of the many different methods any President could use to get us into a war. He can do it by the use of the atomic bomb, by the use of Navy; he could do it by the way he conducted diplomacy, or he could do it by sending troops to areas wholly outside the Atlantic Pact.

All we are dealing with here is the sending of troops under article 3, and I believe that paragraphs 4 and 5 provide as complete a congressional watch over that situation as can be provided. This watch by Congress will result in our having constant and accurate information, and will enable us to use our appropriating power, which is complete, final, and unchallenged, with an utterly smashing effect, should it be the desire of Congress to do so.

Mr. President, there has also been a good deal of talk about the word "commitment." I presume that word is not used in a military sense, that troops are "committed" for a battle which may last for a matter of hours, or, at the most, for a few days, and are then reassembled and regrouped after the fighting is over. Presumably, the word is used in the sense of a promise or a contract.

Frankly, I cannot understand this concept at all. It is inconceivable to me that troops which are sent to the international army are any more legally committed than are troops which we may send anywhere else.

General Eisenhower, in his book, *Crusade in Europe*, said:

No written agreement for the establishment of an allied command can hold up against nationalistic considerations should any of the contracting parties face disaster through support of the supreme commander's decisions. Every commander in the field possesses direct disciplinary power over all subordinates of his own nationality and of his own service; any disobedience or other offense is punishable by such measures as the commander believes appropriate, including the court martial of the offender. But such authority cannot be given by any country to an individual of another nation. Only trust and confidence can establish the authority of an allied commander in chief so firmly that he need never fear the absence of this legal power.

These are the words of General Eisenhower.

I have the utmost respect for the great legal ability of many Members of this body who have been voicing concern,

and I share their concern, that we keep constantly within both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. We can keep within the Constitution and still act in the light of the dangers and threats in the world situation. I have never thought that the Constitution was to be applied in an artificial or unrealistic manner in view of the challenge which now confronts America. I agree that we should be jealous to guard the powers of Congress. It does not seem to me, however, that the only way we can have a strong Congress is by having a weak President. George Washington was a strong President. Andrew Jackson was a strong President. Abraham Lincoln was a strong President. Theodore Roosevelt was a strong President. I think people look back on them with a good deal more enthusiasm than they do to a President like Buchanan, for example. We want our President, whoever he may be, to be as great as he is capable of being. We can have a great Congress and at the same time have a great President. It is possible to have a powerful President and at the same time have a powerful Congress. The existence of one does not exclude the other. The notion that the two cannot exist at the same time is erroneous.

We do not face the challenge of deciding what is legal. We face the challenge of deciding what is wise and what is right. We face the task of providing methods to make the great powers of Congress effective in meeting this new issue. We are not surrendering any powers. We are enhancing and strengthening the powers we already have.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Massachusetts has expired. All time for debate on the amendment has expired. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from New York [Mr. Ives] for himself and other Senators.

Several Senators requested the yeas and nays, and they were ordered.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll, and Mr. AIKEN voted in the affirmative when his name was called.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. LEHMAN. May a quorum call be had at this time?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum call is not now in order because a Senator voted when his name was called.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senate is now proceeding to vote on the amendment, is it not?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senate is proceeding to vote on the question of agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from New York [Mr. Ives] on behalf of himself and other Senators.

The legislative clerk resumed and concluded the call of the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

I announce further that if present and voting, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] would vote "yea."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The result was announced—yeas 35, nays 57, as follows:

YEAS—35

Aiken	Hill	McMahon
Anderson	Humphrey	Monroney
Bennett	Hunt	Murray
Benton	Ives	Pastore
Clements	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Douglas	Kefauver	Smathers
Duff	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Flanders	Kilgore	Sparkman
Fulbright	Lehman	Thye
Hayden	Lodge	Tobey
Hendrickson	Long	Underwood
Hennings	McFarland	

NAYS—57

Brewster	Frear	Morse
Bricker	George	Mundt
Bridges	Gillette	Neely
Butler, Md.	Green	Nixon
Butler, Nebr.	Hickenlooper	O'Connor
Byrd	Hoey	O'Mahoney
Cain	Holland	Robertson
Capehart	Jenner	Russell
Carlson	Johnson, Colo.	Schoeppel
Case	Johnston, S. C.	Smith, N. J.
Chavez	Kem	Smith, N. C.
Connally	Knowland	Stennis
Cordon	Langer	Taft
Dirksen	McCarthy	Watkins
Dworshak	McClellan	Welker
Eastland	Malone	Wherry
Eaton	Martin	Wiley
Ellender	Maybank	Williams
Ferguson	Millikin	Young

NOT VOTING—4

McCarran	Magnuson	Vandenberg
McKellar		

So the amendment offered by Mr. Ives on behalf of himself and other Senators was rejected.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution is open to further amendment.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I move reconsideration of the vote by which the McClellan amendment was rejected.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from South Dakota moves that the vote by which the so-called McClellan amendment was rejected be reconsidered.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, a point of order.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. McMAHON. Is that motion debatable?

THE VICE PRESIDENT. Yes; under the limitation of 30 minutes to a side.

Mr. McMAHON. Does the limitation of time under the unanimous-consent agreement apply to the motion to reconsider?

THE VICE PRESIDENT. It applies to motions as well as to amendments.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MORSE. I raise the question as to whether or not my good friend from South Dakota is in a position to move to reconsider, and ask for a ruling as to how he voted on the first roll call.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. He voted in the affirmative.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. Just a moment. The Senator from South Dakota is not eligible to make the motion, he having voted in the affirmative.

The clerk is confused about it. The Chair is now informed that the Senator from South Dakota voted in the negative. Therefore he is eligible to make the motion.

The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. CASE] to reconsider the vote by which the so-called McClellan amendment was rejected.

Mr. WHERRY and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, may the amendment be stated?

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment will be stated.

THE CHIEF CLERK. On page 5, at the end of line 2, it is proposed to change the semicolon to a comma, and immediately thereafter to insert the following:

But it is the sense of the Senate that no ground troops in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further congressional approval.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll on the motion to reconsider.

The Chief Clerk called the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

I announce further that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is paired on this vote with the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN]. If present and voting, the Senator from Washington would vote "nay," and the Senator from Nevada would vote "yea."

If present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The result was announced—yeas 49, nays 43, as follows:

YEAS—49

Bennett	Cain	Dworshak
Brewster	Capehart	Eaton
Bricker	Carlson	Ferguson
Bridges	Case	Frear
Butler, Md.	Chavez	George
Butler, Nebr.	Cordon	Hendrickson
Byrd	Dirksen	Hickenlooper

Holland	Martin	Taft
Jenner	Millikin	Thye
Johnson, Colo.	Morse	Watkins
Johnston, S. C.	Mundt	Welker
Kem	Nixon	Wherry
Knowland	O'Connor	Wiley
Langer	Robertson	Williams
McCarthy	Schoeppel	Young
McClellan	Smith, Maine	
Malone	Smith, N. C.	

NAYS—43

Aiken	Hill	Monroney
Anderson	Hoey	Murray
Benton	Humphrey	Neely
Clements	Hunt	O'Mahoney
Connally	Ives	Pastore
Douglas	Johnson, Tex.	Russell
Duff	Kefauver	Saltonstall
Eastland	Kerr	Smathers
Ellender	Kilgore	Smith, N. J.
Flanders	Lehman	Sparkman
Fulbright	Lodge	Stennis
Gillette	Long	Tobey
Green	McFarland	Underwood
Hayden	McMahon	
Hennings	Maybank	

NOT VOTING—4

McCarran	Magnuson	Vandenberg
McKellar		

So Mr. CASE's motion to reconsider was agreed to.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment lettered "B," offered by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], as modified.

Mr. WHERRY and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

I announce further that the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is paired on this vote with the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN]. If present and voting, the Senator from Washington would vote "nay," and the Senator from Nevada would vote "yea."

If present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The result was announced—yeas 49, nays 43, as follows:

YEAS—49

Bennett	Frear	Mundt
Brewster	George	Nixon
Bricker	Hendrickson	O'Connor
Bridges	Hickenlooper	Robertson
Butler, Md.	Holland	Schoeppel
Butler, Nebr.	Jenner	Smith, Maine
Byrd	Johnson, Colo.	Smith, N. C.
Cain	Johnston, S. C.	Taft
Capehart	Kem	Thye
Carlson	Knowland	Watkins
Case	Langer	Welker
Chavez	McCarthy	Wherry
Cordon	McClellan	Wiley
Dirksen	Malone	Williams
Dworshak	Martin	Young
Eaton	Millikin	
Ferguson	Morse	

NAYS—43

Aiken	Eastland	Hennings
Anderson	Ellender	Hill
Benton	Flanders	Hoey
Clements	Fulbright	Humphrey
Connally	Gillette	Hunt
Douglas	Green	Ives
Duff	Hayden	Johnson, Tex.

Kefauver	Maybank	Smathers
Kerr	Monroney	Smith, N. J.
Kilgore	Murray	Sparkman
Lehman	Neely	Stennis
Lodge	O'Mahoney	Tobey
Long	Pastore	Underwood
McFarland	Russell	
McMahon	Saltonstall	

NOT VOTING—4

McCarran	Magnuson	Vandenberg
McKellar		

So Mr. McCLELLAN's amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I now move that the Senate reconsider its vote whereby the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas was agreed to.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I make the point of order that the vote of the Senate on the amendment has been reconsidered on one occasion.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The previous motion was that the Senate reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected. That motion was agreed to.

The motion now before the Senate is that the Senate reconsider the vote by which the amendment was adopted. That motion is in order.

The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Arkansas to lay on the table the motion to reconsider.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Are there further amendments to be proposed?

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I call up my amendment which is identified as "3-28-51-C."

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed to strike out all of paragraph 6 and in lieu thereof to insert the following:

6. The Senate hereby approves the policy of assigning American forces, including ground troops, to Western Europe when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty and hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground troops to Western Europe; to promote and advance this policy it is the sense of the Senate that there should be, in the interests of national unity and understanding, the fullest collaboration between the Congress and the President.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I feel the action taken by the Senate in the last few minutes in adopting, upon reconsideration, the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas is dangerous and that it will tie the hands not only of the Executive but also of our responsible military authorities. I believe that to compel the President to obtain the approval of the Senate or of the Congress of any action he may deem wise in support of the security of the United States, regardless of its importance, regardless of whether it is or is not in conformity with a policy which already has been adopted by way of ratification of a treaty by the Senate, will not only cause embarrassment, but may very possibly affect the security of the Nation.

Already we have approved the sending of four divisions to Western Europe, but the amendment just adopted as an

amendment to paragraph 6 of Senate Resolution 99, would, as I understand it, require the President to submit to the Senate or the Congress, depending on the form of the resolution used, any plan for any additions to our Armed Forces or for any change in the policies, no matter how unimportant or small it might be.

I think there can be no serious doubt in the minds of any Members of the Senate that the President has the right to deploy troops—ground troops as well as air forces and the Navy. I cannot see that there can possibly be any difference between the authority which the President of the United States has to deploy ground troops and the authority which resides in the President to deploy our Navy or our Air Forces; yet the amendment, which was adopted by the Senate a few moments ago, unfortunately, in my opinion, would not only make that distinction, but would completely tie the hands of the President and the military forces.

Much has been said on the floor of the Senate to the effect that the President is usurping authority, that he claims the right on his own initiative to deploy ground troops. That is not the fact. Of course, the resolution as it now stands, in paragraphs 3 and 4—neither one of which has been amended, and to neither of which has an amendment been offered—requires the President to consult the military authorities and the Secretary of Defense, as well as appropriate committees of the Senate and House; in the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations; in the House, the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and, in each House, the Committee on Armed Services. I wish to read those two paragraphs, because the reading will show that the President is required, if he follows the sense of the resolution, to make certain consultations, and, by paragraph 4, to exact certification by the appropriate authorities, before he can send any additional troops to Western Europe. Paragraph 3 reads:

3. It is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action to send units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should consult—

First, the Secretary of Defense; second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff; third, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; fourth, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; fifth, the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives; and, sixth, that he should likewise consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Paragraph 4 reads:

4. It is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are giving, and have agreed to give full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" they will "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned.

My amendment in no way affects paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the resolution. All it does is to express approval by the Senate of "the policy of assigning American forces, including ground troops, to Western Europe when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty," and it "approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground troops to Western Europe." It further provides that "to promote and advance this policy," which I have just recited, "it is the sense of the Senate that there should be, in the interests of national unity and understanding, the fullest collaboration between the Congress and the President."

I believe in close collaboration, and I am unable to conceive that, circumstances permitting, the President will fail to consult with the Congress whenever it is possible, or to demonstrate the closest possible collaboration. I also believe it is proper, as recited in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution, that the President consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the Supreme Commander of the international forces abroad. I furthermore believe that there should be a certification of the things which we seek to accomplish.

Certainly all those requirements assure us that the President will have the advantage of the closest cooperation, and of the most intimate collaboration. He is not acting by himself, or on his own authority; he is acting in consultation with the appropriate military and civil authorities of the Nation.

To me it is entirely inconceivable that the President will not, circumstances permitting, collaborate with the Congress of the United States. He has demonstrated his willingness, his eagerness, to do so. I have not the remotest doubt, and I believe that no right-thinking person could have any doubt, that the President will continue to collaborate. But what is now the sense of the Senate, as shown by paragraph 6 of the resolution, is that the President must come to the Congress for approval of any changes or additions, regardless of their importance or size, which may take place in our steps to implement section 3 of the North Atlantic Pact. I am simply unable to see the wisdom of or justification for seeking to tie the hands of the President in that manner.

It has been said on the floor of the Senate time and again that the President has the right to act. Why put him in a position of being embarrassed if, because of the weight and urgency of the circumstances, he does not come to the Senate or to the Congress of the United States for approval? He is going to do it when the circumstances permit; I think no one can doubt that. But do not force him to do it when it is going to lead to embarrassment and to a weakening of our position abroad.

I believe that the action which has been taken on the floor of the Senate within the past half hour will materially weaken our position and our relations with our allies. We must depend upon our friends abroad. We cannot afford to jeopardize the support we shall receive

and which we can give in Western Europe.

I do not think any man believes we can make ourselves secure by building a fortress on this hemisphere and cutting ourselves off from the assistance of the great Western European powers who, like ourselves, are doing everything within their power to assure their own safety and to bring lasting peace and the survival of freedom in the world.

We today heard the President of France speak of the sentiments which actuate France, of the sacrifices they have made, of the manner in which they have been enabled to rebuild their economy and their spirit. I can tell you, Mr. President—and I give this warning with all solemnity—what we have done today is going to be a cause of discouragement among our allies and friends abroad, the dissipation of which will require many, many divisions and billions upon billions of dollars.

Mr. President, I appeal to my fellow Senators not to underestimate the help we can get from our allies in Western Europe. Do not underestimate the damage that will come to all the freedom-loving peoples of the world if we do not undertake our share of responsibility in helping the Western European nations to maintain their integrity and their safety.

Mr. President, the situation is a dangerous one. Without our leadership, without our help, and our encouragement, we are not going to get the full measure of support which our allies in the Western European countries desire to give us. We are withdrawing from them the leadership, the encouragement, and the help which they need.

So this amendment of mine is a simple one. All it would do would be to relieve the President of the implied necessity of coming to the Congress of the United States or to the Senate of the United States for approval of anything he might wish to do in support of our security and in support of the common security of the freedom-loving countries of the world.

I appeal to the Senate to adopt this amendment, which will, of course, take the place of the amendment which has been offered under the sponsorship of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas. My amendment will help our security and will give aid, comfort, and added strength to the freedom-loving nations of the world.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Texas wish to yield any further time?

Mr. CONNALLY. I have no request for time, Mr. President.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New York.

Mr. DOUGLAS and other Senators asked for the yeas and nays.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. For what purpose does the Senator rise?

Mr. CONNALLY. I made an incorrect statement. I said I had no requests for time. I find I have a request for time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The roll call has started.

Mr. CONNALLY. I ask unanimous consent that the calling of the roll be discontinued in order that I may yield 2 minutes to the Senator from South Dakota.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, that may be done.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. LEHMAN. Does that cancel the request for the yeas and nays?

The VICE PRESIDENT. It does not. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the remarks of the distinguished Senator from New York impel me to suggest that the Senate, in reconsidering its action, acted under the argument advanced by the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], when he invited attention to the fact that the first sentence of article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows:

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, which was submitted to the Senate on June 6, 1949, said, under that heading:

The committee and the Senate, in Senate Resolution 239, attached great importance to assuring that any such agreement as the pact would not only be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of the signatory nations, but also that all its provisions would be carried out under the same constitutional safeguards. Constitutional processes for giving effect to the will of the people are the very essence of democracy and it is only through wide popular support that the treaty can be given the strength and vitality necessary to assure its success.

The committee wishes to emphasize the fact that the protective clause in accordance with their respective constitutional processes was placed in article 11 in order to leave no doubt that it applies not only to article 5, for example, but to every provision in the treaty. The safeguard is thus all-inclusive.

I may say, Mr. President, that too many times the Congress has been confronted with conditions under which we are asked to be an accessory after the fact. It is time, in my judgment, for us to help make policy and not simply to endorse something already done, or a position already taken.

Many Senators will recall the arguments that were used in connection with the agreement for aid to Turkey and Greece when it was negotiated. We were told we had to do it to keep faith and I voted for aid to Greece and Turkey on the plea that if such aid were not given we would be pulling the rug out from under the Secretary of State. But I wrote the President and suggested next time Congress should have a chance to sit in on the making of the agreement.

And then when the House Committee on Foreign Aid was sent to Europe, presumably to get first-hand information on Europe's needs and to get data for forming the details of a program to implement the Marshall plan we saw

posters in Europe which treated of the Marshall plan as an accomplished fact. Here, again, we are confronted by an announcement that the President has made a decision and Congress is asked and expected to be an approving agency after the fact.

Mr. President, the American people have a right to demand that Congress share in the making of these programs and these commitments.

Does anyone contend that the people in the Pentagon have the responsibility for determining what kind of a defense establishment this country can afford? No, that is our responsibility and it is our responsibility to determine, as a matter of policy, whether our major contribution to implementing the North Atlantic Treaty shall be by military supplies, by air forces, by naval contingents, by ground troops—or in what proportion to the contributions of other treaty nations.

I voted for the military aid bill after the Senate in the last Congress ratified the treaty. I thought munitions and equipment were a proper way for us to make a contribution, keeping in mind the kind of aid we could give most effectively. But manpower, Mr. President—that presents another question.

Is our best aid given in ground troops? Or in equipment? In ground troops or in airplanes and crews to fly them?

Where do we give most real help for the money spent?

Our resources in manpower are not inexhaustible. We have commitments in Korea that we cannot abandon. Sometimes, I wonder if the boys in Korea think commentators in America have forgotten them.

Our resources in manpower do not begin to compare with the total of the nations in Europe who can and should contribute most heavily to the international army stationed there. As for morale, we already have a very sizable number of men in Germany.

It is my opinion that we can now make our most effective contribution to security in the North Atlantic area by putting our efforts into planes, munitions, and troop equipment.

Moreover, there is the question of where we should deploy our manpower with the war still going on in Korea.

These are the reasons why we are warranted this afternoon in determining a policy on these matters.

So, when it was suggested by Senators in the debate on the Ives amendment that we should hereafter abandon congressional action, in violation of the express provisions of the treaty and the Senate report thereon, as the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] pointed out, I thought we should reconsider and fix a policy on the ratio of troops we will provide.

Just as we might say Congress would want to be considered before an atomic bomb were turned over to an international army—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CASE. May I have one additional minute?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield another minute to the Senator.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, just as we might say that atomic bombs are not to be turned over to the international army or that Congress believes our major contribution should be in terms of an air force, so we have chosen to express a policy on the ratio of troops. If the ratio is to be changed from time to time as some of the debate on the Ives amendment seemed to indicate, then let the change in policy be considered by constitutional processes as the treaty itself contemplated and not by a few committees. That is what we have said, as I see it.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, may I ask how much time I have remaining?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator has 14 minutes.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I claim the floor. I should like to yield time to the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY].

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I should like to ask what the allocation of time is for those Senators who are the proponents of the amendment of the Senator from New York and those who might desire to speak in opposition. If the debate is opened up again, it seems to me we should be entitled to know how much time there is on each side.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from New York offered the amendment, and he has 14 minutes left which he may dispose of as he sees fit.

The Senator from Texas has 26 minutes which he may dispose of in the same way. No other Senator will be permitted to have time unless it is yielded to him by the Senator from Texas or the Senator from New York.

Mr. AIKEN. May I ask whether the roll call was suspended?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Yes. By unanimous consent it was canceled. The roll will have to be called over again.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the suspension of the roll call was a rather unorthodox procedure, but it gave a few of us an opportunity to say a word in commendation of our colleague, the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN]. I listened to the presentation of his argument in connection with his substitute for paragraph 6, and I think the amendment testifies to the honor and integrity of his purpose. It is to the point. It is not confusing. There would be no semblance of any "double talk" in it. It is specific. It states what I think is pretty well understood and has been understood in American history up until a few moments ago, and that is that the President of the United States, as the chief executive, is supreme. That has been a fact of American political history since the birth of the Republic.

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I have only a few moments. I should like to continue with my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Minnesota declines to yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Furthermore, Mr. President, the amendment points out what is a very practical fact in the international situation, namely, that in dealing with a totalitarian power, which has the initiative and can act quickly, it is of the utmost importance for the national security of our Republic and the free world that the Supreme Allied Commander and the President be permitted to act with the same dispatch.

It is one thing to have legalistic arguments about where the power rests. It is another thing, Mr. President, to face the facts of life. The facts of life today are that Mr. Stalin, with his 175 divisions, his Kremlin, and his military leadership, can strike a deathblow at this Republic while Congress is debating how many troops we should send to Europe. We are not back in the days of the minuet and the court of Louis XIV. We are living in the twentieth century. I desire to say, Mr. President, that I think by the adoption of the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] we have damaged the defense of the free world and of the United States of America to a dangerous extent.

Mr. President, we are confronted with a war of movement which could come upon us with the force of an electrical shock. It could destroy us. What are we doing? We are still running around fooling with the rules of the Senate, wondering whether or not we would have enough time to debate before the President sent more troops to Europe. I would remind my colleagues that the President is elected by all the people of the United States. He serves all the people. The office of the President of the United States has a place in our Constitution equal to that occupied by Congress and by the judiciary. The President of the United States, by tradition, by history, and under the Constitution, must be the chief defender of the Republic.

Now we have what I consider to be an intrusion on that legal responsibility. All I can say is that I do not believe the courts would uphold such an intrusion. The Constitution is supreme. It will be supreme over any amendment we may adopt in the Senate which may circumscribe the power of the President. We are not only concerned with the debate on the floor of the Senate, Mr. President. We are concerned with life and death. We are not talking about whether or not, as the President of France said this morning in his memorable address, we are going to liberate a Europe which has been destroyed, but whether or not we will build the ramparts of freedom so strong that no aggressor will dare to attack.

Mr. President, the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas which was agreed to says to the people of Europe, "When you are dead, when your cities are destroyed, when the four divisions we have sent have been mangled, ruined, and killed off, we will have another debate to determine whether or not the President can send some more troops."

I believe that the best way to operate in this kind of world is to permit our military commanders, our President, and the people who are entrusted with the defense of the Nation to use discretionary power to defend the freedom of the world wherever it may be in danger.

That is what the fight is all about. That is what the debate is all about. I never thought that I would become so steamed up about the issue. I never dreamed for a moment that the Senate would reject the prudent advice and counsel of every military leader who came before the two committees. I never believed that the Senate would ignore the advice of the commander in chief of the allied army, General Eisenhower. I never believed that the Senate would ignore the advice of the great men in this country of both political parties. That is what we have done. The Senate has decided, after we had had a little more time, after some reconsideration, and after a little more backstage maneuvering, that we are not going to permit the President to use the power which is rightfully his.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Minnesota has expired.

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield two additional minutes to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Thomas Jefferson once said:

I hold these truths to be self-evident.

In other words, some truths are self-evident because they are a part of the law of nature. One of the basic laws of nature is that of survival. One of the laws of nations is the obligation of the sovereign head to protect the realm. I submit that the Senate of the United States ought not to fool around with the laws of God, of nature, or of international law. We had better live up to those laws.

Mr. President, I appeal to this honorable body to support the clear-cut, the honorable, the decisive amendment of the Senator from New York. The amendment says what is true.

Mr. President, an effort can be made to tell the American people something else, but the truth is that the President has the right, the obligation, and the solemn responsibility to defend the United States. He has that responsibility as Commander in Chief, and he has it without any limitation. So, **Mr. President,** I appeal to this honorable body to join the Senator from New York in the acceptance of his amendment. I appeal to this body not to let down the 175,000,000 people in Western Europe, who are waiting for the vote on the pending resolution. All we are saying to them today by what we have done thus far is, "We think you are worth the four divisions as of Monday, April 2, 1951." **Mr. President,** the well-being, the life and safety of humanity cannot be calculated on the basis of any mathematical proportion like four divisions. It is a matter that can be judged and weighed only by thinking in terms, not only of today, but of posterity.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. LEHMAN. **Mr. President,** I do not know whether the distinguished Senator from Texas wishes to allot time.

Mr. CONNALLY. **Mr. President,** I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. **Mr. President,** I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from New York. I merely state it as a personal observation that I believe had the administration come frankly to Congress with a bill or joint resolution, as it did in the case of the arms implementation proposal, it is my judgment that such a resolution or bill would have been passed by a substantial margin. One of the reasons why the administration finds itself in the present difficulty is because it has not been frank on this issue. In the first place, the executive branch of the Government indicated that it thought it could proceed without consulting Congress at all, it then moved to a position in which it was willing to go along with a Senate resolution. Every Member of the Senate knows that a Senate resolution has no force in law. It was for that reason that the two committees came forth with the concurrent resolution to at least bring the House of Representatives into the picture. I think the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] very clearly stated today the position and deep feeling of many Senators on both sides of the aisle, when he indicated that there had been a definite commitment made by the administration and that the committee which had presented the North Atlantic Pact to us itself was very clear that the implementing would be done by the Congress of the United States.

A person might ask, is there any particular reason why the Congress of the United States should have any doubt about the action of the executive branch of the Government? I do not know how many Senators have had an opportunity to read in this week's Saturday Evening Post an article entitled "What's the Matter With Our Foreign Policy?" written by a man who served as Undersecretary of State in the Democratic administration from 1937 until 1943. I refer to Sumner Welles. I shall not read the entire article now, but I do wish to read a few paragraphs from it because I think it deserves the study and attention of every Member of the Senate, Democrat and Republican alike, as well as of the American people.

I quote from page 2 of the article:

Surely the first, and in its consequences one of the gravest, of these mistakes was our withdrawal in May 1945, of the American forces that had liberated a large part of Czechoslovakia, and our failure to insure unimpeded access to Berlin from the west.

One of those things led to the ultimate taking over of Czechoslovakia by the Communists, and the other led to the blackmailing of the United States and other western powers by the Soviet Union in the blockade of Berlin. Perhaps if there had been more discussion on the floor of the United States Senate those two almost fatal mistakes of the

administration would not have been made.

Further on, **Mr. Welles** says:

It is now an open secret that Prime Minister Churchill repeatedly requested President Truman to agree to keep the American forces in Czechoslovakia and to keep the gates of Berlin open to the West until a meeting between the President, Stalin, and himself had taken place, and that his pleas met with an adamant refusal.

Further in the same article **Mr. Welles** says:

Perhaps the most far-reaching of the errors perpetrated by this Government during those fateful autumn months of 1945 was the "Mission to Moscow" which Secretary of State Byrnes felt impelled to undertake toward the close of the year.

A little further on in his article **Mr. Welles** has this to say:

But I am equally confident that, considering Moscow's tactics in imposing Communist governments on Poland and on other Eastern European countries in the autumn of 1945 and 1946, he would never have permitted his representative in China to pave the way for a repetition of such tactics in the Far East by trying to force Chiang Kai-shek, as General Marshall did, to bring representatives of the Chinese Communist Party into the Chinese Cabinet.

In this case he is speaking of the late President Roosevelt. In other words, he points out in this article that 3 months after the Government of the United States, as a matter of national policy, was urging De Gasperi in Italy to throw the Communists out of the Government, in the Far East we were urging the Government of China to take Communists into their Government.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from California has expired.

Mr. KNOWLAND. **Mr. President,** will the Senator yield me two more minutes?

Mr. CONNALLY. On China?

Mr. KNOWLAND. No; I wish to discuss the statement by the distinguished former Under Secretary of State.

Mr. CONNALLY. Very well.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from California is recognized for two additional minutes.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Further in his article **Mr. Welles** has this to say:

It would be interesting to know how many of those chiefly responsible for our far-eastern policy since 1945 are familiar with the writings of Lenin or with the cardinal doctrines that he and Stalin laid down with regard to the Far East. For these show that one of the basic tenets of Soviet communism has always been that once the billion and a half men and women in China, India, and southeast Asia have been indoctrinated with communism, and are linked to the people of Russia in the struggle to bring about the world triumph of the Communist ideology, the immense superiority in manpower of that alliance will insure the defeat of western capitalism.

Listen to this, by a former Under Secretary of State:

Certainly American policy in the Far East between 1945 and 1950 has expedited rather than retarded the achievement of that aim.

This is not from some irresponsible person. This is not from someone who has no knowledge of the facts. This is

from a man who sat at the right hand of the President of the United States, as the Under Secretary of State, during the most crucial years in American history. Is it any wonder that the Congress of the United States feels that it is entitled to be fully consulted and to have a voice in foreign policy? The record which has led from 200,000,000 people being behind the iron curtain when World War II closed in 1945 to the condition of more than 800,000,000 people being behind the iron curtain today is one which should be challenged by the Congress and by the American people. By what do we measure success in foreign policy?

Finally Mr. Welles has this to say:

The statement issued by the State Department in January 1950 that the Republic of South Korea, although it was established by the United Nations was "not within our line of defense," was an open invitation to the North Korean Communists and to their Soviet and Chinese Communist allies to invade South Korea.

This is the sordid and sorry record of an administration which asks for unlimited blank-check powers. I do not believe that the Congress of the United States or the American people, on the face of that record, would be doing their duty if any such blank-check powers as the Senator from New York desires were granted.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND].

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I listened with great appreciation to the able speeches by our distinguished colleagues from New York and Minnesota. I think they spoke from very full hearts. I do not question at all the patriotism which animated every word that they spoke.

But, Mr. President, I feel that the tack which they would take would be a mistaken one for the best safeguarding of the security of the Nation and of the security of all the peace-loving nations throughout the world. I feel that the amendment offered in good faith by the Senator from New York is nothing more than a milk-toast rewriting of paragraph 6; and in order that it may appear how completely vacuous and meaningless it is, I remind Senators that all that is said in it with reference to the Senate and its powers, obligations, and responsibilities in the future is in these words:

To promote and advance this policy it is the sense of the Senate that there should be, in the interests of national unity and understanding, the fullest collaboration between the Congress and the President.

The obligation to collaborate, of course, exists already. It exists in every field. We are a Nation of friendly people. We of the Senate are on terms of amity, understanding, and accord with our President. He is our chosen Executive leader. Of course, we expect collaboration from him. Of course, we expect to collaborate with him. But the result of this mere recital cuts to nothing

the statement of continuing rights and responsibilities of the Senate in this matter.

At the time the North Atlantic Pact was under consideration, the committee charged with the duty of considering the question gave certain assurances to the Senate. In section 6 of the pending resolution that committee makes it clear that it feels that there is an obligation, a responsibility, and a jurisdiction which belongs to the Senate, and, indeed, to the Congress.

I take off my hat in respect to the Senator from Texas and his colleagues on his committee for having reported a resolution which reiterates what they had in honesty and decency told the Senate at the time of ratification of the pact, namely, that the Congress would have the right to act or not to act, and to look at any proposed program and decide what sort of implementation of article 3 of the treaty should be put in force.

Let us remember that we are not leaving this country helpless. There has been too much talk along that line. Article 5 is not affected in any way. That is the one which prevails, in the event that there is aggression upon us or upon any of the other signatories of the pact. Such aggression constitutes an act of war against them and against us. The provisions in paragraph 6 of the resolution, the spirit of which runs throughout this particular resolution, have nothing to do with article 5. When there is war, the President, as Commander in Chief, can send any troops which exist wherever he feels it is necessary to send them to safeguard this Nation.

Mr. President, let me remind the Senate again that there is no limitation being placed here upon the power of the President to support the occupation forces either in Germany, Austria, or wherever they may be, because insofar as those former enemies are concerned we are still at war with them and it is, of course, our obligation to use whatever troops it may be necessary to use to uphold the hands of those in command of our occupation forces.

We are talking only about what is to happen under article 3 of the pact and I want to remind Senators that by the adoption of the McClellan amendment, which simply spelled out more clearly what was already in section 6 of the resolution as reported by the committee, we made it completely clear that the Senate proposes to stand by its understanding when we ratified the pact, and proposes to be consulted in the future and to have a word in, and to share a part of, the responsibility for, any decision.

We are anxious for every decision to have the confidence of the people of this Nation. I feel and state with all the sincerity I can command, that the confidence of the people of this Nation will be behind the decision in a much greater way when the wish and recommendation and decision of the Executive is supported by the formal supporting action of the Senate and of the House.

We are in serious times. We are in times when nothing less than the maximum confidence which can be created should be created. So I am glad the McClellan amendment was adopted, and I hope the amendment now pending before us will be defeated.

I close by simply stating that I am perfectly willing for the four divisions to go to Europe. If the President had felt that our occupation forces were at all in jeopardy, he could have sent those four divisions long before the matter ever came to this stage. I am perfectly willing for those divisions to go.

I recall to the Senate that Senators are overlooking in this debate, and there has been too little mention made of sections 1 and 2 of the resolution, the first of which approves the action of the President in the appointment of General Eisenhower, and approves the transfer of our occupation troops, under his command, as allied commander in chief.

In section 2 we state, where all can read and all can understand, that it is the belief and sense of the Senate that the threat to the security of these United States, our Nation which we are sworn to defend, and of our North Atlantic Treaty partners, whom we put exactly in the same category with ourselves, makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share to the defense of the North Atlantic area.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Florida has expired.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield to me a few more minutes?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the chairman of the committee.

Mr. President, it seems to me that in those first two sections we do give strong assurance to the world, and certainly to our allies, that we are standing back of them. And in the later stages, when we say, "Yes, the President can send immediately four divisions, and can put them there, not as an arm of our occupation forces but instead as a first contribution, and a very great one, to the building up of an international army under article 3," we are not bluffing, we are not playing. We are instead committing, in addition to the 120,000 precious American lives already there, at least that many more.

Who is there in the world to feel or to say or to believe that the United States, first having committed itself in that very great way to an effort of this seriousness, is going to withhold anything that is within our power to stand back of those men, and stand back of the objective to which we assign them under sections 1 and 2 of the resolution, and under section 6 of the resolution?

Mr. President, I think we are committing ourselves by the adoption of this resolution insofar as the Senate is concerned—and the Senate has a right to interpret its own act for it was one of the actors in the adoption of the Atlantic Pact—to interpret it as permitting

this that we do here, and to interpret the facts as existing and as justifying and even compelling our doing this thing we do here.

It is inconceivable to me that persons with understanding, looking upon what we are doing here, could say that we are not willing to carry out our responsibility. To the contrary the Senate is saying, "We insist upon carrying out our responsibility, and we are not going to resign it or abdicate it to anyone, no matter how good an American he is, because we feel we must share the responsibility for precious American lives which are going to be in danger in this effort which means so much, so terribly much to us and to our partners."

Mr. President, I, like the Senator from New York, was affected by the appearance of the President of France today. I have some reason to feel very tenderly close to the French. I want to tell the Senate that by the adoption of the resolution and by the sending of these four divisions and the putting of our hands to this heavy plow, I think we will be playing the part of "a man," to use the homely but impressive words of the Speaker of the House today when he presented the distinguished President of the second greatest republic in all the world.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted at this point in the RECORD an article entitled "Does the President Have Too Much Power?" written by Henry Steele Commager.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE TOO MUCH POWER?—THAT IS THE QUESTION INHERENT IN THE DEBATE THAT NOW GOES ON IN WASHINGTON

(By Henry Steele Commager)

It is a familiar experience to miss the forest for the trees. There is reason to suppose that the American people are now going through this experience. So intense is our interest in the day-by-day controversies that blaze in our newspapers and clamor on the air that we are scarcely aware of the larger issues involved in those controversies. To the journalist what is important in Washington may be the RFC investigation one day, the WHERRY resolution another, price controls a third, and the latest MCCARTHY burlesque act a fourth. The future historian of the Truman administration, however, may well single out the attack upon the Executive power as the most significant of all postwar developments in the domestic field.

The twenty-second amendment is a case in point. That amendment introduced a far-reaching change in our constitutional system, but perhaps the most remarkable thing about it was that it took the country so completely by surprise. No one, apparently, knew what was happening, least of all the people who woke up one morning to discover that they had struck a blow at democracy—and themselves—by denying the next generation the right to do what they themselves had done in 1940 and 1944.

The ratification of the two-term amendment is one of three major assaults upon the Executive power that have come to a head in this last year. The other two are the attempt to limit the power of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed

Forces of the Nation, and the attempt to hamstring Presidential control of foreign relations. Each of these is dangerous. Taken together they constitute an invasion of the Executive power which, if persisted in, may result in the substitution for our Presidential system of a hybrid of the parliamentary and the presidential systems.

That this result would be neither anticipated nor unwelcome in certain circles is clear from Representative COUDERT's resolution calling for a constitutional amendment which would require the President to resign in the face of a vote of no-confidence. Whatever may be the relative merits of the presidential and the parliamentary systems—a question which we need not consider here—no one familiar with our Constitution or our history can suppose that the one can be grafted onto the other without changes that would be fateful and might be fatal.

This is not the first time that the presidential system has been threatened by congressional usurpation. This happened once before, in the Presidency of the luckless Andrew Johnson; then, too, the assault came from the Republican Party—a party which has for the most part favored a strong Executive. That earlier attack, like the present one, was inspired not by a theoretical preference for the parliamentary over the presidential system, but by hostility to a particular President and considerations of partisan advantage. Historical analogies are always a bit dangerous, but it is relevant to note that that earlier attack upon the Executive power misfired, and that the policies which it was designed to facilitate—radical reconstruction—likewise misfired. Historical prophecies, too, are a bit dangerous, but it is fairly safe to predict that 80 years from now the present attack upon the Presidential power will seem as misguided and pernicious as the congressional attack upon Johnson seems to us today.

There is another feature of this attack, too, that must command our attention and excite our concern. That is its doctrinaire character. It proceeds not out of real but out of imagined dangers. It is rooted not in experience but in fears. For the limitation on the Executive power—with a corresponding expansion of the legislative power—finds no justification in our history. To the generation of Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine history taught that Executive power was always dangerous, but the history of democracy teaches a different moral. Call the roll of the "strong" Presidents—those who have used the Executive power boldly—Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt. None of these Presidents threatened democracy or impaired the constitutional system. It is, on the contrary, the "weak" Presidents—men like Fillmore and Buchanan—and Harding—who bring democracy into disrepute and expose the Constitution to grave perils.

There is, in fact, no basis in our own history for the distrust of the Executive authority. Nor is there any sound basis for the fear, the meddling, or the limitations that are explicit in the three current assaults upon the Executive power. Certainly there has been no correlation between length of Presidential service and danger to democracy or to the Constitution. The American people have on the whole acted wisely in reelecting Presidents; they have never reelected a dangerous man and only once—in 1872—a weak man. And the only referendum that the American people ever held on a third term was an overwhelming endorsement of that innovation—an endorsement confirmed—4 years later.

In this constitutional crisis it is important that we recur to basic principles of our constitutional order, and to our experience with these principles over a period of a century

and a half. These are actually two sides of the same shield, for our Constitution consists not only of the document drafted in 1787 but of the additions to it over 150 years of practice.

Let us look first to the principle involved in the Twenty-second Amendment. Why does this amendment violate sound constitutional principles? It violates sound principles because it writes into the Constitution a quantitative rather than a qualitative limit on popular authority. It writes into the Constitution a limitation not on authority itself but on the degree of authority already granted. It limits not the arena in which democracy may function but the way in which democracy functions in that arena.

This takes, perhaps, a bit of explanation. The wise men who drew up our Constitutions, State and Federal, feared government. They feared, especially that government might invade areas in which government had no standing and no right. There were certain things, so this generation held, that no government could do. Government could not "deprive men of life, liberty or happiness" without due process of law; it could not impair the right of men to worship as they pleased, or the right of free speech or free press, of petition or of assembly. All these powers were beyond the authority of government altogether, and the Constitution framers saw to it that they were removed from governmental authority either by omitting them from the Constitution proper or by writing safeguards into bills of rights.

But where Government did have authority, properly and logically, it had sufficient authority to do the job. Where power was granted, it was granted in all fullness. Thus the power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully. The power to regulate commerce among the States is the power to regulate the whole of such commerce—and the word "regulate" is broadly interpreted. The power to tax knows no limitations other than those written into the Constitution, and any effort to limit that power quantitatively is unsound in principle. In short, the Constitution acknowledges qualitative limitations on the powers of Government, but few quantitative ones except those of a purely mechanical nature.

Now apply this principle to the election of a President. Once grant that the American people (through the rubber-stamp electoral college) have the authority to elect a President, it follows that they have authority to elect him as often as they choose. Granted they may make a mistake—but they may make a mistake in their original choice, for that matter, and presumably they have a better chance of avoiding a mistake the second time than the first, the third time than the second. If the Constitution is to be designed to prevent people from making mistakes, it might as logically start with Congress, for on any fair comparison Americans have made more mistakes with their Congressmen than with their Presidents.

Let us look to the second major assault upon the Executive power—the attempt to limit the power of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Specifically this assault has centered upon the right of the President to commit American forces to danger points outside the boundaries of the United States without prior congressional authorization.

I have recently discussed the strictly constitutional issues involved in this controversy in the Times Magazine and made clear that the overwhelming weight of authority supports Presidential discretion in this field. Congress can, to be sure, limit Presidential power here by the simple expedient of refusing appropriations. But no comfort is to be drawn from the argument. For that matter, Congress could, in effect, abolish the

Presidency and the Supreme Court by refusing to vote the necessary appropriations; no one would defend the constitutionality of such conduct.

But the issue is, of course, more than one of constitutionality; it is one of power. We must beware the common fallacy that because a thing is constitutional it is necessarily sound; we must guard against the comparable fallacy that if anyone can raise any hypothetical constitutional objection to a policy it is necessarily unsound. Preoccupation with the abstract constitutional issue and with the particular issue of sending a certain number of divisions to Western Europe has served to confuse the principle involved in the question.

That principle is one of Presidential power and Presidential duty. The President is Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy, and he is under oath to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution—and by implication the Nation. It should be clear that these general powers and obligations apply with equal force to the disposition of all the Armed Forces of the Nation. If he does not have authority to send land forces to points of danger, neither does he have authority to send the Navy or the Air Force to points of danger outside the boundaries of the Nation, for his constitutional authority in the one arena is precisely the same as in the others.

Those who deny the President the right to send land forces to such places as are essential to the defense of the Nation, by logical implication deny his power to order the Navy to the waters around Formosa or the Air Force to air stations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

There are some further considerations that have not received sufficient attention in this discussion—a discussion which has centered overmuch on the constitutional question. There is, for example, the consideration that insistence upon specific authorization from Congress may serve to deprive the Executive of effective bargaining power in negotiations with the Kremlin, or of influence in negotiation with our associates. There is the consideration that if Congress ties the President's hands in the matter it, in effect, invites aggression whenever it is not available to untie them. A generation ago this consideration would not have been alarming, for in an emergency Congress can convene speedily and act with dispatch. But modern blitz warfare does not wait upon congressional reconvenings.

Theory may mislead us; experience must be our guide. Has the Presidential power in this arena served us well or ill? Have Presidents, in fact, been more war-minded than Congresses, or have they been more mistaken in their understanding of international crises? What shall we say of Jefferson's undeclared war on the Barbary pirates; of Lincoln's personal conduct of the war for the Union from April to July 1861; of Theodore Roosevelt's intervention in the Venezuela crisis and in the Caribbean; of Wilson's determination to arm American merchantmen? Were the President's wrong in these and other ventures, and was Congress in the right? But these questions may be academic. Clearly it is not the remote past that concerns Congress now, but the immediate past.

Though Truman is the ostensible object of attack, Franklin Roosevelt is the real object of attack. It is his foreign policy that is under fire; it is his decision to trade destroyers for island bases, to land troops in Iceland and Greenland, to order the Navy to shoot on sight—that is the issue in the minds of most of those Congressmen who are pressing for limitations on the Presidential power. Who, now, looking back upon those critical months of 1940 and 1941, would repudiate the Presidential decisions—who but unregenerate isolationists of the Chicago Tribune school?

The personal and almost petty form of the third attack upon the Executive power should not conceal from us the significance of the issues involved. This is, of course, the Republican demand that "Acheson must go." It is not a little curious that those most vociferous in their hostility to communism should thus center their attack upon the man who has done more than any other to stop communism, but it is not the merits of the debate that concern us but the principles.

On the one hand are long-established traditions of Presidential control over the Cabinet and of the President as the sole organ of the Government in the conduct of foreign relations, on the other hand, is the oft-refuted notion that Congress may dictate membership in the President's Cabinet, and the new and original notion that a minority party should control the Government.

It is difficult to know whether to be more astonished at the effrontery of congressional claims or at their folly. It is, to be sure, the effrontery that is most ostentatious, for the Republican Party, defeated in every presidential election for 20 years, and in every congressional election but one, is acting as if it actually won the election of 1950. But it is the folly that is most serious. For if successful in their attack upon the Secretary of State the Republicans may do irreparable harm to the presidential system. They may succeed in destroying Presidential control over his Cabinet and Presidential control over foreign relations.

Let us look briefly at what is involved here. The Cabinet is a product of our unwritten Constitution—and a very important part. It is made up, traditionally, of heads of departments; these are selected, in the first instance, by the President, report to him, and are subject to dismissal by him. He may consult with them—but is not legally bound to do so. He may prefer to consult with others—a kitchen cabinet or a brain trust—and is not answerable to Congress for this preference. The relationship between the President and his Cabinet is, in other words, personal and intimate. Whatever the precise nature of that relationship, the nice balance of personality and power, one thing is clear: the President must be in control.

This has been the theory of our Government since the second Washington administration and during most of that time it has been the practice as well. Now and then strong Cabinets—or individual Cabinet members—have tried to dominate weak Presidents. Sometimes—as in Lincoln's case—they have tried to dominate strong Presidents, and come a cropper. Students will recall how Andrew Jackson asserted his command over the Secretary of the Treasury, how the luckless Tyler defied Webster and his colleagues, how Woodrow Wilson fired Lansing because he thought that Secretary had usurped Executive power.

If the principle of Presidential control of the Cabinet is sound generally—as it is—that principle is crucial where the Department of State is concerned. For the President is the sole organ of the Government in the conduct of our foreign relations. This was made clear at the beginning of our history when Washington announced the neutrality proclamation on his own; it has been confirmed by a century and a half of subsequent experience. If there is, then, one part of the Cabinet where Presidential control must be complete, it is the State Department. Adams recognized this when he dismissed Pickens for disloyalty; Lincoln recognized this when he put Seward firmly in his place; Wilson recognized it when he forced the resignation of Bryan and dismissed Lansing.

The claim now advanced by certain Senators that they can force the President to oust Secretary Acheson—and by implication dictate Presidential appointment of his suc-

cessor—is a claim which, if sustained, would reverse 150 years of practice and precedent and make all but impossible the effective conduct of our foreign relations. It is a claim without precedent in history, without basis in law, and without foundation in logic. Like the insistence upon limiting popular will in presidential elections and upon qualifying the power of the President in the realm of national defense, it is a product neither of necessity, of reason, nor of statesmanship, but of partisanship, confusion, and folly.

What is at stake in all this is nothing less than the integrity of our constitutional system. Those who are now so assiduously engaged in undermining that system are not aware of what they are doing. They would doubtless claim the most exalted motives—and we must give them the benefit of the doubt on this. To a public rightly disturbed by revelations of confusion, incompetence and chicanery in the executive departments, they appear engaged in a laudable effort to check the unwise exercise of presidential power.

But more is at stake here than appears on the surface. What the critics and enemies of presidential power are doing is clear enough. They are engaged in substituting for the presidential system a bastard product of presidential and parliamentary, with the disadvantages of neither. If they succeed they will impair and may destroy the constitutional fabric of the Republic.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield me 30 seconds?

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. LODGE. I should like to read to the Senate a bulletin which just now came over the ticker. This is the day General Eisenhower assumes command of the army in Europe. The bulletin to which I refer is as follows:

General Eisenhower said today that any delay in congressional action on defense measures "would delay the whole preparation of defense of Western Europe."

"Anything done which would indicate reluctance on the part of any country to get into this pool of cold water would delay the whole preparation of defense. My concern is that each nation should show its full readiness to cooperate."

Mr. President, I hope that, by our actions, we will show that we are helping and not harassing General Eisenhower. He is over there working for us.

I thank the Senator from New York for yielding to me.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I do not intend at this time to refer to the constitutional issues which have been discussed not only in this debate but for the past 150 years. The dispatch which the Senator from Massachusetts has just read from the man on the ground is a vivid reminder, if we should need a reminder, of what this is all about.

There has been some talk about the moralities of the situation. There has been some talk about the kind of situation which was created by the statements of various men at the time we ratified the Atlantic Treaty. We should not forget at this time why we became a party to that treaty, and what we are here trying to do. We ratified that treaty 2 years ago because we recognized

that there was developing in Europe a threat to the free world.

We know now that the Russians have 175 divisions. We know now that they have more than 25,000 operational aircraft, and, Mr. President, we know now that they have an ever-increasing stockpile of atomic weapons. We know now that Stalin has repeated the philosophy of Lenin time and time again, that we cannot live in a world with them. We know they have said that there will be a series of terrible conflicts, and that one of us will perish and go down. That was the background, briefly sketched, of the Atlantic Treaty when we went into it.

Mr. President, since that time what has happened? We find Yugoslavia breaking away from the other Soviet satellites, but now being threatened with a movement to bring her back into the fold *vi et armis*. We find an ever-increasing force in Eastern Germany with the constant threats that the maneuvers which occur there day after day will some day extend themselves into Western Germany. We find that we are in actual conflict in Korea and have been since last June. So it is against this kind of a background that we decided to implement the North Atlantic Treaty.

Now, Mr. President, I am talking about the morality of saving the free world. We are not going to do it when we constitute the Senate of the United States as a committee on the deployment of troops. I call attention to the fact that some of the Senators who successfully have supported that sort of proposition today have been among the ones who have screamed the loudest to the high heavens about the dangers of communism in the United States. Mr. President, we are not going to be struck down in the United States, regardless of the outcries of men who would seek to make political capital by constantly pointing the finger of suspicion at those who disagree with them here at home. Our danger is coming from this outside threat which grows and grows and grows and, unless it is met, will overwhelm us.

Mr. President, the amendment of the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] is in the true spirit of our institutions and of our Constitution. I am not talking about Harry Truman, who happens to be President of the United States. However, if there were in office a President of the United States who represented the party of the Senators on the other side of the aisle, I would be among the first to stand up for his right under the Constitution to exert his constitutional prerogatives to defend the sovereignty of the United States.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Connecticut has expired.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Arizona [Mr. MCFARLAND].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. MCFARLAND. Mr. President, I had not intended to speak upon this amendment. I had not intended to speak unless a motion was made to recommit the resolution.

However, this evening, on the floor, reference has been made to the administration as though it were to blame for what the Senate has just done. The Senate marched up the hill, and then it marched down again. But no one can say that the President of the United States has in any way injected himself into this debate.

Mr. President, I do not believe I would be performing my duty if I did not rise to state that the administration is in no wise to blame for what the Senate has done through its vote on the reconsideration of the amendment proposed by the Senator from Arkansas.

I was one of the first to urge that the Senate of the United States should adopt an affirmative resolution in order that we might all move forward in unity on this vital issue, and not be sniping at the President of the United States.

It should be pointed out that there may be among us those who laugh this evening because of the victory they have achieved, but it is not a victory for the United States of America. Any indication here that the Congress is not willing to work with the administration, that the Congress is not willing to stand behind such men as General Eisenhower, George Marshall, Admiral Sherman, General Vandenberg, and the others who led our country to victory in World War II; any indication which may have been given by action taken on the floor of the Senate that we believe we have to guard carefully against anything they propose or everything they do, is not in the best interest of this Government nor of its people.

The President has said he is willing to collaborate with Congress; he has said that Congress could adopt any kind of resolution it wanted to adopt if more troops were requested. But by the action which has been taken in adopting the amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, we are attempting to bind future Congresses and to set forth procedures for them to follow.

Mr. President, I was saddened by the adoption of that amendment, because I do not believe it was in the interest of the United States. Those who are happy now may feel differently another day if this action brings confusion and trouble.

I did not join the senior Senator from New York [Mr. Ives] in sponsoring his revised amendment because members of the Foreign Relations Committee prevailed on me not to do so.

In view of the action the Senate has taken already this evening—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from Arizona has expired.

Mr. MCFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield me an additional half minute?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. MCFARLAND. Mr. President, in view of what the Senate has done already this evening, it certainly would be optimistic to hope that the Senate would adopt the amendment of the junior Senator from New York. However, I expect to vote for the amendment of the distinguished junior Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN].

SEVERAL SENATORS. Vote! Vote!

Mr. MCFARLAND. Mr. President, I shall be glad to have Senators vote when the time comes. I know that some Senators are anxious to have the vote taken, and they will have their opportunity to vote on the pending amendment. I have only one-half minute more allotted to me. I have not spoken before on this issue. Surely I can be accorded the courtesy of being allowed to speak for a further half minute without having Senators call for a vote on this question.

Mr. President, as I have already said, I do not think the action the Senate has taken this afternoon has been in the interest of the United States and the defense of our country, at a time when there are those of us who are trying to forward a bipartisan move to obtain a united front in the welfare of our country.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the question of agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New York.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, if the Senators will withhold those suggestions for a minute or two, I now yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON].

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I recognize that the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] read some words from General Eisenhower which should mean a great deal to many of us. I wonder how we can read those words in connection with the first paragraph of the resolution, which says:

1. The Senate approves the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in placing Armed Forces of the United States in Europe under his command.

But then when we say to him, in a little interlineation: "Yes; we approve it up to four divisions, but not beyond that number."

Then we say that it is the sense of the Senate that there shall be consultation between certain Senate and House committees and the President and the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I agree about that; but I do not want to write into the resolution at that point a little provision that on all matters involving the sending of up to four divisions there should be consultation with the Foreign Relations Committees of the House and Senate and the Armed Service Committees of the House and Senate, great committees though they are, constituted by men with whom I have served in the House of Representatives and men with whom I have served with pleasure in the Senate. We say that we shall take their advice and counsel, provided the matters under consideration do not call for the sending in excess of four divisions of our troops,

and then say we shall accept the decisions of the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, on all matters not calling for the sending of in excess of four divisions of our troops, but that if in excess of four divisions are proposed to be sent, such suggestions or plans must be submitted to the Senate of the United States.

Mr. President, I hope we shall take to heart what the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] read to us from the statement of General Eisenhower.

I was well satisfied to vote, finally, for the resolution, before the adoption of the limitation as to four divisions; but I see no chance to rectify that action except by adopting the amendment of the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN]. I hope that by adopting that amendment we can undo the damage and can point out who is really the Supreme Commander in Europe.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator from New Mexico has expired.

All time on the amendment of the Senator from New York has expired.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Green	Millikin
Anderson	Hayden	Monroney
Bennett	Hendrickson	Morse
Benton	Hennings	Mundt
Brewster	Hickenlooper	Murray
Bricker	Hill	Neely
Bridges	Hoey	Nixon
Butler, Md.	Holland	O'Connor
Butler, Nebr.	Humphrey	O'Mahoney
Byrd	Ives	Pastore
Cain	Jenner	Robertson
Capehart	Johnson, Colo.	Russell
Carlson	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Case	Johnston, S. C.	Schoeppel
Chavez	Kefauver	Smathers
Clements	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Connally	Kilgore	Smith, N. J.
Cordon	Knowland	Smith, N. C.
Dirksen	Langer	Sparkman
Douglas	Lehman	Stennis
Dworschak	Lodge	Taft
Eastland	Long	Thye
Eaton	McCarthy	Tobey
Ellender	McClellan	Underwood
Ferguson	McFarland	Watkins
Flanders	McMahon	Welker
Frear	Malone	Wherry
Fulbright	Martin	Wiley
George	Maybank	Williams
Gillette		Young

The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum is present. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN], in the nature of a substitute for paragraph 6 of the pending resolution. The yeas and nays having been ordered, the Secretary will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

The Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is absent because of illness.

I announce further that if present and voting, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and the Senator

from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] would vote "yea."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF] is detained on official business.

The result was announced—yeas 35, nays 55, as follows:

YEAS—35

Aiken	Hoey	Monroney
Anderson	Humphrey	Murray
Benton	Ives	Neely
Clements	Johnson, Tex.	O'Mahoney
Connally	Kefauver	Pastore
Douglas	Kerr	Russell
Eastland	Kilgore	Smathers
Ellender	Lehman	Sparkman
Fulbright	Lodge	Stennis
Hayden	Long	Tobey
Hennings	McFarland	Underwood
Hill	McMahon	

NAYS—55

Bennett	George	Mundt
Brewster	Gillette	Nixon
Bricker	Green	O'Connor
Bridges	Hendrickson	Robertson
Butler, Md.	Hickenlooper	Saltonstall
Butler, Nebr.	Holland	Schoeppel
Byrd	Jenner	Smith, Maine
Cain	Johnson, Colo.	Smith, N. J.
Capehart	Johnston, S. C.	Smith, N. C.
Carlson	Kem	Taft
Case	Knowland	Thye
Chavez	Langer	Watkins
Cordon	McCarthy	Welker
Dirksen	McClellan	Wherry
Dworschak	Malone	Wiley
Eaton	Martin	Williams
Ferguson	Maybank	Young
Flanders	Millikin	
Frear	Morse	

NOT VOTING—6

Duff	McCarran	Magnuson
Hunt	McKellar	Vandenberg

So Mr. LEHMAN's amendment was rejected.

NOTE.—In the daily RECORD of Monday, April 2, 1951, page 3199, the vote on Mr. LEHMAN's amendment was announced as yeas 37, nays 53, and Mr. HENDRICKSON and Mrs. SMITH of Maine were recorded as voting in the affirmative. In the RECORD of Tuesday, April 3, as appears on page 3160, Mr. HENDRICKSON requested unanimous consent, which was granted, to have his vote recorded in the negative, and, as appears on page 3189, Mrs. SMITH of Maine requested unanimous consent, which was granted, to have her vote recorded in the negative; thus making the result on the Lehman amendment, yeas 35, nays 55, as above set forth.

Mr. McFARLAND and Mr. WHERRY addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for the purpose of making a motion to lay on the table?

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I have been asked as to whether the Senate would remain in session until final disposition of the resolutions. It is apparent that in order to dispose of the resolutions today we would have to remain in session until the early hours of the morning. I made a promise to the senior Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] that we would remain in continuous session until the resolutions were disposed of, but he tells me he is willing to release me from that promise. If that be so, I am willing to ask unanimous consent that the Senate take a recess until 12 noon tomorrow. I understand from the Parliamentarian—

The VICE PRESIDENT. There seems to be some ambiguity about the unanimous-consent agreement, as to whether it means that the Senate is to continue in session until the resolutions are disposed of. In order to pose the question, the Chair suggests that the Senator ask unanimous consent that if there be a recess taken today, the status of the matter remain as it is today.

Mr. McFARLAND. I shall do so.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McFARLAND. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the majority leader. At the time the unanimous-consent request was being considered by the Senate, I asked that there be included as a portion of it a provision that the Senate would remain continuously in session today until the business was disposed of. It is now apparent, as the majority leader says, that to abide by that rule would probably keep us here until the middle of tomorrow morning. The Senate began its session today at 10 o'clock this morning, and it has been in continuous session since that time. Under those circumstances I shall gladly waive my own convenience in the matter and shall be glad to agree to have the matter go over until such time as the majority leader fixes.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, the minority leader desires to make a motion to reconsider the vote which has just been taken. Before I propound a unanimous-consent request, I yield to the Senator from Nebraska for that purpose.

Mr. WHERRY. I move that the Senate reconsider its action in rejecting the last amendment.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the motion of the Senator from California.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate takes a recess this evening, it recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow, and that all the provisions of the unanimous-consent request previously made in regard to debate upon the two resolutions remain in full force and effect.

Mr. WHERRY. Reserving the right the object—and I shall not object, because I want to cooperate with the distinguished majority leader—

Mr. McFARLAND. I am cooperating with the minority leader.

Mr. WHERRY. I want the RECORD to show that the minority is perfectly willing to take a recess or to remain in session until both resolutions are disposed of.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Reserving the right to object, I was under the impression that the unanimous-consent agreement would be interpreted as it was written, and, like some of my colleagues have done on occasion, I have made a commitment. I did not know when the Senate would come to a vote on the resolution, which we could have voted on last week. It places me in an embarrassing position. It is not a personal matter; it involves many other persons.

I do not want to block the great spirit of cooperation between the minority and the majority, but I think I should say to my friend, the majority leader, that these things ought to be given some advance thinking so that those of us who make plans might have some idea what to expect.

I should have liked to be present to participate in the discussions. Possibly my vote will not add up to the victory that I hoped it would, anyway, so I shall not object.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the request made by the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Reserving the right to object, I should like to ask the Senator from Arizona a question. What is to prevent the Senate from continuing in session this evening in order to vote for or against the resolutions? Why could we not remain in session?

Mr. McFARLAND. We could do that, but a number of Senators have discussed the possibility of a recess, and the distinguished minority leader stated what he was willing to do. The first Senator who asked me this question was the minority leader himself. The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee prefers to have further action go over, and other Senators have told me that there is an official dinner which it is important for them to attend. I am merely attempting to accommodate the desires of Members and of the committee.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I am willing to yield to the desires of members of the committee, or of other Senators. This situation illustrates the reason why I object to unanimous-consent agreements setting a definite time. We had an agreement to vote today and to proceed until the resolutions were disposed of. All of a sudden something else comes up and we have to change our minds.

If the majority leader receives unanimous consent to have the Senate recess until tomorrow, is it his purpose that we shall conclude consideration of the resolutions tomorrow?

Mr. McFARLAND. Yes. It is my purpose to continue until we conclude action on the resolutions.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Suppose some Senators want to go to a dinner tomorrow evening.

Mr. McFARLAND. I may remind the distinguished Senator that the Senate has been in continuous session since 10 o'clock this morning.

Mr. CHAVEZ. That was done by unanimous consent, at the request of the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McFARLAND. Yes, in an attempt to get a vote. If I thought we could finish this evening within a short time, I should be glad to do so. Debate on the resolution could consume at least two more hours, and then there will be a motion to recommit which will involve another hour. There are a number of amendments yet to be disposed of. I doubt the wisdom of keeping Senators here for a long period of time.

If I had been in frame of mind to want to punish someone, I would have been willing to stay here, but I am not in that frame of mind.

Mr. CHAVEZ. But was the Senator in that frame of mind when he asked originally for unanimous consent to get through with this matter today?

Mr. McFARLAND. I made the unanimous-consent request to stay in continuous session at the request of the Senator from Florida. Let me say that not to conclude this evening may be disappointing to Senators who may have certain things which they have to do. But we try to get along here as best we can. I believe we have saved time by having reached the unanimous-consent agreement to vote today. We have voted on several amendments. If every Senator should make it a point to be present every day during Senate sessions, business of the Senate would be transacted more expeditiously. If Senators make plans to do other things, it is not under my control. We are making progress as rapidly as we can. I do not think we would gain anything by remaining in session until 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning. I do not believe the Senate would be able to work efficiently the next day.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I am inclined to agree with the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McFARLAND. The Senator was critical of me because I made the request.

Mr. CHAVEZ. No; I was not critical of the Senator. I was critical of making a unanimous-consent agreement to get through at a particular time.

Mr. McFARLAND. There was no particular time involved. The agreement provided for a limitation of debate.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Very well. A limitation of debate certainly would control the time. Mr. President, in order that some of our colleagues may attend to their social duties and not interfere with their eating habits, I shall make no objection.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I should like to ask the Senator from Arizona whether he would consider modifying his unanimous-consent agreement to have the Senate convene earlier in the morning. I am in the position of the Senator from Minnesota and the Senator from Florida. I have a commitment for tomorrow night to make an address, and I wondered if the Senator from Arizona would modify his unanimous-consent request so that the Senate may convene at 10 o'clock.

Mr. McFARLAND. I have set a meeting of the steering committee, and the members of the committee have been notified. There is one Senator who has no committee assignment. I do not feel we should cancel the meeting. It is important that the committee assignment be made. I think 12 o'clock is the best we can do. I should like to accommodate the Senator. I should like to accommodate every Senator. It is impossible to do so. We must do the best we can.

Mr. McCARTHY. I may say that I dislike very much to be forced to object. It is not a question of accommodating the Senator. I wish the Senator from Arizona would consider modifying his re-

quest. If he cannot make it 10 o'clock, 11 o'clock would be satisfactory. In that way we could get more amendments out of the way.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Arizona?

Mr. WHERRY. Reserving the right to object, does the Senator from Arizona refer to legislative committees which are to meet tomorrow morning?

Mr. McFARLAND. Legislative committees have set hearings for 10 o'clock. I have set a meeting of the steering committee. It would disrupt our plans if the Senate were to meet before 12 o'clock.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McFARLAND. I yield.

Mr. THYE. Also scheduled for tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock is a hearing on the boxcar shortage. Representatives from four States, Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Minnesota, are to meet with us on the shortage of boxcars.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The subcommittee on Appropriations for Social Security in the Department of Labor will begin hearings at 10:30 tomorrow morning. It would be impossible for the Senate to meet at any time before 12 o'clock and carry on the committee's work.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Arizona?

Mr. WHERRY. I am wondering whether the distinguished majority leader would consider making his request for 11:30 o'clock. We could have a quorum call, which would take nearly 30 minutes.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, in order to be agreeable, I will consent to 11:30 o'clock.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Arizona modifies his request accordingly.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, as I said, the Subcommittee on Appropriations for Social Security in the Department of Labor will meet tomorrow morning. The Secretary of Labor is to testify before the committee. I am certain we will not be able to conclude our hearing before 12 o'clock. The Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] is the ranking minority member of the committee. I am certain we cannot get through before 12 o'clock.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I have conferred with the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY]. There is no objection to convening at 12 o'clock.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair assumes that the status quo of the original request is maintained.

Mr. McFARLAND. That is correct.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. President, my contribution to the historic debate last week urged the administration, military leaders, and Congress to appraise most carefully the weakness as well as the strength of the enemy. I emphasized the equal dangers of overestimating and underestimating the

military capacity of Russia, and pointed out many of her weaknesses. On Sunday, April 1, the Washington Sunday Star published an article entitled "Raising Big Russian Army Simpler Than Its Upkeep," written in London by Edward Crankshaw. In the article Mr. Crankshaw contends, as did I, that Russia would have great difficulty sustaining a major war now. I deem his statement so important to this debate that I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RAISING BIG RUSSIAN ARMY SIMPLER THAN ITS UPKEEP—MAJOR WAR PROBABLY WOULD STRAIN SOVIET INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE TO BREAKING POINT

(By Edward Crankshaw)

LONDON.—The Soviet military machine is very much the most powerful in the world, but it is not quite so formidable as its size would suggest.

An army does not function in a vacuum: it has to be supplied and sustained by the home front. And in considering the effectiveness of the Soviet Army we have to ask whether the Soviet economy is capable of supporting it through a major war.

No matter how great the initial successes of the Russians in any attack on the West, from the first day of the campaign the whole apparatus of Anglo-American air power, including the atom bomb would be brought to bear on the cities of the Soviet Union and on the vital centers of the long lines of communication of the Soviet armies. At the same time the British Empire and the United States would be building up their land forces and exploiting their naval supremacy. It is estimated by military experts that for a sustained major war, the Soviet Union would have to supply from eight to ten million men to its armed forces, at the expense of industry and agriculture.

MANPOWER HAS LIMIT

Stalin, when he thinks of war with the west, has thus to take into consideration many factors besides the fighting strength of the peacetime armed forces. He has to think about his industrial capacity in general, and oil in particular; he has to think about his transport, his food supply; he has to think about the morale of the Russian people and the reliability of the east European satellites; above all, he has to think about his manpower.

We are so accustomed to thinking of Soviet manpower as inexhaustible that it may seem strange to start an appreciation of Soviet strength with an inquiry into numbers. But in fact the manpower of the Soviet Union is very far from being inexhaustible, although until very recently the Soviet leaders, slaves of tradition, have behaved as though it was. Nobody knows the exact population of the Soviet Union, including the postwar annexations (the Baltic States, the Polish Ukraine, etc.); but it is somewhere in the neighborhood of 200,000,000. Thus the vast area of the Soviet empire which bulks stupendously on the map as one-sixth of all the land in the world, carries a population only four times larger than that of Great Britain. It barely exceeds, that is to say, the populations of Great Britain and the United States (America has about 140,000,000) combined.

At present there are known to be some 35,000,000 workers employed in industry and nearly 50,000,000 in agriculture. The white-collar classes, the army and police, and the population of the labor camps account for the rest of the adult population. In agriculture—so urgent is the need for manpower in the factories—women greatly outnumber men.

AGRICULTURE BIG FACTOR

This labor force, plus some millions in the labor camps who appear in no statistics, is required to feed the Soviet Union and supply it with the sinews of war. At the moment the armed forces dispose of some three millions. To sustain a major war the Kremlin would have to call on another five to seven million, taking these from industry and agriculture.

The crux of the matter is agriculture. Any serious depletion of the agricultural labor force would bring the country to the brink of starvation. During the last war the whole population of the Soviet Union was seriously undernourished and some millions died of hunger. This was due in the first instance that quite early in the struggle the Germans occupied the great grain-producing areas of the Ukraine. This pattern would not be repeated in a future war. But this was not the only cause of the trouble; over large areas of Russia during the last war the collectives failed to do their duty, partly because not an able-bodied man was left and the work was too much for the women and children and old men, partly because the heart of many of the peasant women was not in the war (this applied particularly to 1941 and 1942). I myself in those early days saw endless acres of grain being left to rot in the fields, far from the front line, simply because the remaining peasants were weary and disillusioned and knew there was nothing to buy with the money they might earn.

INDUSTRIAL PROBLEM

This pattern would certainly be repeated in any future war. Further, such is the state of agriculture in the Soviet Union that today, 30 years after the revolution, and with all the proud boasts of mechanization, the production of grain (which is the measure of all food in a land where meat and butter and fresh vegetables and fish are considered as luxuries) is still lower per head of population than it was in 1914. It is lower, even, than it was in 1940, on the eve of the last war. For although the Soviet Union has added rich agricultural land to its territory, it has also added the populations of the annexed lands and their cities. And in spite of this increase of territory and population the harvests of 1949 and 1950 barely exceeded the harvest of 1940.

This is the reality behind the new agricultural revolution now being carried out in the teeth of popular resistance—a move to rationalize, cost what it may, the primitive techniques of the Soviet countryside. It is a revolution which cannot possibly pay dividends for at least 10 years to come. Until then, the subsistence margin in the Soviet cities will be perilously narrow.

The manpower problem of the Soviet Union bears not only on agriculture, but also on industry. For although the peasants are being squeezed to the limit in order to release the most fit and intelligent men for industry, industrial production itself is very far from being what it should be.

Stalin has already told the world what Russia wants in order to feel strong enough to cope with the capitalist world on its own terms: An annual production of 60,000,000 tons of steel, 50,000,000 tons of pig iron, 60,000,000 tons of oil, and 500,000,000 tons of coal. In 1945 he estimated that it would take at least 15 years to reach that level of production. He is now a little more than halfway to it, though pig iron still lags.

We have to bear this sort of fact in mind when considering the Soviet Union's vast population and resources. Stalin himself bears it constantly in mind. As far back as 1939 he castigated the Russians for complacency, pointing out that although the Soviet Union was producing vast quantities of iron and steel and electricity, its production per head of population still lagged far behind that of the advanced industrial

countries. "In what respects are we lagging behind?" he asks at the eighteenth party congress. "We are lagging behind economically as regards the volume of our industrial output per head of population. In 1938 we produced about 15,000,000 tons of pig iron; Great Britain produced 7,000,000 tons. It might seem from this that we are better off than Great Britain. But if we divide the number of tons by the total populations, we shall find that the output of pig iron per head of population in 1938 was 154 kilograms in Great Britain and only 67 kilograms in the U. S. S. R. Thus, in order to outstrip Britain economically in the production of pig iron—we must increase our annual output of pig iron to 25,000,000 tons."

STALIN KNOWS ALL THIS

And so on, through the catalog. Whatever the Soviet propagandists like to say, Stalin himself knows the facts very well.

In 1950, in spite of the war, the Soviet Union had increased its pig-iron output to 19,500,000 tons—but Great Britain had also increased hers to 10,000,000 tons. So the ratio was still more unfavorable to Russia in 1950 than in 1939. But the most spectacular comparisons are not with Great Britain but with America. Stalin has never dared make these figures public; their effect on the Russians would be too depressing to bear. Let us take two examples. In 1950 the Soviet Union produced some 25,000,000 tons of steel, or 2½ hundredweights per head of population; but in that same year the United States produced some 90,000,000 tons, or more than 12 hundredweights per head of the population. As for oil, in 1950 the Soviet Union produced some 37,000,000 tons, or less than 3 hundredweights per head of population; but in that same year the United States produced 250,000,000 tons, or more than 1½ tons per head of population.

These towering discrepancies speak for themselves. They are typical of the whole range of industrial and agricultural production. And while it should never be forgotten that the Soviet Union has achieved miracles in the development of her resources, in her great construction enterprises and in the application of modern industrial techniques, this development has been highly selective and perilously uneven. It has also been made directly at the expense of agriculture—at the cost, that is to say, of continuous undernourishment of the millions. Uninterruptedly, since the start of the 5-year plan in 1928, all the best talent in the country has been attracted or directed into industry. And industry itself, in spite of all the official boasting about the high state of mechanization in Soviet agriculture, has been allowed to contribute very little to the land that sustains it. It has provided the peasants with tractors and combine harvesters; but the infinity of mechanical devices which make for the efficiency of farming in Western Europe and the United States is almost entirely lacking.

Thus a picture that emerges is of a nation struggling upward from an immemorial peasant economy, being forced to make continuous and tremendous sacrifices to industrialize itself, concentrating everything on steel and the construction of heavy industry, at the expense not only of food and consumer goods, but also of all the mechanical aids, from trucks to hayrakes and portable saw-benches, which alone can make full use of a modern nation's manpower. It is a nation which is spending its substance on jet-fighters, tanks, and rockets, while the peasants on whom their makers depend still do much of their cultivation with primitive implements.

All this reflects like a mirror the chronic manpower shortage. Even in peacetime there are not enough Russians, skilled and unskilled, to carry through their industrial revolution on an even and broad front, while at the same time growing food and building

houses for themselves. The dislocation caused by war, which would demand the diversion of imperatively needed millions from the tasks which even now are inadequately performed, is something which Stalin cannot comfortably face, for at least 10 years to come—though he could still fight a very effective and terrible war if attacked. And, indeed, the whole pattern of his current planning, with a renewed emphasis on long-term capital development, suggests very strongly, without any further evidence, that to embroil himself in a major war is the last thing he intends to do, until his economy is far more broadly based than it is today.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment lettered "D" to Senate Resolution 99.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Amendments lying on the desk have no parliamentary standing. It is not necessary to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. MUNDT. I wish to offer another amendment to Senate Resolution 99, and ask that it lie on the table and be printed, and that it be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The amendment intended to be proposed by Mr. MUNDT was ordered to lie on the table, to be printed, and to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

On page 4, line 25, and on page 5, lines 1 and 2, strike out the words, "and the Senate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe" and substitute in their place the words, "and it is the sense of the Senate that the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe in implementation of article III of the North Atlantic Treaty should be submitted to Congress in the form of a Senate joint resolution."

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled joint resolution (S. J. Res. 40) to extend the time for the filing of certain claims under the War Claims Act of 1948, and it was signed by the Vice President.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

By unanimous consent, the following routine business was transacted:

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following communications and letters, which were referred as indicated:

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION—LEGISLATIVE BRANCH (S. Doc. No. 17)

A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation, in the amount of \$1,200,000, for the legislative branch, fiscal year 1951 (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION, POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT (S. Doc. No. 18)

A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation, for the Post Office Department, in the amount of \$300,000, fiscal year 1952 (with an accompanying

paper); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

PROPOSED PROVISION PERTAINING TO OFFICE OF HOUSING EXPEDITER (S. Doc. No. 19)

A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a proposed provision pertaining to the fiscal year 1951 for the Office of the Housing Expediter (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

LIMITATION ON NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF WHITE HOUSE POLICE FORCE

A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to remove the limitation on the numerical strength of the White House Police force (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF ALIENS

A letter from the Attorney General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of orders of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, suspending deportation of certain aliens, together with a detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law as to each alien and the reasons for ordering such suspension (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

GRANTING OF APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO CERTAIN ALIENS

A letter from the Attorney General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of the orders of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service granting the application for permanent residence filed by certain aliens, together with a statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law as to each alien and the reasons for granting the applications (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REPORT ON EXPORT CONTROL

A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, his fourteenth quarterly report on export control (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

DEBTS OF INDIVIDUAL INDIANS AND INDIAN TRIBAL ORGANIZATIONS

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to compromise, adjust, or cancel certain debts of individual Indians and Indian tribal organizations, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

REPORT ON OPERATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM

A letter from the Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of the Commission on the operation of the trade agreements programs, the report being a printed copy to replace a mimeographed copy sent to the Senate on December 14, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Finance.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the VICE PRESIDENT:

Resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on Banking and Currency:

"Resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States to enact legislation to curb war profiteering

"Whereas the Government of the United States must take all necessary action to prepare against aggression; and

"Whereas the people of the United States, especially the youth of the Nation, are being

called upon to make sacrifices to defend the principles for which we stand: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the General Court of Massachusetts urges the Congress of the United States to enact legislation forthwith to curb war profiteering; and be it further

"Resolved, That the State secretary send forthwith copies of these resolutions to the President of the United States, to the presiding officer of each branch of Congress, and to the Members thereof from this Commonwealth.

"In house of representatives, adopted March 14, 1951.

"LAWRENCE R. GROVE, Clerk.

"In senate, adopted, in concurrence, March 20, 1951.

"IRVING N. HAYDEN, Clerk.

"A true copy.

"Attest:

"EDWARD J. CRONIN,

"Secretary of the Commonwealth."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Washington; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"House Joint Memorial 2

"To the Honorable Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, and to the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress Assembled:

"We, your memorialists, the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Washington in legislative session assembled, most respectfully represent and petition as follows:

"Whereas the Territory of Alaska is the most exposed portion of continental United States of America; and

"Whereas the Territory of Hawaii is one of the most outlying possessions of the United States of America; and

"Whereas the people of the State of Washington are especially friendly to both the people of Alaska and the people of Hawaii; and

"Whereas a very large portion of the trade which the State of Washington has is with either Alaska or with Hawaii; and

"Whereas bills are now pending before the Congress of the United States providing for statehood of Alaska and Hawaii;

"Now, therefore, your memorialists respectfully pray that the Congress of the United States speedily take such legislative action as is necessary to provide for statehood for the present Territory of Alaska and the present Territory of Hawaii; and be it

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be immediately transmitted to the Honorable Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, the President of the United States Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from the State of Washington.

"Passed the house January 31, 1951.

"CHAS. W. HODDE,

"Speaker of the House.

"Passed the senate March 3, 1951.

"VICTOR A. MEYERS,

"President of the Senate."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"Joint Resolution 25

"Joint resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States to enact legislation to effectuate the development of the Mississippi River Parkway

"Whereas the Congress of the United States, through Public Law 262 of the Eighty-first Congress, has authorized to be appropriated a sum not exceeding \$250,000 to be used by the Departments of the Interior and Commerce, through their respective agencies, the National Park Service and the Bureau of Public Roads, to make a joint

survey of a route for a national parkway to be known as the Mississippi River Parkway, such survey to follow in general the route of the Mississippi River; and

"Whereas a similar proposal for the development of a parkway along the Mississippi River from the source to the mouth, was actively promoted through voluntary agencies in all of the States bordering the Mississippi River with the active cooperation of National Park Service staff members throughout the period between June 1938 and December 1941, and was successful in stimulating interest in the Parkway in Wisconsin to the extent that the 1939 Wisconsin Legislature enacted an enabling act, which is still in force, authorizing all local civil units and State agencies, and especially the State highway commission, to cooperate in the development of the Parkway, and providing for participation in the cost with local and State funds to the same extent as in constructing other highways with Federal aid, our State is prepared to aid actively in developing the proposed parkway. The highway commission is authorized by law to perform, on behalf of the State, each and every duty required of the State by the act of the United States Congress applicable to such parkway development, in order to secure the proposed parkway development project for the State: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the assembly (the senate concurring), That the Wisconsin Legislature respectfully requests the United States Congress to enact such legislation as may be necessary to effectuate the development of the proposed parkway. In so doing, it suggests that the public interest will be best served by a parkway that will be useful for commerce and available and suitable for purposes of national defense, for which the location is well adapted, as well as beautiful and delightful for the traveler seeking recreation, the purposes for which parkways usually are developed; be it further

"Resolved, That in thus presenting its views the Wisconsin Legislature calls attention to its pledge of cooperation in the development of the proposed parkway, as evidenced by the enabling act of the 1949 legislature, presently section 84.105 of the Wisconsin statutes; be it further

"Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be transmitted to each House of Congress and to each Wisconsin Member thereof.

"ORA R. RICE,

"Speaker of the Assembly.

"ARTHUR L. MAY,

"Chief Clerk of the Assembly.

"GEORGE M. SMITH,

"President of the Senate.

"THOMAS M. DONAHUE,

"Chief Clerk of the Senate."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Idaho; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

House Joint Memorial 7

"To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress Assembled:

"We, your memorialists, the Legislature of the State of Idaho, as assembled in its thirty-first session, do respectfully represent that—

"Whereas the western side of the Continental Divide and the waters thereof are tributary to the Columbia River; and

"Whereas since time immemorial the species of fish known as salmon have migrated from the Pacific Ocean to the waters of the State of Idaho for spawning purposes; and

"Whereas the United States has constructed, or caused to be constructed, various dams along the course of the said Columbia River, which said dams have obstructed the free migration of said salmon; and

"Whereas the United States Government allows and permits people to catch salmon

commercially in the waters of the said Columbia River by the use of seines and other such devices; and

"Whereas by regulation of the United States Government people fishing in the waters of Idaho for salmon are allowed to catch the same only with hook and line; and

"Whereas by reason of the said dams, and the said commercial fishing, the waters of Idaho are rapidly becoming depleted of salmon: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the House of Representatives of the Thirty-first Session of the Legislature of the State of Idaho (the senate concurring), That we respectfully urge upon the Congress of the United States to take such action as it deems necessary to regulate and control the taking of salmon commercially from the Columbia River, and to facilitate the active and continued migration of the salmon fish to the waters of the State of Idaho; be it further

"Resolved, That the secretary of state of the State of Idaho be, and he is hereby authorized and directed, to send copies of this joint memorial to the President of the United States, to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, and to the Secretary of the Interior of the United States."

A joint resolution of the legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Public Works:

"Assembly Joint Resolution 10

"Resolution relative to reactivation of the Defense Highway Act of 1941

"Whereas the United States as a member of the United Nations is engaged in a conflict in Asia; and

"Whereas the President of the United States has declared a state of national emergency; and

"Whereas the President and the Federal Congress are ordering controls and limitations on the usage of certain materials essential to the national defense; and

"Whereas highway construction is vital as well as essential to the national defense, particularly on the western frontier of the United States, which is the probable point of first attack by an enemy of the United Nations: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Assembly and Senate of the State of California (jointly), That the Legislature of the State of California respectfully memorializes the President and the Congress of the United States as follows:

"(a) That materials necessary for highway construction, including steel, cement, and asphalt, continue to be made available for the purpose of highway construction.

"(b) That the Defense Highway Act of 1941 be reactivated, and that appropriations for the 'strategic network' and for 'access roads' be made under that act, not requiring matching funds by States or counties, adequate to meet defense highway needs, over and above highway authorizations and appropriations already made by the Eighty-first Congress for the next two fiscal years; and be it further

"Resolved, That the chief clerk of the assembly be hereby directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

"Assembly Joint Resolution 16

"Resolution relative to the compensation of postal employees

"Whereas postal employees have not received any general wage increase since 1949,

in which year they were granted a maximum monthly increase of \$10, despite evidence justifying a general increase of \$40 per month; and

"Whereas postal employees have suffered no less from the high cost of living in the last several years than other public employees and employees in private industry; and

"Whereas most employees in public service and in private industry have received one or more cost-of-living wage increases since 1949; and

"Whereas aside from the obvious inequality of treatment, there is a serious possibility that postal employees will not long be able to resist the lure of greater reward for employment in defense and other industries: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Assembly and the Senate of the State of California (jointly), That the Congress of the United States is respectfully memorialized to enact legislation for an increase in the compensation of postal employees commensurate with the existing cost of living level; and be it further

"Resolved, That the chief clerk of the assembly is directed to transmit a copy of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Postmaster General, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

A resolution of the House of Delegates of the State of Maryland, relating to a more equitable distribution of tax burdens; to the Committee on Finance.

(See resolution printed in full when presented by Mr. O'Connor on March 28, 1951, p. 2936, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

A letter in the nature of a petition from the League of Women Voters of Newark, N. J., signed by Ruth Lynn, president, praying for the enactment of legislation to extend the reciprocal trade agreements; to the Committee on Finance.

A letter in the nature of a petition from the Parent-Teachers Association, St. Albans, N. Y., signed by Mabel S. Kopp, corresponding secretary, praying for the enactment of legislation providing an increase in the staff of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics; to the Committee on Finance.

A cablegram in the nature of a memorial from the Filipino Shipowners Association, Manila, Philippine Islands, remonstrating against the granting of charters to certain Philippine ship operators; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

A letter in the nature of a petition from the mayor and Commission Council of the City of New Orleans, La., signed by deLesseps S. Morrison, mayor, praying for the continuation of the Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

The petition of Mr. and Mr. Anthony H. James, of Anaconda, Mont., praying for the continuation of the Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Resolutions adopted by Allegheny Lodge No. 339, BPOE, the Allegheny Aerie No. 827, FOE, the Business Men's Association of the East North Side, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars of America, local No. 100, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., favoring the enactment of legislation providing a 17-percent increase in compensation for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

Letters and a postal card in the nature of memorials, from sundry citizens of Chicago, Ill., remonstrating against the enactment of House bill 2932, to readjust postal rates; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. THYE:

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Minnesota; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:

"Joint resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States to reenact the emergency maternity care program for the wives of servicemen similar to the benefits provided for pregnant wives of servicemen during World War II

"Whereas during World War II the Congress of the United States enacted into law the emergency maternity care program for the benefit of pregnant wives of servicemen, which legislation did much to alleviate the hardship and distress experienced by the wives and families of men called into active service at a time when the husband is not available or able to provide the necessary care for his pregnant wife because of such military service; and

"Whereas during the present national emergency many of our young married men are being called into active service with the Armed Forces of our country, and already a number of cases have arisen wherein actual suffering and hardship has been experienced by pregnant wives who have no one to help or care for them, owing to the absence of their husbands from home, except public relief or such private charity as may be available locally: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota as follows:

"1. That the Congress of the United States be requested to immediately reenact into law the emergency maternity care program for the benefit of pregnant wives of men serving in the Armed Forces of the United States during the present national emergency; and be it further

"Resolved, That the secretary of state of Minnesota be instructed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President of the United States, the President of the Senate, and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress, and to each Member of the Congress from the State of Minnesota.

"C. ELMER ANDERSON,
"President of the Senate,
"JOHN A. HARTLE,

"Speaker of the House of Representatives.

"Passed the senate the 19th day of March A. D. 1951.

"H. Y. TORREY,
"Secretary of the Senate.

"Passed the house of representatives the 21st day of March A. D. 1951.

"G. H. LEAHY,
"Chief Clerk, House of Representatives.

"Approved March 27, 1951.

"LUTHER W. YOUNGDAHL,
"Governor of the State of Minnesota."

By Mr. LODGE (for himself and Mr. SALTONSTALL):

Resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on Finance:

"Resolution memorializing the Members of Congress from Massachusetts to reduce to 63 years the age for eligibility for old-age assistance

"Whereas many inhabitants of the Commonwealth who have attained the age of 63 years are in need of old-age assistance; and

"Whereas the provisions of Federal law relative to old-age assistance are inadequate to care for such persons: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the General Court of Massachusetts hereby respectfully urges the Congress of the United States to enact legislation granting old-age assistance to persons who have attained the age of 63 years; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of these resolutions be sent forthwith by the secretary of the Commonwealth to the President of the United States, to the Presiding Officer of each branch of Congress, and to the Members thereof from this Commonwealth.

"In senate, adopted, March 21, 1951.

"IRVING N. HAYDEN, Clerk.

"In house of representatives, adopted, in concurrence, March 26, 1951.

"LAWRENCE R. GROVE, Clerk.

"A true copy.

"Attest:

"EDWARD J. CROININ,
"Secretary of the Commonwealth."

By Mr. WELKER:

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Idaho, relating to amendment of the Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951, pertaining to tariff revisions now being negotiated at Torquay, England, and so forth; to the Committee on Finance.

(See joint resolution printed in full when presented by Mr. DWORSHAK, on March 21, 1951, p. 2724, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

By Mr. WELKER:

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Idaho; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"House Joint Memorial 8

"To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress Assembled:

"We, your memorialists, the Legislature of the State of Idaho, as assembled in the thirty-first session, do respectfully represent that—

"Whereas the small mine operators of the State of Idaho constitute a vital and important part of the economy of Idaho; and

"Whereas the operators and owners of mines constitute a vital and important source of discovery and development of important and strategic materials; and

"Whereas the Congress of the United States has appropriated moneys for the purpose of assisting the small mine owners and operators in the United States; and

"Whereas the distribution and expenditure of these moneys is administered by agencies of the Federal Government in States outside the State of Idaho; and

"Whereas the procedure required by the Federal Government in making application for and ultimately receiving aid and assistance, is so cumbersome and detailed, and must be channeled through an agency office in distant States, that it is nearly impossible for the small mine owners in Idaho to receive the aid and assistance of moneys so appropriated by Congress; and

"Whereas in view of the present world conditions, the continued operation of the small mine owners and operators is deemed necessary: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the House of Representatives of the Thirty-first Session of the Legislature of the State of Idaho (the senate concurring), That we most respectfully urge upon the Congress of the United States to take such action as it deems necessary to simplify and expedite the flow of Federal moneys to the small mine owners and operators in the State of Idaho; and that to accomplish this purpose, it is respectfully recommended that the inspector of mines of the State of Idaho, along with other similar offices in the several States, be authorized to receive and process applications for assistance, and to that end, the requirements to receive such assistance be simplified; be it further

"Resolved, That the secretary of state of the State of Idaho be, and he is hereby authorized and directed to send copies of this joint memorial to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States; to the United States Senators and Representatives of the State of Idaho; to the Secretary of

the Interior; to the United States Bureau of Mines, and to the United States Geological Survey."

(Mr. DWORSHAK presented a joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Idaho, identical with the foregoing, which was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.)

(The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Idaho identical with the foregoing, which was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.)

By Mr. DWORSHAK:

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Idaho; to the Committee on Appropriations:

"House Joint Memorial 6

"To the President of the United States, the United States Senate, and to the House of Representatives of the United States:

"We, your memorialists, the Legislature of the State of Idaho, duly and regularly assembled in legislative session, respectfully represent that—

"Whereas the Albeni Falls project, recommended by the Chief of Engineers in his report published as Senate Document No. 9, Eighty-first Congress of the United States, first session, as proposed for flood control, navigation, and power, is located on Pend Oreille River in Bonner County, solely in the State of Idaho; and

"Whereas the proposed power plant at the site of the Albeni Falls project will contain three units, each with a rated capacity of 14,200 kilowatts, and when said project, in coordinated operation with system plants at Hungry Horse, Grand Coulee, Foster Creek, McNary, and Bonneville will add 168,000 kilowatts of nominal prime power to the system; and

"Whereas said project was authorized in the Flood Control Act of 1950, approved by the President May 17, 1950 (Public Law 516, 81st Congress), and the Budget of the United States, for the fiscal year 1952 contains an item of \$10,000,000 for initiation of construction of said project: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of Idaho (the senate concurring), That we most respectfully urge upon the Congress of the United States that the appropriation of the said \$10,000,000, or any amount for the initiation of construction of said project be conditioned upon there being allocated or reserved to the State of Idaho for future use and disposition by that State without restriction, an equitable portion of the firm power available from the Albeni Falls power plant, or such allotment or reservation of said portion of power to be made available to the State of Idaho for future use in, and disposition by that State in such manner as to the Congress may seem appropriate, and that the political subdivisions of this State whose taxable value is reduced by reason of acquisition by the United States of property for construction and operation of the dam, power plant and reservoir, be reimbursed by an annual payment in lieu of taxes equal to the tax which would have been collected on such property were it not owned by the United States; and be it further

"Resolved, That the secretary of state of the State of Idaho be authorized, and he is hereby directed to forward certified copies of this memorial to the President of the United States, the Senate of the United States, and the House of Representatives of the United States, and to the Senators and Representatives representing this State in the Congress of the United States."

(Mr. WELKER presented a joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Idaho, identical with the foregoing, which was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.)

(The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Idaho, identical with the foregoing, which was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.)

HELLS CANYON PROJECT, IDAHO—RESOLUTION OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF TWIN FALLS (IDAHO) CANAL CO.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, the people of Idaho are very much disturbed about the attitude of the Bureau of Reclamation toward our people and their constitutional rights. For this reason, I present for appropriate reference, and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, a resolution unanimously adopted by the Twin Falls Canal Co., of Twin Falls, Idaho, relating to the subject.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the President in his budget message to the Congress on January 15, 1951, has recommended the authorization and immediate construction of the Hells Canyon project on the Snake River, for the purpose of producing electric power and energy; and

Whereas the people of Idaho have a moral and legal right to expect that in any program for the utilization of Snake River waters, which flow for 780 miles through Idaho and along its borders, authorizing legislation should provide for the protection of lands now under irrigation and for the future reclamation of arid lands, and other consumptive uses, in the Snake River Basin; and

Whereas Idaho's economy is basically agricultural and development of our arid land offers the soundest opportunity for further growth; and

Whereas any proposal to construct Hells Canyon Dam without reference or benefit to irrigation requirements of the Snake River Basin would be in conflict with and in repudiation of the Bureau of Reclamation's long standing policy of coordinating reclamation and power developments and allocating assistance to irrigation out of revenues derived from the production of electric power: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the board of directors of the Twin Falls Canal Co., That—

1. Legislation authorizing the Hells Canyon project should provide adequate protection of Idaho's right to the future upstream consumptive uses of the waters of the Snake River.

2. Legislation authorizing the Hells Canyon project should state as its purposes the production of power and the reclamation of arid lands of the Snake River Basin, and the two treated as a single unit of legislation.

3. Legislation authorizing the Hells Canyon project should at the same time authorize the Payette unit of the Mountain Home project and should clearly provide earmarked financial assistance or subsidy needed for construction of the irrigation features of the Mountain Home project without reference to the needs of other projects, and in an amount which is adequate to insure construction of the irrigation features at any time the Congress makes the necessary appropriations.

4. Legislation authorizing that the Hells Canyon project should contain adequate provision reserving for Idaho for her future needs a minimum of 500,000 kilowatts of firm power to offset the potential power loss resulting from the flooding of low-head power sites by the construction of Hells Canyon Dam, such allocation to be made to the State without limitation as to use

or conditions of resale, and to be made available by the Federal Government to the distribution agency designated by the State at a price not in excess of that which would result if the low-head projects were developed and financed by venture capital.

5. Legislation authorizing the Hells Canyon project should provide for appropriate recompense to the State of Idaho for the loss of future taxable values that will result from the flooding of upstream power sites as a result of the construction of Hells Canyon Dam.

Be it further

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be sent to Idaho's Representatives in Congress, to the Governor of the State of Idaho, and to the Secretary of the Interior.

POLICY OF INDIAN BUREAU WITH RESPECT TO DISAPPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS' CONTRACTS WITH INDIAN TRIBES

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, I present for appropriate reference, and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, a resolution adopted at a duly assembled meeting of the All-Pueblo Council, on March 10, 1951, relating to the present policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs with respect to the disapproval of attorneys' contracts with Indian tribes.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION OF THE ALL-PUEBLO COUNCIL

At a duly assembled meeting of the All-Pueblo Council on this 10th day of March 1951, there was discussed the present policy of the Indian Bureau with respect to approval of attorneys' contracts for tribes and, after full and complete discussion, the following resolution was adopted:

Be it resolved, That the present policy of the Indian Bureau with respect to disapproval of attorneys' contracts with Indian tribes is unfair, in violation of our rights as citizens, and is to be condemned; that this body give its support to Felix S. Cohen and others in their present pending appeal to the Secretary of the Interior in opposition of this policy; be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent to the President of the United States, all Congressmen from New Mexico, the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and all attorneys of record opposing the position of the Indian Bureau.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. BUTLER of Nebraska:

S. 1236. A bill for the relief of Kim Song Nore; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CASE:

S. 1237. A bill to provide for elections in the District of Columbia, to provide a delegate in the House of Representatives, to establish a District Council, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. ECTON:

S. 1238. A bill authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue a patent in fee to Eileen Ida Sanders; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BREWSTER:

S. 1239. A bill for the relief of Peter Lukac and his wife, Suzanne Lukac; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KILGORE:

S. 1240. A bill for the relief of Vanin Romildo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 1241. A bill to provide a system of transcontinental superhighways; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. McMAHON:

S. 1242. A bill for the relief of Salomon Henri Laifer; and

S. 1243. A bill for the relief of Anthony N. Goraieb; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEFAUVER:

S. 1244. A bill to amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 to except the Territory of Alaska from certain restrictions upon the making of Federal contributions, and to amend the provisions thereof relating to the taking of oaths by certain civil defense personnel; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. HUMPHREY:

S. 1245. A bill to establish a program of grants-in-aid to assist the States to provide maternity and infant care for the wives and infants of enlisted members of the Armed Forces during the present emergency; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

(See the remarks of Mr. HUMPHREY when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina:

S. 1246. A bill to amend certain laws relating to the submission of postmasters' accounts under oath, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. DOUGLAS (for himself, Mr.

TAFT, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. BENTON, Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. BUTLER of Nebraska, Mr. CAIN, Mr. DUFF, Mr. FERGUSON, Mr. GILLETTE, Mr. HENDRICKSON, Mr. HENNINGS, Mr. HILL, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. HUNT, Mr. IVES, Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. KILGORE, Mr. LEHMAN, Mr. LODGE, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MARTIN, Mr. McMAHON, Mr. MORSE, Mr. MURRAY, Mr. NEELY, Mr. O'CONOR, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. THYE, Mr. TOBEY, Mr. YOUNG, and Mrs. SMITH of Maine):

S. 1247. A bill to provide for the granting of financial aid to Israel; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(See the remarks of Mr. DOUGLAS when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. KILGORE:

S. J. Res. 58. Joint resolution authorizing the President to issue a proclamation designating October 31 of each year as Youth Honor Day; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

GRANTS-IN-AID TO STATES FOR MATERNITY AND INFANT CARE FOR WIVES AND INFANTS OF MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to provide an emergency program of grants-in-aid to the States to assist in providing medical, nursing, and hospital maternity and infant care for the wives and infants of the enlisted members of the Armed Forces, and I ask unanimous consent that a statement prepared by me explanatory of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the explanatory statement will be printed in the RECORD. The Chair hears no objection.

The bill (S. 1245) to establish a program of grants-in-aid to assist the States to provide maternity and infant care for the wives and infants of enlist-

ed members of the Armed Forces during the present emergency, introduced by Mr. HUMPHREY, was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

The explanatory statement is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR HUMPHREY

This bill is in harmony with the program which our Government developed during World War II. That program was initiated in the First Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1943 (Public Law 11, 78th Cong.), and was continued by successive appropriation acts until it was terminated by the Federal Security Agency Appropriation Act, 1948 (Public Law 165, 80th Cong.). The program in World War II was administered by the Children's Bureau under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Labor and later was transferred to the Federal Security Administrator when the Children's Bureau was transferred to that agency. My bill follows that administrative arrangement.

The one significant change between the bill which I am introducing and the practice followed during World War II relates to the grade of the enlisted men who would benefit from the program. My bill provides that the State emergency maternity and infant care programs are to provide maternity and infant care for the wives and infants of enlisted men in all grades. During World War II the program's benefits were restricted to the wives and infants of enlisted men of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh pay grades, which correspond to the current classifications of first, second, third, and fourth pay grades.

In view of the fact that this bill provides for an emergency program, I have included a provision terminating the program at the close of the fiscal year in which the President declares a termination of the present national emergency.

It is essential, Mr. President, that the Congress enact a program of maternity and infant care. Many cases have arisen where pregnant wives of our servicemen have found it financially impossible to meet their medical and health needs as the result of the fact that the family's income was substantially reduced when the family breadwinner was taken into the Armed Forces. At a time when we are calling millions of our young men and women to serve their Nation in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, it is vital that the Congress face up to its responsibilities and provide for their families. The program envisaged by my bill is but the beginning of our responsibility.

FINANCIAL AID TO ISRAEL

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON], the Senator from Maine [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. BUTLER], the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. FERGUSON], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENDRICKSON], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNINGSON], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT], the Senator from New York [Mr. IVES], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. JOHNSON], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], the Senator from West Vir-

ginia [Mr. KILGORE], the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MARTIN], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONOR], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. THYE], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY], the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG], and the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to provide for the granting of financial aid to Israel. For the information of Senators concerning this important measure and in the light of the serious developments of recent days in the Near East, I ask unanimous consent that the bill, together with the formal request of the Ambassador of Israel and a joint statement by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] and myself be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the bill together with the formal request and joint statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 1247) to provide for the granting of financial aid to Israel, introduced by Mr. DOUGLAS (for himself and other Senators), was read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That this act may be cited as the "Israel Aid Act of 1951."

SEC. 2. It is the purpose of this act to give financial aid in the form of grants to the Government of Israel in order to assist the people of Israel in developing their natural resources, expanding their agricultural and industrial economy, and increasing their productive capacity and facilities, and by such assistance, to promote the security and general welfare of the United States and of Israel, and to strengthen the ties of friendship between the people of the United States and the people of Israel, thereby furthering the basic objectives of the Charter of the United Nations.

SEC. 3. In order to carry out the purpose of this act, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President during the period ending June 30, 1952, not to exceed in the aggregate \$150,000,000.

SEC. 4. No assistance under the authority of this act shall be made available until an agreement is entered into between Israel and the United States containing such undertakings on the part of Israel as the President may find necessary to carry out the purpose of this act.

SEC. 5. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and directed, until such time as an appropriation shall be made pursuant to section 3 of this act, to make advances not to exceed in the aggregate \$50,000,000 to carry out the provisions of this act, in such manner, at such time, and in such amounts as the President shall determine, and no interest shall be charged on advances made by the Treasury to the Re-

construction Finance Corporation for this purpose. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation shall be repaid without interest for advances made by it hereunder, from funds made available for the purpose of this act.

SEC. 6. Assistance under this act shall be terminated by the President whenever he, or Congress by concurrent resolution, determines that because of changed conditions continuation of such assistance is unnecessary or undesirable.

The formal request and joint statement are as follows:

FORMAL REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to submit herewith a request by the Government of Israel for financial assistance by grants-in-aid from the United States of America, to the extent of \$150,000,000 for the period July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1952.

2. After estimating its potential sources of foreign exchange for that period, and notwithstanding the remarkable efforts and sacrifices which the people of Israel are making toward the attainment of economic stability, the Government of Israel still faces the prospect of a considerable dollar deficiency. If this shortage cannot be made good, it will become impossible to maintain living standards even at their present reduced level, while Israel's industrial and agricultural development is liable to become impeded, or even paralyzed, through lack of continuous supplies of raw materials and capital goods. On the other hand, the availability of adequate dollar exchange would enable Israel to advance rapidly toward increased productivity and economic equilibrium during the coming few years of heavy immigration.

3. The Government of Israel has observed the historic role of the United States aid programs in enabling many other friendly countries, in similar emergencies, to achieve rapid economic recovery. It also recalls with gratitude the many acts testifying to the special ties of friendship between the peoples of the United States and Israel. In that spirit the Government of Israel now calls attention to its economic problems, many of which go far beyond the normal scope of national responsibility.

4. Immediately upon the proclamation of its independence, and while still struggling against heavy odds for sheer physical survival, Israel set itself to discharge the primary mission for which it was established. Waves of immigration have converged upon Israel from all parts of the world, especially from central, southern, and eastern Europe, and from Islamic countries in west Asia and north Africa. The Jews remaining in central and eastern Europe are but the pathetic remnants of once prosperous communities whose manpower and institutions were ruthlessly consumed by murderous persecution unparalleled in the annals of history. Their desire to abandon the scene of their people's agony and martyrdom is overpowering. It is reinforced by their inborn preference for a life of democratic freedom in a society which upholds as the chief focus of national pride the very Jewish traditions and associations which had been the target of such brutal persecution in Europe. On the other hand, in many parts of the Moslem world Jewish minorities have lived for centuries under an intermittent and precarious tolerance, punctuated by periods of disorder and oppression. In recent generations the rise of a strong national consciousness throughout this area has imparted to Jewish minorities a sharpened sense of separateness and insecurity. At the same time, the

echoes of Israel's achievement have awakened a messianic urge for redemption, which makes Jewish minorities in Arab countries increasingly unwilling to sustain a lot so stoically borne by their ancestors for centuries past, as long as it seemed inexorable. An independent state which makes the absorption and rehabilitation of Jewish immigrants the central purpose of its life has become a compelling magnet to all Jews who lack freedom and dignity in their present abodes. This is one of the spontaneous and irresistible movements of mass migration which have revolutionized the history of peoples. In recent months the threat of world conflict has added a fresh incentive to Jewish immigration—a desperate urge to find shelter before the storm breaks, and while liberty of movement still remains.

5. While the rate and scale of immigration to Israel are largely determined by conditions in Europe and the Moslem world, Israel's resolve to accept immigrants without restriction is animated by a sense of inescapable responsibility. The people of Israel are themselves, for the most part, immigrants—survivors of pogroms and persecution; they know well that to refuse entry to their kinsmen now may mean the renunciation of that crucial opportunity forever. Indeed, some countries have actually established official dead lines before which all prospective emigrants must leave. It is inconceivable that Israel can incur the moral responsibility for whatever might befall Jews who seek admission to Israel and are denied it. Jewish communities throughout the world, and especially in the United States, have spent much effort and sacrifice on Israel's behalf, in the clear expectation that they were thus establishing a permanent haven for all oppressed and insecure Jews in need of a home. It is noteworthy that President Truman's recommendation in 1946 for the transfer of Jewish displaced persons from Europe to Palestine marked the beginning of the United States' specific interest in the search for a solution of this problem. Thus, every circumstance of humanitarian concern and moral principle compels Israel, with the fervent approval of its own public and of Jewish opinion everywhere, to uphold and maintain freedom of immigration. Moreover, from the viewpoint of Israel's own interest, even if heavy immigration is accounted an economic liability in the short term, it must certainly in the long run be regarded as an asset, since it will enhance Israel's self-reliance, its economic strength, and its creative capacity.

6. The conditions which govern the scale of immigration to Israel can well be illustrated by reference to the Jews of Iraq. When the Government of Iraq allowed Iraqi Jews to register for emigration, it was thought by many observers that no more than 30,000 would exercise that option. In fact, about 105,000 out of a total 130,000 Jews registered for emigration and made plans to leave for Israel. On receiving permission to leave the country, an Iraqi Jew loses his citizenship, whereupon it becomes urgent to effect his emigration without delay. In recent months, the Government of Israel has been exhorted by the Government of the United States and by the United Kingdom to make every effort to speed up the evacuation of Iraqi Jews. The Government of Israel, in pursuance of its own policy, has increased the monthly rate threefold in full knowledge of the resulting aggravation of its financial problems.

7. As a result of this immigration, the dominant feature in the life of Israel is the spectacular increase of its population. On May 14, 1948, the Jewish population of Palestine was 650,000. Between that date and the end of 1950, 511,000 immigrants have entered the country, representing a 78-percent increase in the over-all population total. About half a million new immigrants are expected to arrive within the next 3 or 4

years. By the end of 1954, Israel will have trebled its population mainly by immigration. This rate of population increase has no precedent; manifestly it calls for a financial effort on an unusual scale.

8. In receiving these immigrants Israel has solved problems which would otherwise fall on international agencies and on other governments. For example, the admission to Israel of nearly all Jews from displaced-persons camps in the American zone of Germany has directly liberated the United States Treasury from a considerable and continuous expenditure. For many years the European refugee problem had baffled the resources and capacity of the refugee organizations established under the auspices of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Israel has absorbed large numbers of refugees who were the objects of this international concern, without even having received any repatriation from Germany for the wholesale spoliation and destruction of Jewish property in Europe. Moreover, by absorbing Jewish communities which were living in conditions of insecurity or discrimination, Israel has eliminated potential points of friction and instability in more than one area of the world.

9. The difficulty of financing the absorption of this enormous population increase has been aggravated still further by Israel's defense burdens. At its very inception, Israel was forced to mobilize all its resources in fighting, alone and unaided, its battle of survival against overwhelming odds. The aggressive onslaught of the Arab States was successfully repelled; yet their persistent refusal to conclude a final peace settlement continues to strain the resources of Israel by necessitating heavy defense expenditure, on which also the mounting international tension has an inevitable bearing.

10. In addition to the burdens imposed by immigration and defense, the Government of Israel has undertaken to make its due contribution toward the solution of the Arab refugee problem in the Near East. It has declared its willingness to support the reintegration fund to be established by the United Nations by paying into it funds accruing from compensation for abandoned Arab lands, on the understanding that such funds will be used for the permanent resettlement of Arab refugees in conditions which would conform with their own welfare and with the ultimate stability of the Near East. Under this arrangement, which has been publicly announced in the United Nations, Israel is probably assuming a heavier financial commitment in the Arab refugee problem than any other single member government, notwithstanding the fact that the problem itself was actually created in the course of a deliberate attempt to destroy Israel's existence, as a result of which Israel sustained heavy and widespread material damage.

11. A country which increases its population by 80 percent in 2½ years, while simultaneously sustaining a heavy burden for its defense and preparing to make a substantial financial contribution toward the solution of the Arab refugee problem, cannot obviously develop its productive resources to the extent required by these vast burdens without massive outside assistance. Israel, however, has itself made a maximal effort to solve the economic problems with which it has been confronted. This effort has been made in two directions. On the one hand the standard of living of the population has been drastically reduced. On the other hand, every possible means has been adopted to increase production in both agriculture and industry, with impressive results. Whereas the population increased by 80 percent in 2½ years, agricultural production rose during the same period by 70-80 percent and industrial production by 40-50 percent. It is clear, therefore, that Israel is seeking sup-

plementary external aid only after having imposed upon itself heavy sacrifice and considerable self-denial.

12. The magnitude of the effort which Israel has put forth for its own economic development is illustrated by the achievement of net new investment of approximately the equivalent of \$190,000,000 in the calendar year 1949, and of approximately \$275,000,000 in 1950. This new investment was equivalent to more than 25 percent of Israel's total national income in 1949, and to more than 30 percent of the national income in 1950. Yet, Israel now proposes further to raise its annual investment target to the equivalent of approximately \$500,000,000. There is no choice; no lesser target would be compatible with the full productive employment of Israel's people. But it is obvious that the gap in the balance of payments, which is the most striking expression of Israel's economic difficulties, cannot be closed by its own exertions in the immediate future.

13. Since heavy immigration seems certain to continue for the next 3 or 4 years, the consequent dislocation of Israel's economy is bound to persist for that period. The very measures which Israel is adopting to add to its productive capacity are liable, in the short run, to increase the disturbance in the balance of payments. The required diversion of Israel's own resources from production for current consumption to investment work will create inflationary pressure on scarce supplies of consumption goods. Israel is grateful for the great contribution to her long-term productive facilities which is being made through the credits of \$135,000,000 received from the United States Export-Import Bank. Israel also places great reliance for her economic development on the resources for productive purposes which will be sought through the sale of bonds to the public in the United States of America. These imports for specific investment purposes, however, need to be supplemented by a diversion of Israel's own productive capacity from consumption needs to the production of capital goods. The grant-in-aid from the Government of the United States, for which the Government of Israel is herewith applying, would bridge this gap in the availability of consumption goods until the increased production of Israel, which will be the consequence of the capital imports, can catch up with the needs of the population and assure economic stability. This American aid, extended over a brief period of time, can lead to the achievement of Israel's economic equilibrium, in full conformity with the concept of economic recovery which has inspired the aid programs of the United States since their inception.

14. Most prominent among the purposes for which grant-in-aid assistance is requested is one most directly connected with immigration: If the immigrants are to be employed productively, they must have houses near their places of work. The house to be provided is of the simplest character, having an average total cost of approximately £750, the equivalent of \$2,100. At the present time, many tens of thousands of immigrants are in huts and tents. The average housing rate of the population of Israel is three persons per room, while a large part of the population lives at the standard of five persons per room. To alleviate this shortage, it is proposed to build approximately 70,000 housing units in the year July 1, 1951-June 30, 1952, to accommodate roughly 250,000 persons. The total cost would be approximately \$150,000,000—and Israel is reconciled to the need for meeting by far the larger part of this total cost from its own resources. A grant-in-aid of approximately \$30,000,000 is needed to meet foreign exchange costs of materials, imported fixtures, and construction machinery. Israel's own investment in the program would be four times as great as the requested grant-in-aid.

15. Grant-in-aid assistance in the form of supplies needed specifically to restrain the stress of the inflationary pressures is requested in the amount of \$105,000,000. As mentioned above, in the year July 1, 1951-June 30, 1952, Israel will be attempting to raise her total investment toward the target of an annual rate of approximately \$500,000,000. Even under a system of austerity, Israel will require, in the year July 1, 1951-June 30, 1952, at the price levels which prevail today, about \$225,000,000 of imports apart from imports for specific investment purposes.

16. An additional grant in aid of approximately \$15,000,000 is requested for the insurance and shipping costs connected with the delivery of the above commodities in Israel. This amount has been estimated on the assumption that the affected commodities would be purchased not only in the United States but also in other friendly countries, from which shipping costs might in some cases be lower than from the United States.

17. The specific uses of the requested grant in aid might then be outlined as in the following table:

Approximate list of purchases to be financed with requested grant in aid

A. Materials, fixtures, and equipment required to be imported for the construction of 70,000 housing units.....	\$30,000,000
B. Supplies required to restrain the inflationary pressure of the investment and defense programs:	
(a) Wheat.....	25,000,000
(b) Fodders.....	15,000,000
(c) Oilseeds.....	10,000,000
(d) Fertilizers and seeds.....	10,000,000
(e) Cotton, other fibers, and textile materials.....	10,000,000
(f) Leather, hides, chemicals, and minor materials.....	10,000,000
(g) Petroleum.....	25,000,000
	105,000,000
C. Shipping and insurance services.....	15,000,000
Total.....	\$150,000,000

18. The close link between economic stability and political freedom is becoming increasingly understood in all parts of the world. The future of Israel's social and political system is an issue of direct consequence to the cause of world democracy. Israel has established a parliamentary democracy in an area where democratic ideals and principles have not yet struck deep roots. While many countries have recently achieved institutional freedom, not all have simultaneously fought with any marked effect against the traditional social and economic inertia which condemns countless multitudes to a life of squalor and misery. Unless democracy proves its capacity both to insure political freedom and to realize a vision of society based on expanding horizons of material warfare and cultural progress, it will find itself hard-pressed in its struggle to compete against feudal traditionalism on the one hand and modern negations of political democracy on the other. The success of Israel's efforts to combine political freedom with economic progress will certainly affect the prestige of democracy in the crucial area of which Israel is a part. Israel's experience and achievement in soil conservation, land development, irrigation, technological research, industrial progress, as well as in cooperative organization and social freedom, are intimately relevant to the most acute problems which afflict

such wide areas of the Near East with conditions of backwardness and dearth. Thus, any strengthening of Israel's efforts to achieve a high degree of development must be regarded as a contribution to the progress and stability of the entire Near East. For, despite the transient political conflicts which now divide it, the Near East cannot in the long run fail to be affected by progressive examples. In this respect, too, aid to Israel would fully conform with the principles which have determined the United States' aid program.

19. On June 20, 1922, the Congress of the United States of America unanimously recorded its sympathy for the "aspirations of the Jewish people to rebuild their ancient home-land." On December 19, 1945, the Congress, in a concurrent resolution, advocated the establishment of a democratic commonwealth in Palestine "to the end that the country should be opened for free entry of Jews." In a resolution of greeting on the anniversary of Israel's independence in May 1950, the United States Senate paid tribute to the emergence of Israel as an objective in which the American people had indicated their sympathetic interest for many years. In the last three decades successive Presidents of the United States have associated the American people, by close bonds of sympathy and support, with the rebirth of Israel as a modern embodiment of an ancient tradition which bequeathed to the world some of the basic moral ideals on which western civilization is founded. At every decisive stage in Israel's recent development, the efforts and sacrifices of Israel's people, and of Jewish communities working for Israel's welfare, have received notable support from the President, the Government, and the Congress of the United States of America. American representatives in the United Nations have carried this policy into the highest international forum. Israel will always feel the most profound gratitude for the memorable steps taken by President Truman and the Government of the United States in favor of the reestablishment of an independent Israel, its official recognition, and its formal admission to the world community. In seeking the support of the United States for its arduous task of economic development and consolidation, and for its unprecedented efforts in providing homes for so many within so short a time, the Government of Israel is advocating the maintenance and extension of a traditional relationship firmly established in the hearts of both peoples.

JOINT STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOUGLAS AND SENATOR TAFT ON AID TO ISRAEL

We believe there are very good reasons for our country to extend to Israel at this time the economic assistance for which her Government has recently made formal request, and we are glad to introduce in the Senate, with the joint sponsorship of 34 other Senators, a bill to make this possible.

This bill would authorize appropriations aggregating \$150,000,000 for the period up to July 1, 1952, and requires an agreement by Israel to such undertakings as the President may find necessary for the purposes of the measure. Advances up to \$50,000,000 by RFC would be authorized prior to appropriations.

While Israel is scarcely 3 years old as a modern state, its achievements have already been historic. It has come through a bitter struggle for independence with courage, honor, and success. It has created a democratic, political structure and participated as a respected member in the councils of the United Nations. It probably has the strongest army in the Near East, aside from Turkey. We are informed that its agricultural production has risen 70 to 80 percent in 2½ years, its industrial production 40 to 50 percent.

Despite these and other phenomenal gains, the past 2½ years have seen heavy, though welcome, new responsibilities cast upon this state. Five hundred and ten thousand immigrants entered Israel in that period, an increase of 78 percent in the country's overall population. Another half million are expected within the next 3 to 4 years. Despite heroic efforts of her own people, generous gifts of others, and a substantial loan from the Export-Import Bank, there is a wide gap in the availability of consumer goods. This not only has necessitated a serious reduction in standards of living, but also threatens a disastrous inflation. The needs of Israel, as well as recognition of her outstanding record of achievement, call for the most earnest consideration of this proposal for assistance.

Beyond humanitarian considerations, important strategic factors indicate the vital importance of helping this new nation to keep herself healthy and strong and free. The menace of new aggressions by Communist tyranny in Iran or elsewhere in the Near East is great. Israel is a bulwark in that area for world democracy. In the light of American self-interest, we cannot ignore the situation prevailing in those countries.

The economic assistance to strengthen free nations which since World War II has been such a significant part of our American policy should, in our opinion, now be extended to Israel. We believe this can and must be done within the over-all limits set in the budget by President Truman for foreign aid.

The purposes for which it is intended to use this assistance include materials for 70,000 desperately needed housing units and grains, cotton, petroleum, hides, and other supplies required to block the dangerous inflationary pressures. The contributions which the people of Israel themselves must make are much greater, but the assistance called for in this bill is essential to Israel's stability and reconstruction success.

We hope, therefore, that this bill for aid to Israel may have early study and favorable action. This can be a timely and effective contribution to the protection of the free world and a welcome continuation of American assistance to a people whose initiative, enterprise, and dedication to the building of a genuinely democratic state in the Near East are an inspiration to all.

CITATIONS OF MORRIS KLEINMAN AND LOUIS ROTHKOPF FOR CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE—MOTION TO RECONSIDER VOTES

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, I enter a motion to reconsider the votes by which Senate Resolution 119, citing Morris Kleinman for contempt of the Senate, and Senate Resolution 120, citing Louis Rothkopf for contempt of the Senate, were agreed to by the Senate on Friday, March 30, 1951.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The motion will be entered.

PRINTING OF STATEMENT ON HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SENATE CHAMBER

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, as chairman of the Special Committee on the Reconstruction of the Senate Roof and Skylights and Remodeling of the Senate Chamber, I have had the Architect of the Capitol and his staff prepare a statement on the historical background of the Senate Chamber. I ask unanimous consent that the statement be printed as a Senate document, with an illustration.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from New Mexico? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE
ECONOMIC REPORT (S. REPT. NO. 210)

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, on behalf of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report I submit the annual report of that committee which is required by law. Under the Employment Act of 1946 the President sends an annual economic message to the Congress which must then be studied by the joint committee for the purpose of enabling that committee to make its comments upon the recommendations of the President.

This report deals with the most significant aspects of the Nation's economy. It is based upon the conviction that the policy of the Soviet Government in the international crisis arises from a conviction that an economic crisis in the United States will make it impossible for us successfully to lead the free world to permanent peace and to preserve free institutions.

On page 82 of the report will be found a memorandum distributed to all the members of the joint committee on July 18 last, submitting an economic program to meet the new pressures which were set in motion by the Korean war. This committee at that time unanimously recommended increased Federal revenue and rigid scrutiny of all Federal expenditures in order that the Government might finance the military operations it was undertaking without creating a new deficit.

The joint committee was the first to recommend a pay-as-you-go policy. That recommendation enjoys widespread support throughout the country. The report which I now submit is based upon the same principle. It recognizes that inflation is our greatest danger, inflation which increases the cost of living, and at the same time increases the cost of armament.

"Milk and munitions," as we point out in the report, "are both mounting in cost," and as a result the problem which every householder faces in providing for his family is faced by the President and the Congress in providing the necessary military power by which freedom is to be defended.

The great task of Government and of people throughout the Nation is to preserve a sound economy and to prevent inflation from undermining the great international policy we have undertaken, to resist aggression and to preserve free institutions.

I shall not undertake now to analyze the report, except to say that it advocates, first, increased revenues; second, rigid Government economy, both in defense and nondefense expenditures; and, third, the expansion of production, so that inflation may be turned back not only by increasing the receipts of the Government, but by holding down its expenditures, and by promoting productivity.

The testimony of Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives this morning has demonstrated that the program recommended by the committee last July and recommended again now has already

been productive of the most satisfactory fiscal results. Receipts have been increased by the Revenue Act of 1950 and by the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950 by approximately \$4,000,000,000. This increase of revenue, accompanied by expenditures less than were estimated, has produced such a balance of income and outgo that it seems now to be clear that this fiscal year, ending on June 30 next, will show a surplus of more than \$2,000,000,000, even in the face of increasing expenditures by reason of the preparedness program.

There will of course be new expenditures for defense as payments become due upon the contracts which are now being made. If we are to have a pay-as-you-go policy, we must have additional revenue, but we must also have economy in expenditures at the same time.

A thousand copies of this report were printed for the use of the committee and became available last Friday. The supply is now exhausted, and the committee is receiving new demands which it is unable to meet. I am advised by the Superintendent of Documents that the report which I now present will be available immediately and will be placed on sale at the Office of the Superintendent of Documents of the Government Printing Office at 30 cents a copy.

I desired to make this statement so that outside readers of the RECORD and Members of Congress would know that the document will be placed on sale without delay.

I ask that the report be printed with illustrations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The report will be received and, without objection, printed as requested by the Senator from Wyoming.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session,

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, A PROGRESSIVE PARTY THAT HAS NEVER DIED—
ADDRESS BY SENATOR O'MAHONEY

[Mr. KERR asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address entitled "The Democratic Party, a Progressive Party That Has Never Died," delivered by Senator O'MAHONEY, at the annual Jefferson-Jackson dinner in Detroit, Mich., on March 31, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

RURAL ELECTRIFICATION—ADDRESS BY
SENATOR KERR

[Mr. JOHNSON of Texas asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address delivered by Senator KERR at the annual convention of the National Rural Electrification Association on January 30, 1951, at Cleveland, Ohio, which appears in the Appendix.]

THOMAS B. McCABE—TRIBUTE BY SENATOR BENTON, AND EDITORIAL COMMENT

[Mr. BENTON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD editorials from the Washington Star, the

Philadelphia Bulletin, the New York Herald-Tribune, the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Atlanta Constitution, paying tribute to Thomas B. McCabe, which appear in the Appendix.]

UNITED STATES WORLD AIMS AND HOPES
FOR WORLD PEACE—ARTICLE BY REPRESENTATIVE A. A. RIBICOFF

[Mr. BENTON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "RIBICOFF Urges Recapture of Political Initiative," written by Hon. A. A. RIBICOFF, of Hartford, Conn., and published in the March 9, 1951, issue of Foreign Policy Bulletin; which appears in the Appendix.]

MEMORANDUM ON ACCELERATION—
ARTICLE BY A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD

[Mr. BENTON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a Memorandum on Acceleration and an article in the Atlantic Monthly by President A. Whitney Griswold of Yale University, which appear in the Appendix.]

A REPORT FROM EUROPE—ARTICLES BY
JOHN COWLES

[Mr. HUMPHREY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD three articles by John Cowles entitled "A Report From Europe," published in the Minneapolis Star, which appear in the Appendix.]

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
THE WEST—ARTICLES BY HERBERT
McCLOSKEY

[Mr. HUMPHREY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a series of three articles entitled "What Has Brought Us to the Brink of War?" published in the Minneapolis Star on February 27 and 28 and March 1, 1951, which appear in the Appendix.]

A CODE FOR CONDUCT OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS—ARTICLE BY
WALTER LIPPMANN

[Mr. KEFAUVER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "On the Television Problem," by Walter Lippmann, which appears in the Appendix.]

ASSIGNMENT OF GROUND FORCES TO
DUTY IN THE EUROPEAN AREA—STATEMENT BY COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

[Mr. O'CONNOR asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a statement dated March 31, 1951, regarding the proposal to send troops to Europe in support of the North Atlantic Treaty, prepared by the Committee on the Present Danger, which appears in the Appendix.]

CRIME IN WASHINGTON

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement which I have prepared on the subject of crime in Washington.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CASE

Saturday a man was shot and killed about 6 or 6:15 in the morning in an after-hours drinking club here in Washington.

The man who is being held for the killing, and who according to press reports admitted shooting, is quoted as connecting the Senate of the United States with the affair. The Evening Star of Saturday reports that he, Bencovich, says when he saw Gregory, the man slain, and some others start toward him, he figured he was going to get roughed up.

"They had it in for me," he is quoted as saying. "They thought I was noney and had some connection with the Senate." It appears Bencovich had once been employed as a library clerk in the Senate from 1945 through 1947.

It is easy in these days to talk about crime and to be interested in the exposures that have been made in many cities of the country through the efforts of the Senate committee headed by our distinguished colleague, the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. KEFAUVER. But here is a matter on our own doorstep.

This killing following an all-night drinking affair and an argument over gambling losses happened within a stone's throw of the Capitol of the United States. It happened in the District of Columbia, for which, under the Constitution, the Congress of the United States has direct legislative responsibility.

Moreover, in this shooting at 6 o'clock in the morning in an after-hours drinking club two employees of the United States were wounded. They are in what one would think are sensitive positions in the security of the United States.

One of them, a Mr. Peterson, is in the division of the State Department which passes on licenses for the export of munitions to foreign powers. He was shot in the thigh. The other, a Miss Morris, is a Navy yeoman, attached to the executive office of the Secretary of the Navy. She was wounded above the ankle.

The American people have not forgotten that loose talk dropped in late hours of drinking taverns had much to do with the extent of the tragedy at Pearl Harbor. So, I have written to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy for a report on the employment record and the security status of the two employees who were wounded in this 6 o'clock in the morning shooting affair at an after-hours drinking spot.

There is another aspect in this unfortunate affair and that is the report in the press that this is the second fatal shooting which has taken place in recent months in an after-hours drinking club at this particular location. The earlier shooting occurred when the club was operated under the name of the Gold Key, instead of the Downtown Club. But statements of both the Chief of the District Police, Robert Barrett, and Capt. Howard Covell, commanding officer of the first precinct, as quoted by the press yesterday and today, are that the same people who operated the Gold Key Club, which was closed by the courts, are the same group who run the Downtown Club.

That is surprising and substantial confirmation of a specific allegation made in the recently published book which has been attracting so much attention, Washington Confidential by Jack Lait and Lee Mortimer. I shall ask consent of the Senate to place an excerpt from that book in the Record on this point.

Page 125 (Washington Confidential): "On paper, bottle clubs are supposed to be membership organizations, incorporated for social and benevolent purposes. Members bring their own liquor, which is held for them, their names on the labels. The clubs sell set-ups and food.

"Here's how most of them really work. Regular patrons, that is, members, are supposed to pay annual dues of about \$10, depending on the club, but most regulars pay nothing. Transients, that is, guests, are charged a door fee of one or two dollars, depending on the club.

"Set-ups are sold, to those who bring their own liquor, at a nominal price of 35 cents and up. If you haven't your stuff parked or with you, most clubs will sell it to you under the counter or advise you it can be had from a guy seated in front of the entrance in a car.

"These clubs are incorporated as nonprofit private enterprises, not required to pay Federal amusement taxes, even when they provide floor shows and dancing. Nor need they have ABC liquor licenses, because they are supposed not to be selling."

Page 127 (Washington Confidential): "The most notorious of the after-hours spots, the Gold Key, was closed by committee revelations. It has since reorganized as the Downtown Club, with some of the same characters. Most of the others are patronized by unimportant transients or night workers, such as musicians, waiters, and bartenders.

"When lawyer Charlie Ford drew up the papers for the Gold Key, its original organizers were Albert Glickfield, alias Al Brown, Patsy Meserole, and Harry Conners, his brother-in-law. Meserole is a former New York gangster, one of the last surviving members of the late Legs Diamond mob. Glickfield is a gambler and associate of Frank Erickson. The accountant for this after-hour club was Henry W. Davis, a division head in the Accounting Division of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, an agency of the United States Government."

They speak of the Gold Key as, and I quote, "the most notorious of the after-hours spots." They say flatly that after being closed, and again I quote, "it has since been reorganized as the Downtown Club, with some of the same characters."

And it is that club where this shooting occurred last Saturday at 6 o'clock in the morning.

The press reports that Major Barrett, Superintendent of Police, has angrily denounced the operators of the club, pointing out that the District court issued a permanent injunction against the establishment a year ago when operated as the Downtown Club. Further, that police are investigating the possibility that the owners of the club may be in contempt of court.

But one wonders who actually is in contempt of court, those who reopened the club or the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board which fails to control it? The ABC Board is a creature of the Congress and is appointed by and its regulations are written by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia who are named by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

That is why this affair is a direct concern of this body, and why today, I as ranking minority member of the Senate Committee for the District of Columbia, am suggesting to our very able chairman, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], that he direct an inquiry into the whole matter by the subcommittee which deals with law enforcement and liquor regulations. The Superintendent of Police has said he has no law under which he can keep this club closed.

Perhaps the ABC board does not have adequate regulations to cover such situations. Perhaps it is lax in its investigation of such operations, I do not know. This is my first membership on the District Committee. But I am today directing a letter to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board and to the District Commissioners designed to bring out the facts in the situation. With the consent of the Senate, I will ask to place copies of those letters in the Record at this point.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
April 2, 1951.

HON. JOHN RUSSELL YOUNG, President,
Hon. F. JOSEPH DONAHUE, Commissioner,
Brig. Gen. GORDON R. YOUNG, Commissioner,
Board of Commissioners of
the District of Columbia,
Washington, D. C.

GENTLEMEN: Of course, you have noted the second fatal shooting in recent months at the after-hour gambling club maintained at 606 E Street NW.

What regulations, if any, govern the opening and operation of such clubs?

Are they issued licenses?

Under what violation of law did District Court Judge T. Alan Goldsborough on June 21, 1950, order the club then operating at this location "ousted forever from the District of Columbia?"

Have the District Commissioners ever written any regulations for the control and licensing of such clubs?

What responsibility, if any, has been placed in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board for the inspection, licensing, or revoking of licenses for such clubs?

Are such clubs required to register their membership and officers with any governmental agency of the District of Columbia?

If the District Commissioners have written no regulations for the control of such clubs under their authority to prescribe the regulations under which the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board operates, why should they not do so at once?

The press reports that this is the second killing at this particular club within the past year, and that there was another killing at the Hide-Away Club on January 10, 1951.

If existing regulations do provide for any registration of these clubs or any inspection whatsoever with respect to the registration or operations, kindly send me a copy of those which pertain to the operation of the Gold Key Club, and its successor, the Downtown Club, at this 606 E Street NW., location.

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS CASE.

Finally, this whole affair points up the proposal in a bill which I announced last week I would introduce today that would transfer from the District Commissioners to an elected city council the right and the responsibility to write the rules and regulations for the conduct of the ABC Board, and further make their appointments by the Commissioners subject to the confirmation by the elected city council.

Under present law, the Commissioners write the rules, name the ABC Board, and are the appellate court for review of its findings. That combination of legislative, executive, and judicial functions violate fundamental American doctrines and is one of the bad practices my bill is designed to correct.

PRICES OF FARM PRODUCTS—ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, one of the most controversial issues today in the program for economic stabilization involves the prices of farm products. Recently the United States Department of Agriculture, in its March 14 issue of the Employees News Bulletin, discussed the subject of farm prices and what has happened to farm income. I ask unanimous consent that this important article be printed in the body the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FARM PRICES

Prices received by farmers for many commodities have risen recently and are now high in relation to their own history. But they have advanced only 21 percent since the outbreak in Korea, whereas tin has gone up 138 percent, lead nearly 50, chemicals about 27, and textiles 32 percent. Meanwhile farmers' costs have attained record highs, but corporate profits, wages, and average personal incomes are setting new records. Most prices of farm commodities to the producer are still below parity, but if all now below parity attained it, consumer food costs would rise less than 5 percent, making an over-all cost-of-living rise of 2 percent. Food prices have risen less than clothing and house furnishings.

Farm prices dropped 24 percent in 1948-49, while nonfarm prices and wages dropped little or advanced, and on January 15 prices received by farmers were still 2 percent below the January 1948 peak. Farmers' net realized income decreased 3 years in a row from \$18,000,000,000 in 1947 to sixteen and five-tenths in 1948, to fourteen in 1949, and to thirteen in 1950. No other segment of the economy had such a severe economic setback. Corporate profits after taxes are running 32 percent above 1947, and were 18 percent above for 1950 as a whole. In 1950 hourly earnings of factory workers were 18 percent above the 1947 level.

Food is still a better bargain for the average person than in prewar times. Those whose incomes have kept up with the average can buy with 19 percent of their disposable income the same diet that would have absorbed 23 percent thereof in 1935-39. True, many whose incomes have lagged substantially below the average are in serious difficulty. As for the farmer, he gets about 30 cents for the cotton in a shirt selling at \$3.50 to \$4; 3 cents gross for the tomatoes in a 16-cent can; 2½ cents for the corn in a 19-cent can; a cent a pound for the onions sold in stores in November at 57 cents; and 2½ cents for the wheat in a 15- to 16-cent loaf of bread—which has risen nearly 2 cents since June 1950, though wheat, in January 1950, was only 16 cents a bushel higher than before the Korean outbreak.

While prices of manufactured items have increased partly because market supplies are limited to permit increased production of military goods, agricultural products, available in record quantities, have increased in price because demand rises as consumer incomes rise. But the public does not expect manufacturers to produce military goods at less than fair returns. It should not expect farmers to produce food at a discount either. The prices of farm commodities are not exempt from price control by law; they are all subject to control as soon as they reach a legally specified level. No ceiling may be established below the parity price, or the highest price producers received from May 24 to June 24, 1950. Ceilings must be high enough to permit fair processor margins. The prohibition against below-parity ceilings for farm products is not inconsistent with other legal price and wage provisions, nor with accepted Government principles.

COMMUNISM IN HAWAII—STATEMENT BY SENATOR BUTLER OF NEBRASKA AND ARTICLE FROM HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN

Mr. BUTLER of Nebraska. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement prepared by me on the subject of Communism in Hawaii, to be followed by a brief article from the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of March 14, 1951.

There being no objection, the statement and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMMUNISM IN HAWAII—STATEMENT BY SENATOR BUTLER

A few weeks ago, I had occasion to refer to the proposed appointment of a Communist named Ralph Vossbrink to the Traffic Safety Commission of Honolulu. Today, I want to advise the Senate of the appointment and service of another Communist, Ernest Arena, as a member of an official agency of the Territorial government of Hawaii.

I have here a news clipping from the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of March 14, 1951, entitled "Arena, ILWU Aide, Dropped From Full Employment Body," and I would like to read a few sentences from this clipping: "An ILWU official has been dropped from Governor Stainback's full employment com-

mittee because he was one of the 'reluctant 39' witnesses before the congressional Un-American Activities Committee.

"Governor Stainback's office directed the removal of Ernest Arena late Tuesday after Mr. Arena's status was called to its attention.

"He had been serving on the board since November.

"There was no official explanation as to how he came to be appointed in the first place—7 months after he had defied the committee.

"But an unofficial report said that membership on the committee is 'by organization' and the ILWU had suggested his name to the labor department, which in turn passed it on to the Governor."

Now it will be noted that the news story states he was dropped from the committee because he was one of the so-called reluctant 39 witnesses before the House Un-American Activities Committee. That is a masterpiece of understatement. Ernest Arena without any possible doubt is or was a Communist and the hearings conducted by the House committee in Hawaii last year proved that beyond question. Frankly, I do not know why this Honolulu newspaper should be so shy and bashful about referring to this man as merely being one of the "reluctant 39." I might explain that the term "reluctant 39" refers to the 39 persons in Hawaii, who last year refused to answer questions of the House committee, and as a result were cited for contempt of Congress. In most cases, these witnesses declined to answer whether or not they were at that time or had previously been members of the Communist Party. In some cases, they also refused to answer other key questions.

I do not contend that every one of these 39 persons are Communists. In fact, in a few cases, there is substantial evidence that they are not. However, in the case of this man Arena the evidence of his Communist affiliation as contained in the hearings of the House committee is overwhelming.

For example, a witness named Izuka stated under oath that he (Izuka) collected Communist Party dues from Arena, and further stated that Arena was a member of various Communist Party cells or fractions to his certain knowledge. A witness named Tokunaga stated that Arena recruited him (Tokunaga) to join the Communist Party, that Arena sold Communist literature at one meeting of a Communist Party cell, and further that Arena had regularly attended meetings of various Communist cells.

A witness named Easter Doyle testified that he, as treasurer, collected Communist Party dues from Arena, helped to organize and later served as chairman to one Communist Party group, and that Arena had recruited him (Doyle) into the Communist Party. He stated under oath that Arena was known to him to be a Communist. Other witnesses named Kuhia, Mo'i, and Lorenzo testified that Arena attended meetings of various Communist Party units or fractions, while still other witnesses, such as Wilfred Oka and Robert McElrath, likewise linked Arena to the Communist Party in one way or another, although not quite so specifically.

In other words, at least six witnesses very definitely identified this man, Arena, in Communist Party activities. Three of them testified that he took a leading part in those activities. All of these witnesses, with the exception of Tokunaga, testified under oath to the House committee.

Under such circumstances I believe it is a little absurd to refer to Arena as being merely one of the "reluctant 39" without mentioning the fact that the evidence of his Communist Party membership was conclusive.

Now I have gone into some detail on this one case, not because this man Arena is so important, but because his appointment is indicative of the general laxity in the atti-

tude of too many people in Hawaii toward the whole Communist question. When the House Committee on Un-American Activities went to Hawaii last year and conducted an investigation and later held full public hearings, a wealth of information was disclosed about Communist activities in the Territory. Most of the principal Communists there were thoroughly identified to the public. Thirty-nine of the witnesses who had been previously identified as Communists in sworn testimony were called to the stand and refused to testify, and these 39 were cited for contempt by the House of Representatives. At that time I believe most of us who were concerned about the extent of the Communist conspiracy in Hawaii felt that a major step had been taken to stamp out that conspiracy. I am sure we all felt that once the facts were known to the public that the residents of Hawaii would take the necessary action to clean out the traitors in their midst.

Unfortunately that did not occur. Even with the facts before them the people of Hawaii have not yet taken vigorous action. The cases of the 39 so-called reluctant witnesses were taken into district court, but the judge directed an acquittal. To date no appeal from that decision has been taken by the Justice Department, although I am told that the Government might well be able to sustain its case in a higher court, in view of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In other words, the authority of a committee of the House of Representatives was openly flouted and nothing has been done about it. These persons are all still at large.

Furthermore, about 16 of them were chosen as delegates to the Territorial Democratic convention, and 4 of them were elected to the executive committee of the Territorial Democratic Party. So far as I know they are still members.

During recent weeks we have had these two cases—the Vossbrink case and the Arena case, where appointments were made or proposed of men who were not only among the "reluctant 39" but were actually leaders in that Communist group and positively identified as such by sworn testimony.

Altogether there seems to be a sort of conspiracy of silence on the part of a few high administrative officials of this Government and a conspiracy of tolerance on the part of leaders in Hawaiian life on this subject. It is just almost impossible for me to understand how these people can continue to receive such appointments purely by accident. It seems that most of the officials in Hawaii have just chosen to forget the disclosures of the House Un-American Activities Committee of last year, and the disclosures made before that by me as a result of my investigation in Hawaii in 1948. Apparently, the attitude is to accept these known Communists into all sorts of activities in the Territory, on the theory that they have not yet been proven guilty of anything, and that therefore they have, in effect, a clean bill of health.

I do not mean to imply that there is no one in Hawaii who is concerned about the question. At the last legislative session the legislature was persuaded to create a special commission on subversive activities, and that commission has now made its report. I have not yet seen a copy of the report, but I understand that it reports the Communist Party has now gone underground. If that is true, it may be still more difficult to keep watch on the Communists.

I suggest it is time for more thoroughgoing action to clean out this nest of conspiracy in Hawaii. I know perfectly well what will be the reaction among some of the proponents of statehood down there. Immediately today or tomorrow, some spokesman for the statehood cause will rush into print with a statement to the effect that Senator BUTLER

is calling attention to these things merely because he hopes to defeat statehood thereby. That is the standard excuse in Hawaii for doing nothing about communism. It is the regular practice to excuse official tolerance for Communists on the ground that the Communist issue has been raised by the opponents of statehood and therefore it cannot be of any importance.

I hope that will not be the reaction in Hawaii to these comments of mine. Just to give one more example, there has recently come into my hands a copy of the letterhead of the Hawaii Chapter of the National Society for Crippled Children and Adults, Inc. Among the names listed on the sponsoring committee, I find the name of Jack Hall. For the information of the Senate, Jack Hall went to Hawaii as a Communist organizer in the late 1930's and is still exceedingly active. He is now regional director of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union in the Territory. He is sometimes spoken of as the Communist leader there. The House Un-American Activities Committee developed a full record of his activities in the hearings last year.

Now, of course, I do not suppose that Jack Hall's presence on the sponsoring committee of the Society for Crippled Children will hurt the crippled children any. What is difficult for me to understand is why such an organization should find it necessary to include persons like Jack Hall on its sponsoring committee. No doubt, the Hawaii Chapter of the society hopes for contributions from members of the ILWU in Hawaii, and no doubt it felt it should have a sponsoring committee broadly representative of the community, but surely there must be some place where the line should be drawn. Certainly the various charitable organizations in the 48 States do not find it necessary to include notorious Communists on their sponsoring committees in order to secure community support for their activities. On the contrary, I do not know of any charitable organization in the 48 States which would stoop to such tactics. If it did, it would lose far more than it would gain.

During the last few weeks, I have received quite a little flood of letters from residents or former residents in Hawaii applauding me for my fight against communism there, and expressing their concern about the situation. Some of them are against statehood. Some of them are for statehood, but all are concerned about the apparent tolerance of communism and about the apparent willingness to accept Communists as good citizens until they are convicted of something. I suggest in all sincerity that that tolerance is not the proper attitude, and I strongly feel that those who support statehood for Hawaii would make more progress in their efforts if they devoted more attention to doing a real clean-up job on communism in Hawaii instead of castigating Butler for calling attention to this serious situation.

[From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of March 14, 1951]

ARENA, ILWU AIDE, DROPPED FROM FULL EMPLOYMENT BODY

An ILWU official has been dropped from Governor Stainback's full employment committee because he was one of the "reluctant 39" witnesses before the congressional Un-American Activities Committee.

Governor Stainback's office directed the removal of Ernest Arena late Tuesday after Mr. Arena's status was called to its attention.

He had been serving on the board since November.

There was no official explanation as to how he came to be appointed in the first place—7 months after he had defied the committee.

But an official report said that membership on the committee is "by organization" and

the ILWU had suggested his name to the labor department, which in turn passed it on to the Governor.

TONER'S HAND SEEN

Edward P. Toner, leader of an anti-Communist drive among the stand-pat Democrats, figured in the dismissal move.

He addressed a letter Tuesday to President Truman and other national Democratic officials criticizing the Governor for the selection. "If this doesn't stink to high heaven, I don't know what does," the Toner letter said.

Mr. Toner also spoke out against the rumored appointment of Mr. Stainback to the Territorial Supreme Court after he leaves the governorship.

RECESS

Mr. McFARLAND. I move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 9 minutes p. m.) a recess was taken until tomorrow, Tuesday, April 3, 1951, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate April 2 (legislative day of March 26), 1951:

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Richard D. Searles, of Arizona, to be Under Secretary of the Interior, vice Oscar L. Chapman.

IN THE COAST GUARD

The following-named persons to be chief boatswains in the United States Coast Guard:

Ronald S. Jacobs
Norman A. Cooper

The following-named person to be a chief machinist in the United States Coast Guard:

Alford C. Atkinson

The following-named person to be a chief ship's clerk in the United States Coast Guard:

John A. Williamson

The following-named person to be a chief electrician in the United States Coast Guard:

Peter S. Fredriksen, Jr.

The following-named person to be a chief pharmacist in the United States Coast Guard:

Gerard A. Hearn

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MONDAY, APRIL 2, 1951

The House met at 12 o'clock noon, and was called to order by the Speaker.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, by whose mercies we are spared and by whose power we are sustained, we are coming unto Thee in this sacred moment of prayer encouraged by many blessed memories and experiences of Thy great love and goodness, transcending all our needs and our unworthiness.

Grant that as we again enter upon tasks and responsibilities, which are far

beyond our own finite wisdom and strength, and the fallibility of human judgment, we may have our minds illumined with a new insight into the riches of Thy grace and our hearts consecrated to a new obedience to Thy divine will.

Inspire us with a stronger faith in Thee and in the power of moral and of spiritual principle. Give us a vision of that blessed time when justice and righteousness shall find a clearer expression in our social, industrial, and political life and when civilization shall be glorified with the spirit of good will and all the nations of the earth shall walk together in the paths of peace.

Hear us in the name of the Prince of Peace. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, March 22, 1951, was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries, who also informed the House that on the following dates the President approved and signed bills and joint resolutions of the House of the following titles:

On March 19, 1951:

H. R. 335. An act to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon a certain claim of the Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County, Kans.;

H. R. 906. An act for the relief of Mrs. Vera Raupe;

H. R. 1090. An act to extend the period for the admission of alien spouses and minor children of citizen members of the United States Armed Forces;

H. R. 1165. An act for the relief of Richard Gregory Rundle and Valquette Adele Rundle;

H. R. 1966. An act for the relief of Mrs. Dorothy Manious; and

H. J. Res. 195. Joint resolution making additional appropriations for the legislative branch for the fiscal year 1951, and for other purposes.

On March 23, 1951:

H. R. 1724. An act to provide for the renegotiation of contracts, and for other purposes; and

H. J. Res. 173. Joint resolution to amend and extend the provisions of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, as amended.

On March 24, 1951:

H. R. 2070. An act for the relief of Geraldine L. Smith, mother and natural guardian of Thomas Clayton Smith, a minor; and

H. J. Res. 207. Joint resolution making additional appropriations for the District of Columbia for the fiscal year 1951, and for other purposes.

On March 26, 1951:

H. R. 2268. An act to authorize the payment of interest on series E savings bonds retained after maturity, and for other purposes.

On March 27, 1951:

H. R. 1498. An act to provide compensation for duty voluntarily performed on their days off by officers and members of the Metropolitan Police force, the United States Park Police force, and the White House Police force.

On March 28, 1951:

H. R. 2339. An act to clarify the immigration status of certain aliens.

On March 29, 1951:

H. R. 609. An act for the relief of Carroll L. Vickers.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Woodruff, its enrolling clerk, announced that the Senate had agreed to the amendments of the House to the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 40) entitled "Joint resolution to extend the time within which prisoners of war may file claims under the War Claims Act of 1948."

ANNOUNCEMENT

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to make a statement. After consultation with the majority and the minority leaders of the House and remembering the terrific jam we had upon this floor on previous occasions, with the consent and approval of the floor leaders, the Chair announces that on today during the ceremony the door immediately opposite the Speaker will be open and the doors on the Speaker's left and right and none other. No one will be allowed upon the floor of the House who does not have the privilege of the floor of the House.

RECESS

The SPEAKER. The Chair declares a recess at this time.

Thereupon (at 12 o'clock and 3 minutes p. m.) the House stood in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

JOINT MEETING OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE TO HEAR AN ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY VINCENT AURIOL, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE

The SPEAKER of the House of Representatives presided.

The Doorkeeper announced the Vice President and the Members of the United States Senate.

The Senate, preceded by the Vice President and its Secretary and Sergeant at Arms, entered the Hall of the House of Representatives.

The Vice President took the chair at the right of the Speaker, and the Members of the Senate took the seats reserved for them.

The SPEAKER. On the part of the House, the Chair appoints as members of the committee to escort the President of the Republic of France into the Chamber the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PRIEST], the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARTIN], the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RICHARDS], and the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. EATON].

The VICE PRESIDENT. On the part of the Senate, the Chair appoints as members of the committee to escort the President of the Republic of France into the Chamber the junior Senator from Arizona [Mr. McFARLAND], the senior Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], the junior Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY], and the senior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY].

The Doorkeeper announced the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States entered the Hall of the House of Representatives and took the seats reserved for them.

The Doorkeeper announced the Ambassadors, Ministers, and Chargés d'Affaires of foreign governments.

The Ambassadors, Ministers, and Chargés d'Affaires of foreign governments entered the Hall of the House of Representatives and took the seats reserved for them.

At 12 o'clock and 15 minutes p. m., the Doorkeeper announced the President of the Republic of France.

The President of the Republic of France, escorted by the committee of Senators and Representatives, entered the Hall of the House of Representatives and stood at the Clerk's desk. [Applause, the Members rising.]

The SPEAKER. Members of the Congress, today is a happy day for those of us who constitute the Senate and House of Representatives. We are honored by the presence of the leader of a great democracy, an historic friend of the United States and its people. From the day Lafayette set foot upon this soil to now, the United States has felt a warmth and an affection, yea, a love for the people of France. [Applause.]

And so today, Mr. President, we wish to assure you of that continuing friendship, unalloyed. In the condition our world is in today we want to assure you that the people of the United States of America are going to do a man's part in the great work of this world. [Applause.]

It is my distinguished honor, and it gives me great pleasure to have the privilege of presenting to you the President of the Republic of France. [Applause, the Members rising.]

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE

PRESIDENT AURIOL. Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Senators, and Members of Congress, I am deeply moved by the exceptional honor you are rendering me in allowing me to appear before this assembly and to address you from this glorious rostrum. It will touch the heart of the people of France to whom, through me, this homage and this warm welcome are directed.

I am the more deeply moved that my visit is the first one made by a President of the French Republic, in the name of France to the Republic of the United States and that it recalls to me two historic visits to our country made by two of our illustrious statesmen: Benjamin Franklin in 1776, and, a century and a half later, after the First World War, President Wilson.

It gives me an opportunity to pay tribute to your heroic young men who under the command of their glorious leaders twice rushed to our ravaged country to share with our own sons in the fight.

These memories illustrate our common history, and this history already long and always friendly is a history of freedom.

In recalling these memories in the presence of the Congress of the great American democracy, I want to express our constant and heartfelt sympathy to all the families whose sons have died for our common ideal and are resting forever in French soil, side by side with the sons of France and of the other Allied Nations. Through you representing the 48 States of the Union, I wish to tell the

American people of our grateful and loyal friendship and of our unshakable attachment to the great human principles France has always proclaimed—principles embodied both in your Declaration of Independence and in our declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen, principles which, 3 years ago, after so many trials and contests, have received the unanimous consecration of the United Nations.

These sacred achievements of man which are not only the most precious values in our civilization but also the conditions for all future improvement, for all individual and social progress, are today threatened—we are sorrowfully obliged to admit this—only 6 years after our two people made sacrifices never before equaled in history, for the attainment and organization of a just and tranquil peace.

Confronted with this situation, far different from what we had wanted and expected, with our security threatened, any nation worthy of her freedom must face reality and take stock of her own responsibilities. Today I have come to tell you what France thinks and what France seeks.

Gentlemen, you are the representatives of a people who insist upon truth. Your opinions are based on facts and your judgments on acts and not on words.

This is why I will ask you this question: When in the defense of her independence and the sacred cause of liberty a nation has lost 1,357,000 men from 1914 to 1918, 575,000 dead from 1939 to 1945—240,000 perished in uniform in the first and the last battles for freedom, 112,000 were shot or were killed by bombing, 182,000 died deported to Germany for belonging to the underground, and 40,000 died in enemy labor camps; when, for the same cause, the same nation, fighting at the door to southeastern Asia, in Indochina, a war which has lasted more than 4 years, does not hesitate to reaffirm her faith in international law by sending to Korea officers and men whose heroism makes them the worthy comrades of your officers and men; then I ask you, who could seriously question her determination? In fact, what nation has ever proven better her love for independence and for peace and her will to defend both?

The attitude which has been given the barbarous name of "neutralism" has always been foreign to the French soul, not only because it is a moral absurdity—can anyone be neutral between servitude and liberty, between good and evil—but because it is geographical and historical nonsense. Our people have experienced the frailty of their exposed land and sea frontiers. Almost alone in 1914 and again in 1939 they have met the first shock of armies so powerful that each time it has taken 4 years of ceaseless effort and a coalition of the world's forces to defeat them. Therefore they know that right without might is powerless. They know that isolation is death. They know that neutrality, whether declared, armed or disarmed, has protected neither Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, nor Denmark and that an aggressor would never stop at a

frontier post, even should it be surmounted with a dove holding the branch of an olive tree. [Applause.]

Finally, they know that France is not simply the western extremity of Europe in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, but that the French Union extends its influence and civilization to all parts of the world and that in the common strategy for freedom and peace, France has courageously accepted the tasks and responsibilities of a great world power. They know also that once France has fallen, the whole of Europe will be in chains with all her potential strength in the service of the invader and that the whole world, indeed civilization itself, will be in mortal danger.

I shall always remember the clear warning when, in 1919, as a young deputy I heard it stated from the rostrum of our own Parliament by the President of the United States that France still stands at the frontier:

Here is where the blow fell because the rulers of the world did not sooner see how to prevent it . . . they know that the only way to do this is to make it certain that the same thing will not always happen that has happened this time, that there never shall be any doubt or waiting or surmise, but that whenever France or any free people is threatened, the whole world will be ready to vindicate its liberty.

Because they did not establish this union in time, because they did not organize soon enough and at the most vulnerable points a collective defense prepared for instant action, the democratic nations with their decisions delayed by the interplay of their institutions or by the scruples and indiscipline of freedom were once more thrown into the most destructive of wars. One after the other, nations fell which would have been saved had they joined their forces. And France herself who entered the fight faithful to her word, was wounded on the ramparts, imprisoned for 4 years, and almost destroyed.

If our people had given up, if for a single moment they had hesitated between resistance and collaboration with the enemy, if they had not been willing to subject themselves to an implacable oppression, had not chosen to destroy, often with their own hands, their properties and their tools, rather than work for the enemy, if they had permitted him at times when the fortunes of war were in the balance to have a free disposition of their remaining resources and forces in metropolitan France and in her overseas territories, what would Europe and the world be today?

After such common fights and sacrifices, the achievement of the final victory must not make us forget the perils to which we were led by an uncoordinated diplomacy and strategy. It is the very old story of the Horatii and the Curiatii. For the goal to be reached is not to liberate a Europe which may once more be occupied, enslaved, exploited, and ravaged, and whose name, you may be sure, would only recall the final ruin of a civilization, but rather, by shielding her against aggression, to protect the whole community of the free nations and in this way to save peace.

In putting into practice an effective union, in which risks as well as efforts must be shared, France has a clear understanding of her duties and of her rights. [Applause.]

Her contribution to the defense of freedom and of peace is first of all her own recovery.

Undoubtedly, gentlemen, our people are sometimes disparaged, and they are sometimes guilty of self-disparagement. But those of you whom we have had the joy of welcoming in our country have been able to see the road covered since the liberation.

In 1944, the country was bled white, the state disrupted, 90 percent of our departments were in ruins, our lands were laid fallow, our industrial equipment was pillaged or obsolete, our ports, our means of communication were in shambles, more than two million houses were destroyed or damaged, our economy and our finances were ruined.

In 1951, there is an increased population, republican institutions are reestablished, our production has been raised to the level of 133 as compared with a 100 in 1938, our commercial balance is in equilibrium and our currency stabilized before the rise in prices of raw materials could compromise the equilibrium thus gradually attained, our homes have been built again and the specter of social troubles and of despair has been pushed aside. Gentlemen, it is with pride that I speak of the accomplishments of our workers, of our engineers, of our leaders of enterprise, of our farmers, of our administrators, of all Frenchmen and of their representatives. The generous aid that you have given us through the Marshall plan, for which I am happy to thank you today publicly, has not been extended to us in vain. In giving a decisive impulse to our paralyzed economy, it has again opened for us the way to work and to hope, and by driving away the threat of unemployment and misery, it has preserved us from those social upheavals which are the breeding ground for adventure and tyranny. [Applause.]

Though a great deal remains to be done, this first balance sheet of our recovery testifies to the courage of our people, supported by your brotherly assistance.

Our next contribution to the cause of freedom and peace is our rearmament effort which our Parliament has voted by a huge majority without hesitation or reservations. This has been done in spite of the already enormous burden of our reconstruction and reequipment and of our military expenditures. It is certainly not the fault of our two nations if world collective security has not been organized, though we consider this failure as merely temporary. The spirit of aggression is foreign to both Americans and Frenchmen. But in the face of threats of totalitarian expansion and the formation of certain mighty groups of powers whose policies and armaments are not subject to the free control of the people, we have turned thoughtfully and inflexibly to regional pacts and especially to the regional pact of the North Atlantic which, conforming to the statutes of the United Nations, has but one aim—

to deter aggression and to strengthen the peace. Thus, by our reciprocal undertakings that we shall from now on pool together our resources of arms and troops at all threatened and strategic points, we have made the Atlantic community a solid foundation of our common security and of peace. [Applause.]

For us, indeed, the effort for peace and the effort for defense are not contradictory; they complement each other. With the prudence and firmness dictated by our said experience, we shall never cease to answer negation, procedural obstructionism and propaganda in the language of right, of truth, and of sincerity.

Let us not fail to speak clearly, frankly, and firmly. Let us put at the service of peace and freedom, side by side with our material forces as long as those are needed, the invincible moral forces which always animate free people aware of the righteousness of their cause.

We shall not tire, on our part, of repeating the conditions that are necessary for the reestablishment of trust and cooperation among all peoples. Does everyone sincerely want peace? In that case, everyone must respect the commitments subscribed to in the Charter of the United Nations by all the Allies of yesterday; in that case, certain countries must stop interfering in the internal affairs of others in an effort to weaken their freely chosen regimes, to provoke troubles, to paralyze production and to pour daily insults upon their governments.

In that case, international and permanent control by the United Nations Organization of armaments, of all armaments, in all countries, must be accepted, in order to limit fairly and later to destroy all classic or atomic weapons.

In that case, the national armies must be progressively replaced by a United Nations army as provided by the common Charter.

In that case, every country must agree to the free movement of wealth, ideas, and persons as well as the free and sincere expression of view, under international control of peoples on whom regimes have been imposed by force.

Here are, among so many others, the questions to which answers must be found. And so that they may be answered clearly, I am asking them here, clearly and publicly, before the legislature of a great Nation which is ridiculously accused every day, as is ours, of warmongering, and I am certain that I speak in the name of all the men who want peace with liberty, the only peace worth living for.

Finally, our effort to unite and organize Europe must be considered a contribution to the defense of peace and liberty by all who believe that it is not sufficient to guarantee the security of welfare and justice, enrich their existence and increase their attachment to society.

France is working toward this goal by the creation of communities of production of which the coal and steel pool, that bears the name of its moving spirit, President Schuman, is but a beginning and a preface for others that we are

preparing. [Applause.] France is working toward this goal through the Council of Europe and the Strasbourg Assembly which she initiated. She is working toward it in seeking the formation of a European army—the nucleus of a future international army—to take its place, first of all, in the great Atlantic army whose illustrious leader, General Eisenhower, I wish to salute here today.

Passionately devoted to the realization of a European federation which will put an end to secular antagonisms, France has put aside her legitimate resentment against the enemy of yesterday, demanding of it only that it bring to the cause of cooperation the admission of its responsibilities as well as the proof of its redemption through the repudiation of its old regime and the sincere attachment to the cause of democracy. Convinced of the need for supranational institutions, France has declared herself prepared to grant to those bodies, in conformity with her constitution and under condition of reciprocity, part of her sovereignty. [Applause.] And she hopes to convince the still hesitant nations that they will not curtail their sovereignty but on the contrary strengthen it by associating it with others, by uniting their resources and labor to increase their forces, by developing and coordinating their industrial and agricultural economies, by widening their markets, by raising the standard of living of their workers, in a word, by making of the old divided Europe, slow of decision, torn with antagonisms, distrustful of herself, a new and harmonious organism animated by one soul and adapted to the needs and exigencies of the modern world. [Applause.]

Patently and untiringly, we shall pursue the realization of these United States of a free Europe which, with full respect for the independence and dignity of all nations, will join the United States of America to work still more effectively for the welfare and peace of the world. In this way, we shall translate into actuality the prophecy of Victor Hugo who said, 75 years ago, on the eve of the Philadelphia Exhibition:

The future is already foreseeable. It belongs to a united and peaceful democracy. And you, our delegates to the Philadelphia Exhibition, you are beginning under our eyes and the superb realization which the twentieth century will witness: the union of the United States of America and of the United States of Europe. * * * Go, workers of France, go, workers of Paris who know how to think, go, girl artisans of Paris who know how to fight, useful men, brave women, go and carry the good news, go and tell the new world that the old world is young. You are the ambassadors of fraternity. The two continents will exchange not only their products, their trade, their industries, but also their ideas and the progress they make in justice as well as in prosperity.

Gentlemen, I would be happy if today, I could have been one of those useful ambassadors of friendship and of peace. [Applause, the Members rising.]

At 12 o'clock and 45 minutes p. m., the President of the Republic of France, accompanied by the Committee of

Escort, retired from the Hall of the House of Representatives.

The Doorkeeper escorted the invited guests from the Chamber in the following order:

The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Ambassadors, Ministers, and Chargés d'Affairs of foreign governments.

JOINT MEETING DISSOLVED

The SPEAKER. The Chair declares the joint meeting of the two Houses now dissolved.

Thereupon (at 12 o'clock and 48 minutes p. m.), the joint meeting of the two Houses was dissolved.

The Members of the Senate retired to their Chamber.

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order at 1:30 o'clock p. m.

CONSENT CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. This is Consent Calendar day. The Clerk will call the first bill on the Consent Calendar.

CERTAIN CLAIMANTS DAMAGED BY BLASTING OPERATIONS ON THE MERRIMACK RIVER

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 512), conferring jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claims arising out of certain blasting operations on the Merrimack River.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. TRIMBLE. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, the members of the Objectors Committee for the Consent Calendar by unanimous vote of all the members, including the majority and the minority, feel that in fairness to the country and to the Congress itself, no legislation should pass by unanimous consent which involves an aggregate expenditure of more than \$1,000,000. The members of the Objectors Committee also feel that no bill which changes national policy or international policy should be permitted to pass on the Consent Calendar.

For many years the members of the Consent Calendar Committee have felt that any bill which appears on the Consent Calendar, even though it does not change national or international policy, and does not cost more than \$1,000,000, should not pass without the membership being fully informed of its contents providing it is a measure that would apply to the districts of a majority of the Members in the House of Representatives. At least the committee members feel that such a bill should not pass without it first having been cleared by the leadership of both parties. It has been the policy of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee to pass such a bill over without prejudice one or more times to give time to the Members to become fully informed with its contents before passage. Members of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee also feel that if a bill is placed on the Consent Calendar

and the reports show it has not been cleared by the Bureau of the Budget, by the respective departments affected by it, and is also not in accordance with the President's program, that it should not pass on the Consent Calendar but rather the chairman of the committee in charge of the measure should call it up under suspension of the rules or go to the Rules Committee for a rule.

The members of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee also feel it fair to state to the membership that it is not their purpose to obstruct legislation or to object to bills or pass them over without prejudice because of any personal objection to said bill or bills by any one or all of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee, but that their real purpose, in addition to expediting legislation, is to protect the membership against having bills passed by unanimous consent which, in their opinion, any Member of the House might have objection to.

We, the members of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee, earnestly request chairmen of the standing committees of the House to take into consideration the contents of this statement before placing bills on the Consent Calendar.

It is our opinion that legislation involving the expenditure of more than a million dollars should not be on the Consent Calendar in view of the economic conditions and the problems which confront us all, but that it should come to the House for consideration either under a rule granted by the Rules Committee or under suspension of the rules.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, let me say to the gentleman from Arkansas that members of this committee, called the objectors' committee, do not determine the passing of a bill. "The only thing they have to do is to say whether or not the bill should be considered. Any Member can demand a roll call, or can get time to debate or can offer amendments to any of these bills. When we send them over to the other end of the Capitol, where the chief rule is unanimous consent, they come back here passed on in the other body by unanimous consent."

So when you undertake to limit the size of a bill, or the kind of a bill that can be considered by unanimous consent, you are reversing a policy that is as old as the Government. The members of the committee who do this objecting are not passing on whether or not a bill should pass, because, as I said, any Member has a right to demand a roll call.

Mr. REECE of Tennessee. We know from past experience that it is impractical to get consideration under suspension of the rules of a large number of bills that might come within the scope of the statement suggested by the gentleman and his committee.

Mr. RANKIN. Certainly.

Mr. REECE of Tennessee. We therefore get around to the proposition, it seems to me, of whether the Congress is going to abrogate its right to consider this type of legislation or not.

Mr. RANKIN. The gentleman from Tennessee is entirely correct.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, it is not the policy of the members of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee to pass upon the merits of any bill; the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee from time immemorial, at least for the 8 or 9 years I have been on it, has certain established rules to go by in order to determine whether or not it is proper for a bill to be passed on the consent calendar. That is the job assigned to the members of the Objectors Committee.

It resolves itself to this, Mr. Speaker, either we must have an Objectors Committee that functions and functions under certain rules, or abolish it, and let all bills go to the floor of the House for consideration or under suspensions and let the membership vote upon them. However, the purpose of the consent calendar is to make a channel or an avenue for those measures that are considered not controversial and yet may be near the line of controversy; and the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee is set up primarily for the protection of the membership and not for any arbitrary decisions on the part of the objectors themselves.

It is up to the House to state whether or not they approve the established rules of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee; and if they do, the objectors should either follow those rules or the Objectors Committee should be abolished. We feel we are working for the benefit and protection of the Members of the House in not permitting bills to pass on the consent calendar which obviously are in violation of the established rules of the House for the consent calendar. They are simply placing the members of the committee in an embarrassing position, providing that they want to fulfill their duty and protect the membership of the House. Therefore, upon the instigation and suggestion of the general chairman of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TRIMBLE], the suggestions that he read were drawn up and approved by each of the six members of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee.

Let me in closing, Mr. Speaker, emphasize the fact that the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee was established primarily to protect the Members of Congress; yet since I have been on it it seems almost invariably the rule that the Members think we are here to interfere with the passage of their bills. That is not the case at all; we are here to expedite legislation, to aid the Members, and at the same time to protect them. I recall very well—many of the Members here now may not have been here at that time, 1941 and 1942—when there was a bill on the Consent Calendar that contained in it a provision for pensions for Members of Congress. The Consent Calendar Objectors Committee did not think it should go through, but immediately afterward it was called up under a suspension of the rules and went

through this House. Six weeks later it was discovered in the Senate that the bill had one word in it that would cover Members of Congress, and a furor broke loose in this body as well as the other body, and they were compelled to pass a bill rescinding their own action.

I call this to the attention of the Members to let them know the real purpose of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee. They are to protect the country, to protect the Congress, and to protect the individual Members of the Congress. Either we should continue the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee and have it work under established rules which the chairmen of the respective standing committees will abide by, or attempt to abide by, or abolish the objectors committee.

Mr. Speaker, in further explanation of the position taken by the Members of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee, I may say that in most instances where bills are requested to be passed over by the members of the committee, they are measures which the members themselves would gladly vote for if they came up in the regular order under a rule or under suspension. The only reason why the Members of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee do not permit them to go through is because they should never have been placed on the Consent Calendar in the first place. In some particular they violate the long-established rules set up by the House as a guide or signpost for the members of the objectors committee to follow. I recall several years ago a bill of my own was reported by one of the standing committees of the House and placed on the Consent Calendar. It called for an authorization of many millions of dollars and much more than any bill passed by unanimous consent should call for. I was forced to object to my own bill because it was my duty to do so as a Member of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee. I did object to it and it was stricken from the Consent Calendar. I merely mention this, Mr. Speaker, to show to the membership, as well as those individuals and organizations who are interested in getting bills through Congress, just what procedure is necessary in order to have their bills passed.

I may say, Mr. Speaker, that the passage of many bills would be expedited if they were never placed on the Consent Calendar; particularly those bills which cannot be permitted to pass by unanimous consent because they involve too much money or for some reason they do not meet with the requirements established for the Objectors Committee of the Consent Calendar to follow in determining whether or not they are proper to permit passage by unanimous consent. If the chairmen of the respective standing committees of the House would consult with the chairman of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee, the gentleman from Arkansas, Judge TRIMBLE, before placing bills on the Consent Calendar, or would consult with any of the other five members of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee before placing them on the Consent Calendar,

I am sure much time would be saved and legislation expedited.

Let me emphasize that the Members of the Consent Calendar Objectors Committee do not necessarily object to the merits of any bill, and in many cases they ask to have bills passed over without prejudice, or object to them being passed on the Consent Calendar, when they would gladly vote for them if they came up in the regular order.

Mr. Speaker, in regard to the bill just called, No. 6 on the Consent Calendar, I ask unanimous consent that it may be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa? There was no objection.

BURIAL BENEFITS FOR PHILIPPINE VETERANS

The Clerk called the bill (S. 82) to provide reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with the burial of those who served in the military forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines while such forces were in the Armed Forces of the United States pursuant to the military order of the President of the United States, dated July 26, 1941.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. FORD. Mr. Speaker, on the basis of the enunciated policy recently placed before the House, I object. This bill involves too much of a cost and should come up under some other procedure.

MESSRS. BYRNES of Wisconsin and TRIMBLE objected.

STUDY OF THE HEALTH OF WORLD WAR II PRISONERS OF WAR

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 304) to provide for a study of the mental and physical sequelae of malnutrition and starvation suffered by prisoners of war and civilian internees during World War II.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the War Claims Commission, with the assistance and cooperation of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, shall inquire into and report to the Congress with respect to the mortality rate and the mental and physical sequelae of malnutrition and imprisonment sustained by members of the Armed Forces of the United States and civilian American citizens who were imprisoned by enemies of the United States during World War II. To this end the War Claims Commission is authorized and directed to make all necessary arrangements (including contracts, agreements, and so forth), for the conduct of research activities for the purpose of determining—

(1) the procedures and standards to be applied in the diagnosis of the mental and physical condition of former prisoners of war;

(2) the life expectancy of former prisoners of war;

(3) whether there is evidence to sustain a conclusive presumption of service connection in favor of former prisoners of war for purposes of hospitalization in Veterans' Administration facilities; and

(4) standards to be applied, for the evaluation of claims of American civilian and military personnel based upon the physical and mental sequelae of the conditions of their imprisonment, in the event such claims are later made compensable.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CONSTRUCTION OF CERTAIN VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION HOSPITALS

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 313) to provide for the construction of certain Veterans' Administration hospitals, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Messrs. TRIMBLE, ASPINALL, and CUNNINGHAM objected.

ESTABLISHMENT OF VETERANS' HOSPITAL FOR NEGRO VETERANS IN FRANKLIN COUNTY, VA.

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 314) to provide for the establishment of a veterans' hospital for Negro veterans at the birthplace of Booker T. Washington in Franklin County, Va.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Messrs. ASPINALL, BYRNES of Wisconsin, and TRIMBLE objected.

UNIFORM PENSIONS FOR SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR VETERANS

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 315) to liberalize the service pension laws relating to veterans of the war with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, or the Boxer Rebellion, and their dependents.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That in determining eligibility to service pension for veterans of the war with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, or the Boxer Rebellion, and dependents of such veterans, which are payable under the laws reenacted by the act of August 13, 1935 (49 Stat. 614; 38 U. S. C. 368, 369), or under acts amendatory or supplemental to such laws, the following additional rules shall obtain:

(a) The delimiting dates of the war with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, or the Boxer Rebellion shall be from April 21, 1898, to July 4, 1902, inclusive: *Provided*, That if the person was serving with the United States military forces engaged in the hostilities in the Moro Province the period herein stated shall extend to July 15, 1903.

(b) In computing active service there shall be counted continuous active service which commenced prior to and extended into the applicable period specified in (a) hereof or which commenced within such applicable period.

(c) A discharge or release from active service under conditions other than dishonorable shall be a prerequisite to entitlement to service pension.

Sec. 2. The minimum monthly rates of pension payable to veterans by virtue of the laws referred to in section 1 as modified by this act shall be \$90 in cases where the veteran served 90 days or more or was discharged for disability incurred in service in line of duty unless such veteran is now or hereafter becomes on account of age or physical or mental disabilities, helpless or blind, or so nearly helpless or blind as to need or require the regular aid and attendance of another person, the monthly rate shall be \$120; and \$60 in cases where the veteran served 70 days or more unless such veteran is now or hereafter becomes on account of age or physical or mental disabilities, helpless or blind, or so nearly helpless or blind as to need or require the

regular aid and attendance of another person, the monthly rate shall be \$78.

Sec. 3. Except as provided in section 4 hereof, where eligibility for pension or increase of pension is established by virtue of this act, pension shall be paid from date of receipt of application therefor in the Veterans' Administration, but in no event prior to the first day of the second calendar month following the enactment of this act: *Provided*, That payment of death pension may be made from date of death of a veteran where claim therefor is filed within 1 year after date of death of the veteran, but no payment shall cover a period prior to the first day of the second calendar month following the enactment of this act.

Sec. 4. All persons receiving pensions on the day prior to the effective date of this act under the laws referred to in sections 1 and 5 of this act shall, effective the first day of the second calendar month following the enactment of this act, receive the benefits of this act without the necessity of filing a claim therefor.

Sec. 5. Subparagraphs I (g), I (h), and III (a) of part III, Veterans Regulation Numbered 1 (a), as amended (38 U. S. C., ch. 12), are hereby repealed: *Provided*, That in the event any person receiving pension on the day prior to the effective date of this act under the provisions of any of the laws mentioned in this section is not entitled to receive a higher rate of pension by reason of the enactment of this act, pension shall continue to be paid to such person under such laws.

Sec. 6. The provisions of this act shall be effective the first day of the second calendar month following its enactment.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

AMENDING VETERANS REGULATIONS TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM RATE OF COMPENSATION FOR WORLD WAR II VETERANS WHO HAVE ARRESTED TUBERCULOSIS.

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 316) to amend the Veterans Regulations to provide a minimum rate of compensation for World War II veterans who have arrested tuberculosis.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Messrs. ASPINALL, FORD, and TRIMBLE objected.

PROVIDING ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OR LOSS OF USE OF A CREATIVE ORGAN.

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 318) to amend the Veterans Regulations and the World War Veterans' Act, 1924, as amended, to provide additional compensation for the loss or loss of the use of a creative organ.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Messrs. BYRNES of Wisconsin, FORD, and ASPINALL objected.

UNIFORM BENEFITS FOR VETERANS ATTENDING MILITARY, NAVAL, AND COAST GUARD ACADEMIES

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 2384) to provide that attendance during designated dates at service academies of veterans of the Spanish-American War and World War I shall be considered active military or naval service on the same basis provided for veterans of World War

II for the purpose of laws administered by the Veterans' Administration.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I object for the reason this bill, although it would not cost much more than a million dollars the first year, eventually will cost many millions of dollars; therefore it is not a proper bill to be placed on the Consent Calendar.

Messrs. TRIMBLE and FORD objected.

AMENDMENT TO VETERANS REGULATIONS

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 320) to amend Veterans Regulations to establish for persons who served in the Armed Forces during World War II a further presumption of service connection for psychoses developing to a compensable degree of disability prior to January 1, 1950.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Messrs. BYRNES of Wisconsin, TRIMBLE, and ASPINALL objected.

DESIGNATION OF SUCCESSORS TO RESIGNED OR REMOVED UNITED STATES MARSHALS

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 2119) to amend sections 544 and 546 of title 25, United States Code.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That subsection (a) of section 544 of title 28, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"(a) Before entering on the duties of his office, each United States marshal including any marshal appointed to serve during a vacancy, shall give a bond in the sum of \$20,000 for the faithful performance of duties by himself and his deputies during his continuance in office, and for a period of 30 days after his death, resignation, or other separation from office, for the faithful performance of duty by his deputies and any person designated pursuant to section 546 to perform the duties of marshal.

"The bond shall be approved by a judge of the district court of the district for which such marshal is appointed, and filed and recorded in the office of the clerk."

Sec. 2. Section 546 of such title is amended to read as follows:

"§ 546. Death, resignation, or other separation of marshal from office.

"Upon the death, resignation, or other separation from office, of any United States marshal, a deputy designated by the Attorney General shall perform the duties of the former marshal in his name for a period of 30 days, or until a successor is sooner appointed and qualifies, during which time the former marshal's bond shall remain in full force and effect and with like liability as though the marshal were in office and acting. After the expiration of such 30-day period and until a successor is appointed and qualifies, the deputy designated as aforesaid shall act as United States marshal in his own name and furnish the bond specified in section 544 of this title, following which money may be advanced to him and he shall be accountable therefor and be liable on his bond in all respects as a regularly appointed United States marshal. Service in this capacity shall entitle the acting marshal to reimbursement of the amount of premium paid for his bond notwithstanding the provisions of section 14 of title 6, United States Code.

"The default or misfeasance of any deputy if committed within the 30-day period aforementioned and prior to the appointment and qualification of a successor, shall be a breach of the former marshal's bond, and he or his executor or administrator shall have like remedies against such deputy for such default or misfeasance as the marshal would have had if he had continued in office."

SEC. 3. The analysis of chapter 33 of such title, immediately preceding section 541 of such title, is amended by striking out the item "546. Death of marshal," as set out in such analysis, and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "546. Death, resignation, or other separation of marshal from office."

With the following committee amendments:

Page 2, line 11, after "deputy" insert "United States marshal of that district."

Page 2, line 14, strike "sooner" and substitute therefor "duly."

Page 2, line 14, before "during" insert "whichever occurs first."

Page 2, line 17, strike "after" and substitute therefor "If a successor has not been appointed and qualified within the 30-day period, then between."

Page 2, lines 18 and 19, strike "until a successor is appointed and qualifies, the" and substitute therefor "the appointment and qualification of a successor, a."

The committee amendments were agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

WAIVER OF BOND REQUIREMENTS ON COAST GUARD CONTRACTS

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 2394) to amend the act of April 29, 1941, to authorize the waiving of the requirement of performance and payment bonds in connection with certain Coast Guard contracts.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the act of April 29, 1941 (55 Stat. 147; 40 U. S. C. 270e), is hereby amended to read as follows:

"The act of August 24, 1935 (49 Stat. 793), may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Treasury, be waived with respect to contracts, for the manufacturing, producing, furnishing, construction, alteration, repair, processing, or assembling of vessels, aircraft, munitions, matériel, or supplies of any kind or nature for the Army, Navy, or Coast Guard, regardless of the terms of such contracts as to payment or title."

With the following committee amendments:

Page 1, line 7: Between the word "Navy," and the word "or", insert the words "the Secretary of the Air Force."

Line 8: Between the word "to" and the word "contracts", insert the words "cost-plus-a-fixed-fee and other cost type contracts for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the United States and with respect to all contracts, including cost-plus-a-fixed-fee and other cost type." After the word "contracts" insert a comma.

Page 2, line 1: Between the word "Navy," and the word "or", insert the words "Air Force."

The committee amendments were agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the

third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CONVEYING CERTAIN LANDS TO OGDEN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 3040) to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to convey certain lands in Ogden, Utah, to the Ogden Chamber of Commerce.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Secretary of Agriculture be authorized and directed to convey by quitclaim deed to the Ogden Chamber of Commerce, Ogden, Utah, all rights, titles, and interests of the United States in and to lots 1 to 48, inclusive, in block 7, Fairmount Park Annex Addition to Ogden City, Weber County, State of Utah.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE PANAMA RAILROAD—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States, which was read, and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries:

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the information of the Congress, the One Hundred and First Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the Panama Railroad Company for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.
THE WHITE HOUSE, March 27, 1951.

PRESIDENT AURIOL'S ADDRESS

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the proceedings had during the recess will be printed in the RECORD at the point where they occurred.

There was no objection.

CALENDAR WEDNESDAY

Mr. PRIEST. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in order on Calendar Wednesday of this week be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I want to say that as long as these veterans' bills are stymied, I do not feel like agreeing to dispensing with Calendar Wednesday, because that is the one day that we can bring these bills up, if the Committee on Rules refuses a rule, or if the Chair refuses to recognize us under suspension of the rules. Some of these bills are very, very important, and I am going to object to dispensing with Calendar Wednesday until they are disposed of.

CONTESTED ELECTION CASE—W. KINGS- LAND MACY AGAINST ERNEST GREEN- WOOD (H. DOC. NO. 104)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House, which was read, and, with the accompanying papers, referred

to the Committee on House Administration and ordered to be printed:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C., April 2, 1951.

The honorable the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SIR: The Clerk has received a stipulation signed by the attorneys for the contestant and the contestee in the contested election case of W. Kingsland Macy versus Ernest Greenwood for a seat in the Eighty-second Congress from the First Congressional District of the State of New York.

This case is being developed under the laws governing contested-election cases in the House of Representatives. Since this stipulation contemplates a variation in the requirements of the statute, and, further, since the House itself only may grant such a departure from the provisions of the laws governing such cases, this stipulation is being transmitted to the House for its consideration.

Very truly yours,

RALPH R. ROBERTS,
Clerk of the House of Representatives.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPROPRIATION BILL

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House which was read:

MARCH 22, 1951.

The honorable the SPEAKER,
House of Representatives.

SIR: Pursuant to the authority heretofore granted, the Clerk received today from the Secretary of the Senate the following message:

That the Senate had passed without amendment House Joint Resolution 207, entitled "Joint resolution making additional appropriations for the District of Columbia for the fiscal year 1951, and for other purposes."

Very truly yours,

RALPH R. ROBERTS,
Clerk of the House of Representatives.

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION

Mr. STANLEY, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had on March 22, 1951, examined and found truly enrolled a joint resolution of the House of the following title:

H. J. Res. 207. Joint resolution making additional appropriations for the District of Columbia for the fiscal year 1951, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to announce that pursuant to the authority granted him on Thursday, March 22, 1951, he did on Friday, March 23, 1951, sign the following House joint resolution:

H. J. Res. 207. Joint resolution making additional appropriations for the District of Columbia for the fiscal year 1951, and for other purposes.

RESIGNATION FROM COMMITTEE

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following resignation from committee, which was read:

MARCH 19, 1951.

HON. SAM RAYBURN,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I hereby tender my resignation from the Committee on Public Works.

Yours very sincerely,
MORGAN M. MOULDER,
Congressman, Second District, Missouri.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the resignation will be accepted.

There was no objection.

INSULT TO AMERICANS OF ITALIAN ORIGIN

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Speaker, a week ago Saturday, at a televised hearing of a crime committee of the other body sitting here in Washington, one of the members of that committee read into the record of the proceedings with evident sanctimony a telegram alleged to have been sent by an aged Italian who had long ago become an American citizen, in which was contained the insinuation that Americans of Italian origin are more inclined to be criminals and crooks than those of any other racial segment of the United States.

It is my suspicion that the telegram read into the record was not written by an Italian who long ago became an American citizen, but by some bigot of another race. If, however, the writer was or is an Italian, then I have no respect whatever for him or his views as he is a traitor and a disgrace to the fine race whose blood courses his veins. I am sure that the membership of this House will agree that the insertion of such a telegram into the record of the proceedings of the committee was an error which should promptly be rectified, an error which unfairly and without warrant reflects upon a great portion of our American population and citizenry. Furthermore, the telegram should never have been read over the television broadcast in the first place. Since it disclosed no information whatever about any violation of law by any specific individual or individuals. It was purely and simply a deliberate slander of a fine segment of our people who have contributed much to our great Nation. I do hope it will not remain a part of the record of the committee's proceedings.

JOHN MITCHELL

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, yesterday in the hard-coal fields of Pennsylvania and being celebrated today is the birthday of the great leader of the United Mine Workers, John Mitchell, affectionately known to hundreds of thousands of men and their families in the coal fields of America as Johnny Mitchell. In the early and turbulent era of the organization of labor in the coal industry, this great American, this great humanitarian, did much to aid and succor the workers and their families.

I take this opportunity, Mr. Speaker, of expressing to America the gratitude, the love, the affection, and the reverence of this day to his memory.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

Mr. MILLER of California asked and was given permission to address the House for 20 minutes on next Wednesday, following any special orders heretofore entered.

Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to address the House for 15 minutes today, following any special orders heretofore entered, on the subject of John James Audubon.

Mr. REED of New York (at the request of Mr. GRAHAM) was given permission to address the House for 35 minutes on tomorrow, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered.

Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to address the House for 15 minutes on Wednesday next, following any special orders heretofore entered.

AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL CREDIT UNION ACT

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point on the subject of the objectives of a bill I introduced today proposing amendments to the Federal Credit Union Act.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

OBJECTIVES OF BILL

Mr. PATMAN. The object of this bill is to make certain amendments to the Federal Credit Union Act, as follows:

First. Section 7 of the Federal Credit Union Act reads, in part, as follows:

Powers: A Federal credit union shall have succession in its corporate name during its existence and shall have power—

(5) To make loans with maturities not exceeding 3 years to its members for provident or productive purposes upon such terms and conditions as this chapter and the bylaws provide and as the credit committee may approve, at rates of interest not exceeding 1 percent per month on unpaid balances (inclusive of all charges incident to making the loan): *Provided*, That no loans to a director, officer, or member of a committee shall exceed the amount of his holdings in the Federal credit union as represented by shares thereof. No director, officer, or committee member shall endorse for borrowers. A borrower may repay his loan, prior to maturity, in whole or in part on any business day.

It is proposed to amend the first proviso in paragraph 5 to read as follows:

Provided, That no loans to a director, officer, or member of a committee shall exceed the amount of his holdings in the Federal credit union as represented by shares thereof unless (a) each loan (other than a loan which will not make his indebtedness to the Federal credit union exceed the amount of his holdings in such union) is in his absence unanimously approved at a meeting of the board of directors, the credit committee, and the supervisory committee, at which a majority of such board and a majority of each

such committee is present, and (b) a record of such approval is entered on the loan application.

This would make it possible for the directors, officers, and the members of the committees of a Federal credit union to borrow from it under certain conditions.

Second. Section 7 of the Federal Credit Union Act reads, in part, as follows:

Powers: A Federal credit union shall have succession in its corporate name during its existence and shall have power—

(7) To invest its funds (a) in loans exclusively to members; (b) in obligations of the United States of America, or securities fully guaranteed as to principal and interest thereby; (c) in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Governor, in loans to other credit unions in the total amount not exceeding 25 percent of its paid-in and unimpaired capital and surplus; (d) and in shares or accounts of Federal savings and loan associations.

It is proposed to amend paragraph (7) of section 7 by striking out "and" appearing as the first word in subsection (d) thereof and by striking out the period at the end of subsection (d) thereof and by substituting for such period a semicolon and by adding after such semicolon "and (e) in shares of central credit unions."

Federal credit unions may now invest their funds in Federal savings and loan associations. The proposed change would make it possible for them to deposit funds in their own central organizations. Many States have central credit unions in which other credit unions may deposit funds and from which other credit unions may borrow. For example, there is an excellent central credit union of this type in Minnesota, one in North Dakota, one in Rhode Island, and such in several other States. It seems as reasonable for Federal credit unions to be able to invest their funds in central credit unions as it is for them to invest funds in Federal savings and loan associations.

Third. Section 13 of the Federal Credit Union Act reads as follows:

Dividends: At the annual meeting a dividend may be declared from the remaining net earnings on recommendation of the board of directors, which dividend shall be paid on all paid-up shares outstanding at the end of the preceding fiscal year. Shares which become fully paid up during such year shall be entitled to a proportional part of said dividend calculated from the first day of the month following such payment in full.

It is proposed to make the above subsection (a), and to add another subsection as follows:

(b) If at any annual meeting a dividend is declared under subsection (a), then upon recommendation of the board of directors a patronage dividend may also be declared at such meeting from the remaining net earnings. A patronage dividend shall be paid to members in proportion to the interest they have paid during the preceding fiscal year on loans made to them.

The addition of subsection (b) would make it possible for Federal credit unions to pay patronage dividends to their members. This would permit such action to be taken by the members if they so de-

sire and if they have first declared a dividend on shares.

Fourth. Section 16 of the Federal Credit Union Act reads as follows:

Certain powers of Governor: (a) The Governor may prescribe rules and regulations for the administration of this chapter (including, but not by way of limitation, the merger, consolidation, and/or dissolution of corporations organized under this chapter).

(b) The Governor may suspend or revoke the charter of any Federal credit union upon his finding that the organization is bankrupt or insolvent or has violated any provisions of its charter, its bylaws, or of this chapter, or of any regulations issued thereunder.

(c) The Governor is hereby authorized and empowered to execute any and all functions and perform any and all duties vested in him hereby, through such persons as he shall designate or employ; and he may delegate to any person or persons, including any institution operating under the general supervision of the administration, the performance and discharge of any authority, power, or function vested in him by this chapter.

(d) All books and records of Federal credit unions shall be kept and reports shall be made in accordance with forms approved by the Governor.

(e) The Governor is hereby authorized to make investigations and to conduct researches and studies of the problems of persons of small means in obtaining credit at reasonable rates of interest, and of the methods and benefits of cooperative saving and lending among such persons. He is further authorized to make reports of such investigations and to publish and disseminate the same.

It is proposed to add to section 16 the following new subsection:

(f) Any officer or employee of the Federal Security Agency is authorized, when designated for the purpose by the Director of the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, to administer oaths and affirmations and to take affidavits and depositions touching upon any matter within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions.

The addition of this subsection would enable Federal credit union examiners and other officers and employees of the Federal Security Agency to administer oaths and affirmations and to take affidavits and depositions pertaining to matters within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, if designated to do so. It would be a convenience at times when it is necessary to have such service as the above and no other person qualified to perform it is readily available.

READJUSTMENT OF SIZE AND WEIGHT LIMITATION ON FOURTH-CLASS MAIL

Mr. BURNSIDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from West Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. BURNSIDE. Mr. Speaker, I have introduced today a measure which I feel merits the serious consideration of this House. I refer to my bill to readjust size and weight limitation on fourth-class—parcel-post—mail. No doubt this bill will be referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and it

might be well to direct the attention of the House that the proposed bill contains the same provisions that were approved by the House on February 9, 1950, by the Eighty-first Congress, insofar as weight and size reductions on fourth-class mail matter are concerned.

Since 1946, the volume of parcel post has increased enormously and the facilities of the Post Office Department have not been extended to take care of this growing volume of less than carload freight which is being handled at less than the cost of the service rendered. Adequate provisions were contained in H. R. 2945, the postal-rate bill before the Eighty-first Congress to protect farmers and other rural users in the use of parcel post to meet the needs of our citizens served by third- or fourth-class post offices or who reside on rural or star routes. The bill presented today contains the same provisions and rightly so. The purpose of this measure is to restrict not the use, but the abuse of the parcel-post system as presently conducted. Due to this unwarranted and uneconomic condition privately conducted transportation agencies in the field competitive with parcel post are feeling the brunt of this subsidized competition. These private agencies are taxpayers who are being strangled by this unfair governmental competition and naturally they are seeking relief.

In order that the Members of this House may know just what is happening the following table is reproduced here for their information. It will be noted that with each successive increase in the number of parcel-post pieces handled, the yearly deficit incurred in the handling of parcel post has also increased.

Fourth-class mail matter at zone rates constitutes 2 percent of the total number of pieces of mail handled. However, it comprises 60 percent of the total weight and occupies 70 percent of the total transportation space. And according to the Postmaster General, fourth-class mail costs 65 percent of the total cost of handling all mail.

	Number of parcel-post pieces at zone rates	Deficit in handling at zone rates
1946.....	821, 226, 667	\$30, 975, 143
1947.....	936, 025, 683	40, 808, 243
1948.....	962, 517, 251	63, 964, 630
1949.....	1, 048, 920, 633	90, 044, 894

In other words, the more parcel post the post office handles, the greater the deficit. How much longer can this continue? You can supply the answer by enacting the bill here proposed.

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Brooks] is recognized for 15 minutes.

AUDUBON YEAR—JOHN JAMES AUDUBON: MAN OF PURPOSE

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, one of the philosophers of the ages once remarked, "If you do not know where you are going, any road will get you there." But the life without purpose is spent in

the void of time—forgotten by man and slighted in the indexes of history.

I recall the story of one great American life, lived with a purpose that was not crushed by poverty, hardship, or near-starvation. While this life was spent in the most peaceful years of the Republic, it holds much strength and inspiration for our people in this time of international strife.

John James Audubon decided early in his life to contribute to the body of scientific knowledge and to record the great beauties of nature. This choice caused him to lose his family fortune, to forsake the comfortable fireside of his plantation home, and to endure often the pangs of hunger.

Audubon's father was said to be a wealthy French naval officer who had fought in the forces of Lafayette and Rochambeau, and was among George Washington's close personal friends. The family owned estates in Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Santo Domingo, and France.

Had Audubon lived his life without a deep longing to interpret the natural handiwork of God, he could have reveled in soft luxury, but he would have been without the satisfaction of having helped build the arts and institutions of America. Nor would he have then been entitled to the honors of a grateful Nation in the declining years of his life.

Born in Louisiana about 1785, young Audubon was taken to France by his father after the death of his mother in a Santo Dominican insurrection. There he studied unwillingly the vocations and avocations of his father. Nursing his ambition to study the natural wildlife of America, especially ornithology, Audubon returned to this country when 18 years of age.

His work as an artist and as a scientist took him to Pennsylvania, New England, Kentucky, Texas, and back to his native Louisiana. All the while his meager fortune dwindled as increasing interest in the beautiful birds and woodlands kept him from the time and attention which he should have given to his business. Not for years, but for decades, he remained in the forests, capturing the loveliness of nature and setting it down on canvas for all generations.

Death came to this great American in 1851—100 years ago. There is now a bill before Congress authorizing the President to designate this anniversary year as the Audubon Centennial Year. It is one of those rare bills which does not ask money; it asks only that America be reminded again that much of our knowledge of the flora and fauna of our country came from this man of purpose, John James Audubon.

It lies within our responsibility to show that our Government is not forgetful of those who have given their life work to the building and dissemination of culture of many kinds, and in this instance, to honor the man who more than any other drew in a large measure from nature for the enhancement and enlargement of our appreciation of this beautiful land of ours.

AUDUBON, THE LOUISIANIAN

We in Louisiana have always been proud of the great contributions of the State to the cultural life of America. Few States, if any, have seen so many of their sons make such lasting additions to the literature, music, and art of the Nation.

In the first ranks of these great Louisianians is Jean Jacques LaForet Audubon, known to history as John James Audubon.

While there has been much conjecture about the birthplace of this famous artist, we have always been willing to accept Audubon's statement that Louisiana was the land of his birth. A major portion of his work was done at Bayou Sara, La., a lovely river town in West Feliciana Parish that has since been claimed by the encroaching waters of the Mississippi and its population resettled in nearby Saint Francisville. Mandeville, a resort town near New Orleans, is generally believed to be the place of his birth.

Although some groups, including a 1930 Senate committee, have contended that Audubon was born in Haiti and others say that he was the "Lost Dauphin," son of King Louis XVI, of France, the naturalist himself reported otherwise.

In the introduction to the second volume of the Ornithological Biography, Audubon spoke of America as "the land of my birth," and as the country in which "my eyes first opened to light." In this volume he tells of how his father went to Louisiana and married a Spanish lady of beauty and that he was one of three sons born to this union.

In a letter to his wife, written from New Orleans in 1837, Audubon spoke of that city as "my natal city." And, at his Louisiana plantation home, Beechwoods, he occasionally would describe for friends his birthplace near New Orleans.

Frances Hobart Herrick, Audubon's biographer, wrote that the establishment of the naturalist at Bayou Sara in 1821 "forged the link that bound the heart of Audubon to the State which was first in his affections."

The city of New Orleans has honored this great Louisianian with a magnificent park and monument dedicated to his memory. Other cities and places in Louisiana have likewise recognized this great man by naming streets, buildings, and memorials in his honor. The people there know that working from the confines of his Louisiana plantation, he reached out into the bayous and the swamps, filled as they are with the teeming millions of feathered creatures, and made studies and developed knowledge regarding our wildlife in natural state which no one has even attempted to duplicate. Because of his great love of the great outdoors, he was able to draw with a practiced eye in rich colors pictures of our wildlife to enrich the homes and the lives of our people everywhere. Louisiana knows John James Audubon and claims him; appreciates his fascinating, useful, and well-spent life. We want to help bring about the passage of the resolution commemorating 1951 as

a centennial year in honor of this great American—this is Audubon year.

FREE BRIDGE ACROSS THE RIO GRANDE AT DEL RIO, TEX.

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce be discharged from further consideration of the bill (H. R. 3299) to extend the times for commencing and completing the construction of a free bridge across the Rio Grande at or near Del Rio, Tex., that the same be rereferred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

GRAIN FOR INDIA

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Speaker, as India starves, and tragedy is compounded day by day, action by the House of Representatives is stymied by the Rules Committee.

On March 29, President Truman issued the following statement:

India has an urgent need for grain to prevent suffering and starvation. This I pointed out in my message of February 12 to the Congress. My views have not changed. We can, at some sacrifice, spare the grain. We should do so—first, to save human lives; and secondly, to strengthen freedom and democracy in an important area of Asia. Moreover, we should provide the first million tons promptly as a grant. We can then explore in greater detail the situation with respect to the remaining million tons.

India must have 6,000,000 tons of grain in order to meet the famine conditions caused by severe drought. India has made arrangements to buy 4,000,000 tons through ordinary sources, including United States suppliers. To pay for the additional 2,000,000 tons of grain would place too great a strain on the financial resources of India and would prevent the carrying out of its essential development program. In addition, with the provision of grain to India as a grant, the Indian Government will deposit the local currency coming from the distribution of the grain to the Indian people into a special account which can be used for agricultural development projects in India agreed to by us. These projects will help alleviate the recurrence of such conditions as the present.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee carefully investigated this matter and on March 5 favorably reported a bill to provide the grain to India. This bill has bipartisan support. It reflects the desire of the American people to help the Indian people in their present emergency.

Prompt action is vital. The monsoon season occurs in India during the summer. Many roads are then made impassable and grain shipments to remote areas are greatly impaired. Each day's delay after April 1 in starting shipments will leave a serious gap in India's food supply later this summer and cause great suffering. I hope, therefore, that the Congress will enact the necessary legislation as soon as possible after its recess.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, would the gentleman mind pointing out that cotton is bringing more in India than it is in the United States, and that they are quitting the growing of wheat in India and growing more cotton, and asking us to send wheat and give it to them?

Mr. RIBICOFF. I may say to the gentleman from Mississippi that I do not know that to be a fact. I will say, however, that last year India did cut down somewhat her acreage of wheat, but wheat acreage has been increased this year.

Mr. RANKIN. I will say to the gentleman that that is a fact and the statement is correct.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Speaker, I would now like to summarize this bill and analyze some of the major questions relating to it.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

INDIA EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE ACT, H. R. 3017—SUMMARY OF THE BILL AND FACTS ON MAJOR QUESTIONS RELATING TO IT

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Speaker, first, the bill, H. R. 3017 authorizes the appropriation of \$140,000,000 of new funds and the transfer of \$50,000,000 already appropriated to ECA, to furnish 2,000,000 tons of food grains to India as a grant. This food is solely to meet India's emergency need resulting from the succession of natural disasters in 1950.

Only half of this total of \$190,000,000 is to be made available before June 30, 1951. The remainder is to be available only after the beginning of the new fiscal year on July 1, 1951.

India is to pay all costs of transportation—about \$50,000,000.

The bill requires that before aid is delivered, India agrees to the usual provisions of nondiscriminatory distribution, full publicity, and unrestricted observation by United States observers, and to take action to increase production and supply to reduce its future needs. India must also set aside as counterpart funds all receipts of local currencies coming from the sale of the grain through its distribution system. This counterpart is to be used for local currency expenses of the United States in aiding India and in such other ways as may be agreed upon between the United States and India for improving and increasing food production and for projects in the mutual interest of the United States and India.

The program is to be administered by ECA. The appropriate provisions of the ECA Act will apply.

Authority is included for a \$20,000,000 RFC advance to the Maritime Administration to take ships out of the mothball fleet to get the shipments started in time to meet the emergency. This will be repaid out of freight receipts, which will fully cover costs of operation and repayment of this advance.

Provision is made for termination of aid by the President or concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Second. India's need: The Indian people normally have barely enough to eat to sustain life—an average of about 1,700 calories a day compared to 3,200 in the United States. India's 1950-51 crop of food grains—the main part of their diet—was cut by an extraordinary combination of earthquakes, floods, drought and locusts by more than 5,000,000 tons short of the 1949-50 crop, a cut of about 10 percent. India normally imports about 2,000,000 tons of grain and must now import this year 6,000,000 tons.

India is trying to fill its need by buying between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000 tons from outside the United States—substantially all the grain these other countries can export—and 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 tons in the United States. This total of 4,000,000 tons is all for which India now has funds available.

India has asked the United States for assistance in obtaining the necessary additional 2,000,000 tons in this country—the only possible source—on special and easy terms.

Third. United States supply of grains:

The United States can spare the 2,000,000 tons without jeopardizing its own needs. The United States now has on hand about 450,000,000 bushels of wheat. If the full 2,000,000 tons—75,000,000 bushels—were supplied in wheat, the United States would have left 375,000,000 bushels or about 10,000,000 tons, much more than is needed for a safe carry-over. Actually a part of the delivery would be in milo, rice, and beans.

Fourth. India's financial difficulty:

India's total foreign exchange reserves are worth about \$2,000,000,000. Of this a minimum of about \$1,250,000,000 is required to back India's currency and to finance her foreign trade. This leaves about \$750,000,000 available for all other expenditures.

India is desperately in need of economic development—not to improve the pitiful standards of living of her people, but just to keep them from deteriorating. To do this, India has worked out a 6-year, minimum development program. This program will cost the equivalent of nearly \$4,000,000,000. Of this about \$1,700,000,000 must be in foreign exchange to buy necessary imports.

If this plan is to succeed, it will require India's total available foreign exchange assets of about \$750,000,000—and more.

India now owes the International Monetary Fund \$100,000,000 and the International Bank \$62,500,000. It is absolutely essential to India's development that its ability to obtain further external loans should not be reduced. India has no funds and no possibility of earning funds which will not be desperately needed for her vital development program and which could be spared to pay a debt for food. India is already exporting all the manganese, mica, burlap, and other major export commodities which her mines and industries can produce without great additional outlays of capital—which India does not have. India

could not give the United States this manganese and other strategic materials in barter or to pay a debt because the proceeds of the sale of all such materials, the bulk of which already go to the United States, are already being used and will need to be used to pay for her imports of food and other essentials.

The food which India must have will be eaten this year. It will save countless lives. But it will not directly increase India's ability to pay a debt made for it. A loan of this kind for consumables is considered unsound practice by both private bankers and governments.

It is plain from these hard facts that if India is compelled to go further in debt for the food it needs now, its ability to carry out its minimum development plan will be seriously endangered. This would prevent India from creating the conditions which would enable it to meet similar emergencies in the future. As President Truman said in his message:

Unless India can undertake such a program, its economic troubles will increase, the standard of living of its people will continue to decline, and there will be no end to its history of recurrent famine.

Fifth. Why a grant is provided: India's request was for assistance in providing the needed 2,000,000 tons on special and easy terms. This request includes a loan or a grant. It is for the United States to determine in its own interest what the reply should be.

In view of the factors set out above, the executive branch concluded that there are no terms upon which repayment of a loan by India would be easy—or in fact could be made without gravely threatening its future stability. The President's message to the Congress therefore called for a substantial portion of the grain to be promptly made available as a grant. The message recommended that the Congress authorize the full 2,000,000 tons and appropriate funds now for only the first million tons. This would avert the imminent danger and provide time to explore in greater detail the need for the balance of the Indian request and to determine the best way of supplying the amounts needed. This conception is written into the bill by the provision in section 3 that only half the funds authorized may be available before June 30, 1951—the remaining half only thereafter.

The President's recommendation, which is supported by the testimony of the witnesses before the Foreign Affairs Committees, is based: First, on India's inability to repay a loan without seriously injuring the essential needs of her economy; and, second, on the principle followed by the United States in foreign aid since World War II—in the light of post-World War I experience—that in such circumstances a loan does not make economic good sense and help should be given by grant if it is to be given at all.

Sixth. The interest of the United States: The primary interest of the United States in this situation is humanitarian—to prevent mass suffering among the Indian people. Former President Hoover stated: "This does not fall

into the category of politics; it falls into the category of Christianity."

At the same time it is of highest importance to the United States that democratic government survive and flourish in India—the country of the greatest land mass, population, and potential strength in free Asia. Despite the political differences between the United States and India over the situation in the Far East, relations between the United States and India are fundamentally good and friendly. Widespread chaos in India, resulting either from failure to have sufficient food in this crisis or from failure to carry out the development plan on schedule, could seriously weaken the confidence of the masses in the central government and the democratic system.

Because of the importance to the United States of a stable, friendly India, it is in our national interest that in making the grain available, India should not be saddled with a debt which would curtail or postpone the essential development program.

There is an additional intangible but highly important reason why a grant would be far more valuable to the United States than its cost. This is the first official request India has made to the United States for help. The response of the United States will be watched with the utmost interest by all the people of Asia who have seen the response which the United States has made in recent years to the nations of Europe for economic and military aid. Although a long-term loan would make the food available to India, it would do so only at the expense of her development plan. The United States knows this and the people of India and Asia know we know it. If the United States nevertheless responds to India's request by making food available only on a loan basis, it would inevitably be cited both by Soviet propagandists and by influences in India seeking to pull India away from the free nations toward the Soviet Union and Red China, as demonstrating a lack of true friendship for India and needs of her people. On the other hand, a grant by the United States in India's time of great emergency, recognizing her need for every bit of her foreign exchange to carry out her development plan, would demonstrate the friendship and understanding of the American people for India and would enormously strengthen the effectiveness in India of the large number of members of the Indian Parliament and public who believe in closer relationships with the United States.

A gift of food in this situation would not only be a great humanitarian act, it would also be a dramatic act of the greatest importance and benefit to the United States in our relations with Asia—its returns in friendship and confidence would far exceed its cost.

Seventh. India's attitude toward the United States: The attitude of the Indian Government and people toward the United States is fundamentally friendly. Attempts are being made to prove the contrary by quoting certain statements contained in recent speeches

delivered in Texas by Bharatan Kuma-rappa, an Indian representative on the U. N. Social Commission. These speeches were made by him as an individual, not as an official of the Indian Government. The Indian Government has publicly disavowed any responsibility for these speeches.

There are unquestionably many people in India who feel that India should side with the Soviet Union. There are many more who, despite their deep suspicion of the West resulting from centuries of foreign domination, are friendly to the United States and feel that India's best interests lie in close association with the free nations of the world. The following statement which 43 members of the Indian Parliament cabled to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate are typical of the views of these many friends of the United States in India:

Undersigned members of Indian Parliament belonging to various parties, groups, and states, request you place this message before honorable Members Senate/House of Representatives of the United States.

Consideration by your House of proposal for gift to India of food grains to help this country tide over her present shortage and mitigate distress to our people will be watched keenly by many here. We are amongst those in India who are opposed to totalitarianism in all its forms and recognize that liberty and integrity of free countries of Asia including our own are today menaced by Communist expansionism. We have on the other hand watched with appreciation great effort for welfare of free world embodied in Marshall aid and point 4 program. We would like to see United States and India cooperate with countries, commonwealth and other democracies in securing world peace through collective security.

Convinced as we are that bulk of Indian people believe in democratic way of life and recognize in democracies of world their natural friends and allies, we should be happy to see our fellow legislators in United States Congress give their approval to proposal now before them moved by needs of people of India and uninfluenced by momentary differences of policy. We are confident such gesture of solidarity on part of representatives of American people toward people of India would strengthen friendship and understanding between our two countries and bring them closer together.

Statements that Prime Minister Nehru has disavowed the views expressed by these members of Parliament are untrue. What the Prime Minister did was criticize the procedure by which members of the Parliament addressed their views to the United States Congress. His own views were expressed when he said to Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review of Literature:

Too much reliance on outside help means that you do not grow up properly, that you do not strengthen yourself. That is true, but in the matter of wheat, we have wanted it; we want it badly; we are facing a very severe crisis. We don't shout about it quite so much perhaps as we might; it is unbecoming to shout. But the fact is that our need is very great. We welcome the suggestions made in America—in the Congress there—that a large quantity of wheat will be coming, and we shall look forward to it.

Prompt action of H. R. 3017 will strengthen the position of Indian friends

of the United States. Inaction, delay, or substitution of a loan for a grant will strengthen the position of those Indians who advocate closer relations with the Soviet Union.

Eighth. Method of distribution: H. R. 3017 provides for a gift of food to India to be distributed to the people through the rationing system. Some people have feared that this may not get food to the needy. Actually, such fears are groundless. In the first place, India's rationing system is one of the world's best. It covers 125,000,000 of India's people in cities and towns who cannot possibly buy enough food in the open market. Secondly, the rationing system is not operated for profit and grain is distributed through it at prices low enough to enable even the lowest income groups to buy their rations. Therefore, as long as the system is maintained by adequate supply of grain, very few people will be unable to pay for their rations. Thirdly, those who lack even the small sums required to buy rationed grain are traditionally cared for by their family or their village. The Indian family is a large and closely knit organization and all of its members have an obligation to help other members of the family who are in need. The inhabitants of an Indian village have the same sense of obligation to their fellow villagers. Fourthly, in the event that a locality suffers a disaster of such magnitude that the family and the village cannot care for the needy because almost all the local people are without resources, the Government provides aid. Over the years there has been established a famine code in India. Under it the Government insures that food grain is delivered to the stricken area and immediately commences public works projects to provide employment and wages for the inhabitants to buy food.

The two witnesses best qualified to comment on this matter, Rev. Vincent McCauley, appearing in behalf of the Catholic Welfare Organizations and with long experience in India, and Dr. Franklin C. Fry, representing the National Council of Churches of Christ, who has just returned from India, both vigorously opposed any idea of taking any portion of this food out of the well-operating rationing system for free distribution—even though their own organizations are actually engaged in charitable work in India.

Ninth. Counterpart funds: Although H. R. 3017 provides for a gift of food to India without payment in foreign exchange, it requires the Indian Government to pay into a special account all the local currency it receives from the distribution of the food through its rationing system. These funds are to be used to pay all local currency expenses of the United States in aiding India. They are also to be used as agreed upon by the United States and India for the benefit of the Indian people in programs to increase food production and in other projects and programs in the mutual interest of the two countries.

This program makes American aid doubly effective—first to meet the emer-

gency need for food, and, second, to help the Indian people in their own efforts to prevent such emergencies arising in the future. These funds can be used to establish agricultural extension services, develop and distribute more productive seed stocks, teach better farming methods, improve distribution of agricultural products, dig tube wells and increase water supply to farmers, control malaria and other diseases which cut down the working energy of farmers, develop mineral resources needed by India and the United States and otherwise strengthen the Indian economy. The ECA will be responsible for seeing to the usefulness of all such projects.

Tenth. Transport: Inland transport of the additional 2,000,000 tons will be difficult but can be handled without impairing other important shipments to the Korean front and elsewhere.

Ocean transport can be handled by making vessels available from our large mothball fleet. The bill authorizes an advance of funds from the RFC to the Maritime Administration to reactivate and operate these ships. This advance will be repaid out of receipts from the operation of the ships.

Eleventh. Use of grain by Indians: The masses of the Indian people eat wheat in the form of coarse grinding called "atta." In a few large cities some of the wheat is preground and issued in the ration system in this form. Elsewhere, the grain is issued whole and is ground into "atta" by small village mills or milled or pounded in households.

The Indian people are unaccustomed to flour and do not know how to use it. Moreover, the "atta" is milled at an extraction rate of 95 percent, an important nutritional factor in a diet predominantly composed of grain.

Any requirement that a part of the grain provided by H. R. 3017 be delivered as flour, would to that extent diminish the helpfulness of the gift.

Twelfth. Strategic materials:

Manganese and mica: India shipped to the United States in 1950 585,971 tons of manganese, and 260,000 tons of mica, about three-fourths of its total exports. The bulk of the remainder went to the United Kingdom. These shipments are continuing. There is a current rumor that there has been a cut in manganese shipments in 1951. This is not true. From January 1 to March 3, 110,000 long tons have been shipped. This is a rate about 10 percent greater than the average in 1950. Arrivals in January were about 81,000 long tons. Official statistics for arrivals in February have not yet been completed; however, shipments in January which might be expected for February delivery were about 62,000 tons—and as much as 16,000 tons is known to have been received by only one United States company. It is a fact, though, that exports are being hampered by lack of shipping. One of the important beneficial results of the grain program would be to make available ships to carry manganese on the return trip.

Monazite: In 1946 the then independent state of Travancore instituted an embargo on all exports of monazite, a source of thorium and several rare

earths, which embargo was subsequently incorporated in the Indian Atomic Energy Act and now applies also to other atomic energy materials. The State Department, however, constantly has been trying to arrange with the Indian Government to lift the embargo for exports to the United States and efforts to this end are still continuing. The total value of monazite sands which might be exported would not amount to much more than a million dollars a year, which would have a very minor effect on India's balance of payments. Only one American company is a substantial refiner of monazite. This company sells about half of its current output of refined thorium salts to such ordinary industries as the gas-mantle industry. The remainder is taken by the Atomic Energy Commission. This company has on hand as the result of the processing of monazite for its rare earth constituents, waste material containing several hundred tons of thorium. Current demand for thorium has not been great enough to warrant refining these waste materials for their thorium content.

Monazite is also the source of certain rare earth elements, some of which are valuable to industry and for the defense program. The Indian Government is now arranging to refine these elements in India, and there is hope that they may be available for United States purchase in the near future.

Any amendment to the food bill which would interfere with India's independent control over its own resources by compelling the Indian Government to lift its embargo as a precondition to delivery of food under the bill, would not only result in the lasting hatred of India but might even result in the Indian Government choosing to refuse the terms, despite the suffering which would follow. Should this occur, it would take decades to restore the destruction which United States prestige would suffer in India and all Asia.

The way to obtain a lifting of the Indian embargo is not through an attempt at compulsion, but through negotiation in a friendly atmosphere of the kind which could be created by the food grant.

Thirteenth. The princely wealth of India: Before India's independence, the princes, nizams, and maharajahs who headed the princely states had full control not only over their own property but also over the property of the state. It was this property which constituted the bulk of the princely wealth of India. This property was primarily lands and palaces. It included gold and jewels which were largely in the form of works of art and ceremonial symbols and regalia of the state.

The princely states have now been incorporated in the Indian Republic and the greatest part of the wealth formerly controlled by the princes has been taken from them and given to the new states. The princes, who remain as symbolic officials in the new states, have been made settlement of a very small portion of their old holdings. The palaces have become public buildings and the lands are being distributed under the land-

reform plans. The jewels are held as heirlooms and treasures of the state and used in state ceremonies. There is little if any market for these articles in their present form. To be sold they would have to be broken up and melted down. This would destroy much of their value. To compel the destruction and sale of these national treasures and antiquities would not bring a realistic solution to India's financial difficulties and would create a lasting resentment among the masses of the Indian people which would seriously affect the good will we are striving to foster.

Fourteenth. Jute and burlap: India is a major source of jute and burlap for the United States—almost 80 percent coming from India in 1950. The jute industry is also a major source of foreign-exchange earnings for India. India imposes an export duty on jute products. Burlap prices are now high and it is being said by some that this is the result of the Indian export duty. This is not true.

The underlying cause of the present high price in the United States is the fact that the demand here has outstripped the supply. While United States demand for burlap has risen since the Korean war, the supply decreased because of the Indo-Pakistan trade impasse. The supply problem should be alleviated by the new Indo-Pakistan trade agreement of February 25, which provides that Pakistan will supply India with 1,000,000 bales of raw jute before June 30 of this year and an additional 2,500,000 bales in the succeeding 12 months.

The direct cause of the present high price of jute goods in the United States is the action of the United States market alone. Statistics given in United States burlap publications show that the high price in the United States bears no relationship to the Indian export price, including the export tax. The spot market in the United States just before the outbreak of hostilities in Korea was about 16 cents per yard for 40-inch 10-ounce burlap. By late October this rose to about 31 cents and by March 10, 1951, it more than doubled to about 34 cents. Meanwhile, the landed price in New York, including India's export tax, remained constant at a fraction less than 16 cents until late October. In the latter parts of October and November, India twice raised its export tax in the hope of eliminating illegal transactions by narrowing the gap between India's export ceiling price and the market sales price. As a result of these increases in export tax the landed cost in New York rose to less than 23 cents. As of March 10, 1951, the American mark-up of spot market price over landed cost was still approximately 12 cents—or about 50 percent of the landed cost, in contrast with the pre-Korean mark-up of about one-half cent or about 3 percent of the landed cost.

India removed controls on exported jute prices on March 12. In what is now a free market it is to be expected that Indian exporters will raise their asking price to a level in line with the American spot market price.

It is clear from these facts that the very high price of burlap to the American farmers and other consumers is a result of market forces in the United States and does not result from the Indian export tax.

Fifteenth. Effects of the Indo-Pakistan trade impasse: It has been said that the Indian food shortage and India's inability to pay for its full import need of 6,000,000 tons of food grains is a consequence of the former trade impasse between India and Pakistan. This is not true.

Allegations have been made that the food shortage resulted from, first, failure of India to buy wheat which was available in Pakistan in 1950, and, second, to the diversion of land from food grains to jute and cotton. As to the first point: In early 1950, India's imports were based upon estimated requirements to keep the rationing system functioning properly. Had India then bought the Pakistan wheat, it would have correspondingly reduced its purchases from other sources. During the course of the year Pakistan sold its grain elsewhere. By the time the natural catastrophes made it evident that more grain was needed, the Pakistan grain was not available.

As to the second point: India increased its jute acreage only some 150,000 acres and its cotton acreage by about 1,200,000 acres in 1950. Not all of this increased acreage was at the expense of food grains, and the total decrease of food-grain production resulting from this diversion probably did not exceed 175,000 tons. The foreign exchange value of these cash crops made it possible to buy grain abroad equivalent to all that could have been produced on this land—and more too.

India's financial difficulties have been attributed to the almost complete stoppage of legal trade with Pakistan during 1950. There is no questioning the fact that both countries suffered from this trade impasse. Had normal trade occurred, the two countries would have been in a better general economic position as 1951 began. However, it is highly doubtful that India would have had larger foreign exchange resources available to buy food grain as it normally runs a deficit in its trade account with Pakistan.

In any case, India and Pakistan signed comprehensive trade agreement on February 25, 1951, and the reestablishment of normal trade patterns can be expected. Under the terms of the agreement, India is to receive 325,000 tons of food grain from Pakistan in 1951. This grain will be included in the Indian purchase program of 4,000,000 tons. It will not reduce India's need for the 2,000,000 tons requested.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. ROONEY) from April 2 through April 6, inclusive, on account of official business.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. ROONEY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and

include an article appearing in *Il Progresso Italo-Americano*.

Mr. CELLER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks on three subjects.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and include newspaper editorials.

Mr. MAGEE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a newspaper article from the *St. Joseph (Mo.) News-Press*.

Mr. RANKIN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a statement by Hon. Homer B. Ketchum, national legislative director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Mr. BURDICK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.

Mr. GRAHAM asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include the returns on a questionnaire he recently circulated to the householders in his district.

Mr. VELDE (at the request of Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin) was given permission to extend his remarks.

Mr. KERSTEN of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances.

Mr. MORANO asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article from the *Greenwich Times*, Greenwich, Conn.

Mr. JUDD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances, in each to include additional matter.

Mr. VAN PELT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances, in each to include additional matter.

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in three instances, in each to include additional matter.

Mr. ANGELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article.

Mr. PERKINS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

SENATE ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to an enrolled joint resolution of the Senate of the following title:

S. J. Res. 40. Joint resolution to extend the time for the filing of certain claims under the War Claims Act of 1948.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. STANLEY, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on the following dates present to the President, for his approval, bills and joint resolutions of the House of the following titles:

On March 22, 1951:

H. R. 609. A bill for the relief of Carroll L. Vickers;

H. R. 2339. A bill to clarify the immigration status of certain aliens; and

H. J. Res. 173. Joint resolution to amend and extend the provisions of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, as amended.

On March 24, 1951:

H. J. Res. 207. Joint resolution making additional appropriations for the District of Columbia for the fiscal year 1951, and for other purposes.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. PRIEST. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 2 o'clock and 7 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, April 3, 1951, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

325. A letter from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting the report of the Secretary of Defense, together with the reports of the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, for the 6 months from July 1 to December 31, 1950, pursuant to section 202 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; to the Committee on Armed Services.

326. A letter from the Chairman, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, transmitting copies of the report on the Government-owned tin smelter at Texas City, Tex., and the program for the purchase and sale of tin metal in the United States, pursuant to Public Law 125, Eightieth Congress; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

327. A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled, "A bill to remove the limitation on the numerical strength of the White House Police force"; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

328. A letter from the president, Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled, "A bill to amend the act entitled 'an act to control the manufacture, transportation, possession, and sale of alcoholic beverages in the District of Columbia,' approved January 24, 1934, as amended"; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

329. A letter from the chief scout executive, Boy Scouts of America, transmitting the Forty-first Annual Report of the Boy Scouts of America for the year 1950, pursuant to the act of June 15, 1916, entitled "An act to incorporate the Boy Scouts of America, and for other purposes" (H. Doc. No. 97); to the Committee on Education and Labor and ordered to be printed with illustrations.

330. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting audit report of Government Services, Inc., for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1950, pursuant to a request of the Board of Trustees, Government Services, Inc.; to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

331. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting the audit report on the Inland Waterways Corporation for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950, pursuant to the Government Corporation Control Act (31 U. S. C. 841) (H. Doc. No. 98); to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments and ordered to be printed.

332. A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior, transmitting copies of legislation passed by the Municipal Council of St. Thomas and St. John, and by the Municipal Council of St. Croix, pursuant to section 16 of the Organic Act of the Virgin Islands of

the United States approved June 22, 1936; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

333. A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting copies of orders of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service suspending deportation as well as a list of the persons involved, pursuant to the act of Congress approved July 1, 1948 (Public Law 863), amending subsection (c) of section 19 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended (8 U. S. C. 155 (c)); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

334. A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting copies of the orders of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service granting the application for permanent residence filed by the subjects of such orders, pursuant to section 4 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

335. A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting copies of orders entered in cases where the ninth proviso to section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 (8 U. S. C. 136), was exercised in behalf of such aliens, pursuant to section 6 (b) of the act of October 16, 1918, as amended by section 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Public Law 831, 81st Cong.); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

336. A letter from the Acting Postmaster General, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled, "A bill to amend certain laws relating to the submission of postmasters' accounts under oath, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

337. A letter from the Chairman, United States Tariff Commission, transmitting a copy of the Third Annual Report on the Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, pursuant to Executive Order 10082; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

338. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year 1951 in the amount of \$21,500 for the legislative branch (H. Doc. No. 99); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

339. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting the Fourteenth Quarterly Report by the Secretary of Commerce on Export Control, pursuant to the Export Control Act of 1949; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

340. A letter from the Secretary, Philippine War Damage Commission, transmitting the Final and Ninth Semiannual Report of the United States Philippine War Damage Commission, pursuant to the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

341. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled, "A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to compromise, adjust, or cancel certain debts of individual Indians and Indian tribal organizations, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

342. A letter from the Chairman, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, transmitting a report that under Executive Order 9942, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is producing and selling synthetic rubber, pursuant to section 9 (a) of the Rubber Act of 1948 (Public Law 469, 80th Cong.), as extended and amended by Public Law 575, Eighty-first Congress; to the Committee on Armed Services.

343. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting proposed revisions in budget estimates for the fiscal year 1952 involving a decrease in the amount of \$5,317,000 for the Department of Commerce, in the form of amendments to the budget for said fiscal year (H. Doc. No. 100);

to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

344. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a draft of proposed provisions pertaining to the fiscal year 1952 for the Panama Canal, in the form of an amendment to the budget for said fiscal year (H. Doc. No. 101); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

345. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year 1951 in the amount of \$51,300,000 for the Atomic Energy Commission (H. Doc. No. 102); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

346. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year 1952 in the amount of \$151,000 for the United States Soldiers' Home, in the form of an amendment to the budget for said fiscal year (H. Doc. No. 103); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

347. A letter from the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, transmitting a stipulation signed by the attorneys for the contestant and the contestee in the contested election case of W. Kingsland Macy against Ernest Greenwood for a seat in the Eighty-second Congress from the First Congressional District of the State of New York (H. Doc. No. 104); to the Committee on House Administration and ordered to be printed.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. SIMPSON of Pennsylvania: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 3196. A bill to amend section 153 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code; without amendment (Rept. No. 284). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. DOUGHTON: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 3336. A bill to suspend certain import taxes on copper; without amendment (Rept. No. 285). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ANDERSON of California:

H. R. 3453. A bill to provide for the common defense and security of the United States and to permit the more effective utilization of manpower resources of the United States by authorizing universal military training and service, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. CELLER:

H. R. 3454. A bill granting to physically handicapped individuals a special deduction, for income-tax purposes, of \$600; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H. R. 3455. A bill to amend section 4202 of title 18, United States Code, relating to parole of Federal prisoners; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. COUDERT:

H. R. 3456. A bill to permit the postponement of income tax with respect to a portion of earned net income paid to a restricted retirement fund; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HAGEN:

H. R. 3457. A bill to supplement the Federal Aid Road Act, approved July 11, 1916, as amended and supplemented, to authorize regular appropriations for the construction of rural local roads, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. MCCORMACK:

H. R. 3458. A bill to provide for the granting of financial aid to Israel; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. PATMAN:

H. R. 3459. A bill to amend the Federal Credit Union Act; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts (by request):

H. R. 3460. A bill to encourage employment of veterans with pensionable or compensable service-connected disabilities through Federal reimbursement to any employer, insurer, or fund, of amounts of workmen's compensation paid on account of disability or death arising out of such employment; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. SAYLOR:

H. R. 3461. A bill to provide a method for the advancement of certain substitute rural carriers in the postal field service to the position of regular rural carrier; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. SMITH of Virginia:

H. R. 3462. A bill to authorize the delivery of sewerage from communities in Virginia into the sewerage system of the District of Columbia and the treatment of such sewerage in the District of Columbia sewerage treatment plant, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. VINSON:

H. R. 3463. A bill to authorize the transfer of certain naval vessels; to the Committee on Armed Services.

H. R. 3464. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with the construction of certain naval installations and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. BURNSIDE:

H. R. 3465. A bill to readjust size and weight limitations on fourth-class (parcel post) mail; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. FORAND:

H. R. 3466. A bill to amend the Social Security Act, as amended, by increasing the amount of wages and net earnings from self-employment permitted without suspension of benefit payments under the Federal old-age and survivors insurance system, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LATHAM:

H. R. 3467. A bill to provide aviation education for certain students in senior high schools; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. MULTER:

H. R. 3468. A bill to amend the Federal Employees' Compensation Act to extend coverage to certain persons engaged in civil defense; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. SMITH of Mississippi:

H. R. 3469. A bill to require that a more adequate statement of the ingredients in certain insecticides and other economic poisons be contained on the labels thereof; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. VINSON:

H. R. 3470. A bill authorizing the procurement of land for the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. HILLINGS:

H. J. Res. 219. Joint resolution to permit articles imported from foreign countries for the purpose of exhibition at the World Trans-

portation Fair, to be held at Arcadia in Los Angeles County, Calif., to be admitted without payment of tariff, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SMITH of Mississippi:

H. Con. Res. 86. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the meetings of the United Nations Assembly and similar world organizations of which the United States is a member, should be opened with prayer; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. SHEEHAN:

H. Con. Res. 87. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should request General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur to return to the United States and to report on the Korean situation at a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives; to the Committee on Rules.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

By Mr. GOODWIN: Memorial of Massachusetts Legislature for Members of Congress from Massachusetts to reduce to 63 years the age for eligibility for old-age assistance; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GREENWOOD: Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 55, adopted by the New York State Legislature, memorializing Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture to continue without change the present agreement in regard to the joint regulation of the New York milk marketing area; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. HOLMES: Memorial of State of Washington, House of Representatives, house joint memorial No. 2, urging favorable legislative action to provide for statehood for Territories of Alaska and Hawaii; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Also, memorial of State of Washington, House of Representatives, house joint memorial No. 8, urging extension of time for period of at least 2 years in which Indian tribes may file claims before the Indian Claims Commission; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts: Memorial of the General Court of Massachusetts, advocating that the eligibility age for old-age assistance be reduced to 63 years; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the General Court of Massachusetts, urging enactment of legislation to curb war profiteering; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of California, relative to the immigration of Basque sheepherders pursuant to Public Law 587 of the Eighty-first Congress, and to appropriate funds for national civil defense; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of California, relative to requesting the Congress to reject H. R. 2982, relating to second-class mailing matter; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of California, relative to the reactivation of the Defense Highway Act of 1941; to the Committee on Public Works.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Idaho, relative to appropriations for the Albeni Falls project; and to regulate and control the taking of salmon commercially from the Columbia River; and to expedite the flow of Federal moneys to the small mine owners and operators in the State of Idaho; to the Committee on Public Works.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Kansas, relative to taxes on incomes,

inheritances, and gifts; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Maryland, relative to ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the terms of office of the President of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Maryland, relative to urging the Congress of the United States to distribute tax burdens more equitably; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States urging enactment of legislation to curb war profiteering; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Montana, relative to the Indians of the State of Montana, relating to all existing Federal laws which discriminate against such Indians, etc.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Nevada, memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States to provide sufficient funds to carry on an effective program in the 1952 fiscal year to combat the threat of the halibut weevil to the West's livestock industry; to the Committee on Appropriations.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of New Mexico, relating to old-age assistance, aid to the blind, and aid to dependent children; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of New Mexico, requesting recognition of United States Highway No. 85 as a defense highway and officially declare it to be Pan-American Central Highway; to the Committee on Public Works.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Washington, relative to requesting enactment of legislation to extend the time within which Indian tribes may file claims before the Indian Claims Commission for a period of at least 2 years from August 13, 1951; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Washington, memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States to take such action as is necessary to provide for statehood for the present Territory of Alaska and the present Territory of Hawaii; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, relative to requesting the enactment of such legislation as may be necessary to effectuate the development of the proposed Mississippi River Parkway; to the Committee on Public Works.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii, relative to requesting the Congress of the United States to enact legislation providing for segregation, care, maintenance, and treatment of persons afflicted with Hansen's disease; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii, relative to residents of the Territory of Hawaii serving in the Armed Forces and exempting them from all Federal taxes becoming due while in the service; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ADDONIZIO:

H. R. 3471. A bill for the relief of Severio Tavella; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3472. A bill to recognize the public service of, and extend certain benefits to,

Oscar Bitchman; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. CHELF:

H. R. 3473. A bill for the relief of Valentina Askold; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JOHNSON:

H. R. 3474. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Yuen Shee; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McCARTHY:

H. R. 3475. A bill for the relief of George Lahood;

H. R. 3476. A bill for the relief of Anastazia Bolek; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MULTER:

H. R. 3477. A bill for the relief of David Mordka Borenstajn, Itta Borenstajn nee Schipper, and Fella Borenstajn; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'TOOLE:

H. R. 3478. A bill for the relief of Avelino Rodriguez Pego; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3479. A bill for the relief of Alfredo M. Gerardo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

167. By Mr. GOODWIN: Resolution of Malden (Mass.) mayor and city council opposing any proposed bill for the levying of a tax on State and municipal bonds; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

168. By Mr. GRAHAM: Petition of 39 members of the congregation of the First Reformed Presbyterian Church of Beaver Falls, Pa., opposing the passage of a universal military training bill that does not include the recommendations of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training calling for limitation of the opportunities for the purchase by trainees of any alcoholic beverages, including beer, through (a) prohibiting the sale thereof to them on any military, naval, or other camp reservation, or in any post exchange, ship's store, or canteen, (b) declaring "off limits" to trainees all taverns, taprooms, and similar facilities whose principal business is selling alcoholic beverages; to the Committee on Armed Services.

169. Also, petition of 54 members of the Geneva Reformed Presbyterian Church of Beaver Falls, Pa., urging that no measure for universal military training be passed that does not include the recommendations of the President's Advisory Commission on UMT calling for limitation of the opportunities for the purchase by trainees of any alcoholic beverage, including beer, through (a) prohibiting the sale thereof to them on any military, naval, or other camp reservation, or in any post exchange, ship's store, or canteen, (b) declaring "off limits" to trainees all taverns, taprooms, and similar facilities whose principal business is selling alcoholic beverages; to the Committee on Armed Services.

170. Also, petition of 33 members of the College Hill United Presbyterian Church of Beaver Falls, Pa., that no measure for universal military training be passed that does not include the recommendations of the President's Advisory Commission on UMT calling for limitation of the opportunities for the purchase by trainees of any alcoholic beverage including beer, through (a) prohibiting the sale thereof to them on any military, naval, or other camp reservation, or in any post exchange, ship's store, or canteen, (b) declaring "off limits" to trainees all taverns, taprooms, and similar facilities whose principal business is selling alcoholic beverages; to the Committee on Armed Services.

171. By Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin: Resolution of the Lithuanian Americans of Kenosha, Wis., reaffirming their loyalty to the principles of American democracy, pledge of

wholehearted support of the administration in its efforts to resist the Communist forces of aggression, and to achieve an international peace founded on principles of freedom and justice; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

172. Resolution of the Kenosha County Dental Society reaffirming faith in the American, voluntary way to safeguard the Nation's health and insure against the costs of illness and unequivocally oppose any form of national compulsory health insurance as a dangerous step toward complete acceptance of a planned, socialistic economy; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

173. By the SPEAKER: Petition of Miss Ruth E. Sherburne, clerk, First Congregational Church, Amherst, Mass., relative to the famine which threatens thousands of the people of India; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

174. Also, petition of M. L. Meyer, secretary, Business Men's Association of the East North Side, Pittsburgh, Pa., relative to going on record in favor of a 17-percent annual pay increase for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

175. Also, petition of C. Yohner, secretary, VFWA, Local No. 100, Pittsburgh, Pa., relative to going on record in favor of a 17-percent annual pay increase for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

176. Also, petition of E. M. Reynolds, secretary, Allegheny Aerie No. 827 FOE, Pittsburgh, Pa., relative to going on record in favor of a 17-percent annual pay increase for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

177. Also, petition of R. J. Maur, secretary, Allegheny Lodge No. 339, BPOE, N. S., Pittsburgh, Pa., relative to going on record in favor of a 17-percent annual pay increase for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

178. Also, petition of James Burnham, Bombay, India, relative to the famine threatening millions in Bihar; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

179. By Mr. FORAND: Resolution of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island memorializing Congress in respect to the drastic change in the delineation of the purport of the Italian Peace Treaty, thereby removing the barrier to the size of the armed forces Italy may maintain for the later defense of Western Europe, approved March 15, 1951; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

180. Also, resolution of the City Council of the City of Providence memorializing the Members of the Congress of the United States of America from the State of Rhode Island to urge passage of such legislation as would permit the active participation of Italy in the program for defense against aggression; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

SENATE

TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 1951

(Legislative day of Monday, March 26, 1951)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Eternal God, we thank Thee for this shrine of the Nation's faith where, facing vast human issues committed to our hands, relying on a strength and a wisdom not our own, we come humbly to confess: In God we trust. In all the perplexities of these confused days may